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ABSTRACT
This dissertation reviews the impact of "coordination reforms"
on improving public service delivery to disadvantaged groups. It
describes and analyzes the significant issues, problems, and advantages
connected with a coordinative approach to federal policy and program
implementation. This study asserts that coordination, properly struc-
tured by task force relationships and interagency agreements among
federal agencies (both laterally--across different agency boundaries and
vertically--between different levels of government, i.e., federal state,
and local) can provide disadvantaged groups with bargaining advantages
for overcoming bureaucratic barriers--fragmentation, bureaucratic iner-
tia ("red-tape") , resistance to change, inadequate resource allocation
(i.e., limited staff, funds, technical services, etc.) to individual
agencies--that hinder the use of federal programs to solve contemporary
problems. A case study approach is used to investigate this thesis.
The research examines a case study dealing with developing and
operating a National Rural Cable TV Development Task Force to coordinate
and implement more effectively federal policies and programs in communi-
cations and economic development. This particular task force is signifi-
cant because it was conceived and initiated by an advocacy organization,
to support their clients in acquiring public services. A major case study
of this Task Force effort was possible because I served as a principal
staff member of the Task Force. My role as a staff member placed me in a
unique position to be a participant-observer of the Task Force's entire
development and operation.
The case study reveals that special coordination mechanisms can
help increase the chances of disadvantaged groups (i.e., any disenfran-
chised group that feels powerless in dealing with public bureaucracies--
including ethnic minorities, the poor, and rural inhabitants) receiving
public services; by attacking bureaucratic barriers i.e., disjointed pro-
gram activity, unresponsiveness, untimely delays, etc. encountered in
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public program implementation. The study concludes that successful coor-
dination strategies by special groups, e.g., advocacy organizations,
minorities, etc. require: the use of regularized government action chan-
nels g, a task force, interagency agreements, etc. to mobilize project
support by key "inside contacts" and other political actors; a designated
task force "coordinator" empowered to enforce compliance with mandated
objectives; pre-coordination assessments of agency cultural determinants
that prescribe organizational behavior (i.e., ways of doing things) that
may have to be violated and based on this analysis, and the timely
involvement and motivation of key holders of organizational power (eg,
career civil servants) to support the process.
The information in this study indicates that coordinative
mechanisms can be a desirable supplement to the activities of advocacy
organizations seeking to insure disadvantaged groups greater leverage in
public program implementation. Coordination mechanisms provide disad-
vantaged groups with the ability to exert greater influence upon the
public service delivery process, under circumstances where normally such
groups occupy a passive role, with little participation in decision
making and with little or no access to redress mechanisms to control
service delivery inequities. Finally, this study offers some basic notes
toward a theory of coordination. These notes, as well as the study in its
entirety, are meant to serve as a general reference for forming some basic
theoretical assumptions about the wider application of coordinative
approaches to improving public policy and program implementation. It is
hoped that this study will lead to greater understanding, planning, and
development of this implementation strategy.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind
Title: Chairman Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Problem
Disadvantaged groups have not fared well in successfully lobbying
the government system for a "fair share" of services. This is especially
true in comparing such groups with the more politically powerful groups,
who exercise great influence and persuasion over public programs by vir-
tue of their possession of certain bargaining advantages--owed political
favors, a network of government contacts, position, wealth, etc. Profes-
sional observers--politicians, scholars, public advocacy organizations,
et al of the public sector--have noted that governmental fragmentation
(i.e., the proliferation of a confusing web of federal programs and agen-
cies) and the disjointed behavior of agencies precipitate and exacerbate
the inability of disadvantaged groups to gain access to public services
without support.
It has been recognized that there are too many separate federal
programs, all at the same level and among different agency levels, offer-
ing support for services of the same kind, or for the same clientele, all
with varying funding sources, eligibility rules, application procedures,
allocation formulae, expiration dates, review arrangements, and adminis-
trative guidelines.
This maze of conflicting programs, policies, and procedures is
simply too overwhelming for disadvantaged groups without "power," organi-
zation, or support to lobby effectively. In addition, few of these
individual programs have sufficient resources--staff, funds, technical
assistance, etc.--to serve more than a fraction of those eligible. This
assures that certain powerless groups will be consistently overlooked or
ignored in their quest for public services. This inequity is further
exacerbated by the fact that few public officials are given to interpret-
ing and implementing national policy, program guidelines, and project
eligibility criteria in any consistent, coordinated, or coherent fashion.
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3Given these circumstances, this dissertation is directed at
examining the impact of government coordination reforms on removing the
bureaucratic roadblocks which consistently exclude certain groups from
the benefits of public programs.
Significance
Studies and research concerned with the improvement of the func-
tioning of American government, as this dissertation is, must confront
the central problem of coping within the federal system with the stresses
and strains of competing objectives--at the same level and among differ-
ent levels of government. Of the numerous studies throughout history that
have aimed at reform or reconstitution of the federal system, most have
taken the view that one appropriate response to this problem is to push
for more coordination, i.e., overcoming red tape by streamlining and/or
synchronizing bureaucratic procedures. This is because, in large part,
coordination is seen as a significant aid in unraveling the "bureaucracy
problem" which is frequently discussed in terms of "red tape," fragmenta-
tion, inefficiency, duplication, unresponsiveness, and resistance to
change.
Various federal reports, papers, memoranda, evaluations, recom-
mendations, etc., have, in one form or another suggested that in a large
number of program areas, federal, state, and local agencies should work
together to establish coordinated mechanisms for the implementation of
program strategies. Generally, it is believed that with better coordina-
tion, federal programs would be more effective, federal expenditures
would yield greater returns, and the government process would operate
more smoothly.
This study is significant because the subject of coordination
continues to be a recurring theme within various government administra-
tions, as well as among various government observers. Also, over time, it
has become increasingly clear that part of the major problem facing gov-
ernment programs is not just a lack of resources, but the inability to use
existing resources efficiently and effectively. This, in fact, was a
major overtone of the Carter administration's government reorganization
4plans. Specifically, the President's major injunction to his urban advi-
sors had been to "concentrate on improving the utility of programs already
in existence, rather than designing 'bold new initiatives." 1
Simply said, the administration is interested in making what
exists in terms of government programs operate more effectively and effi-
ciently rather than attempting to tack on costly "new" replacement ap-
proaches (which most often differ only in contrived names from previous
approaches and not in increased impact achieved). Thus, rather than waste
more money, effort and time (not to mention risking the disruption of
current services to the public trying to reinvent "the wheel," or a new
public service delivery machine, the administration deems it more produc-
tive to overhaul and reconstitute the preexisting program machinery by
solving some of its inefficiencies.
For example, insufficient coordination within federal agencies
and between public programs is often seen and acknowledged as a universal
complaint about the malfunctioning of the federal sector in general. The
politically attractive features often attached to the clarion call
sounded for "better coordination" are: its universal acknowledgement as a
common governmental deficiency, its seemingly simplistic nature in terms
of solution, and to paraphrase Eugene Bardach, its presumed "little cost"
to carry out.2 The present Administration has vocalized publicly and
internally that its basic goal in reorganizing the government is to mini-
mize duplication, overlap, and jurisdictional conflict between Federal
Departments/Agencies by streamlining and coordinating certain functions.
Apart from the typical political rhetoric usually associated with such
remarks there remains a real problem to be dealt with. Thus, there is a
definite need to understand, or at least to appreciate, what range of
bureaucratic elements or administrative factors should be considered in
public policy decision making and implementation, with regard to improv-
ing the impact, and not the volume count, of mechanical operations deliv-
ered by governmental programs to the public (i.e., recording how many
individual clients screened as opposed to how many actually helped)
through "better coordination."
The perpetual interest of scholars and politicians in bringing
5greater order, uniformity, and precision into public policy decision
making and implementation, thereby increasing public program impact, has
been reflected in such administrative approaches or management control
systems as: Cost Benefit Analysis; Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
Systems (PPBS); Systems Analysis; Implementation Estimation;* Management
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by Objectives; and Zero-Based Budgeting.
Too often, such techniques are developed only in theory and do not
affect the practices of government. More importantly, when new govern-
ment reform techniques are tried, seldom are they initiated by disadvan-
taged groups and/or public advocacy organizations working face to face
with government program decision makers. Consequently, little is known
about what impact reforms initiated by public groups or organizations
might have on ameliorating the interface between agency levels, and among
different government programs, or in ultimately improving public service
delivery to disadvantaged populations.
Federal agencies still tend to be audited more in terms of opera-
tions performed, than in terms of results achieved. Thus, despite contin-
ual testimony to the need for more effective implementation of federal
programs via greater coordination, little has changed to improve public
service delivery to disadvantaged groups. Consequently, there is a need
for research and investigations, to fill the void in empirical knowledge
about attempts by public advocacy organizations to institute government
coordination reforms to improve public service to disadvantaged groups,
and about the impact of disadvantaged groups' use of regularized govern-
ment action channels to forestall bureaucratic snafus.
Focus
This dissertation deals with how a public advocacy organization
used the established government concern for more coordination, and regu-
larized government action channels (e.g., task force, interagency
*Forecasts of implementation consequences for use in designing
new programs or reorganizing existing agencies. This is a new thrust
being followed by Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and The Urban
Institute's Institutional Analysis Program.
6agreement, etc.) to create a power-process for overcoming the
bureaucratic barriers that hinder public service delivery to
disadvantaged groups. This study illustrates a coordinative approach to
the basic problem of coping within American government with the stresses
and strains of competing objectives and demands for limited resources--at
the same level and among various different levels of government.
Specifically, this research describes how advocacy organizations and
disadvantaged groups can work within the bureaucracy to use the
government push for coordination to their advantage, in calling for: the
elimination of wasteful actions and procedures (i.e., duplicative
requirements, sequential versus simultaneous reviews, unnecessary
personnel, etc.); the forestalling of communications problems (i.e.,
policy misinterpretations, project eligibility confusion, uninformed
publics and bureaucrats, etc.) and the focusing of existing resources on a
target problem (i.e., cable TV development) . Overall, this is a research
effort developed to study: the bureaucratic dynamics of public policy
implementation; the influence of public advocacy group intervention; and
outcomes resulting from attempts to "streamline" the delivery of public
services to disadvantaged groups through the use of coordinative
mechanisms. There is an emphasis in this study on identifying the kinds
of knowledge that appear to be significant in enhancing the use of
coordination strategies by disadvantaged groups as leveraging mechanisms.
A case study of the formation and operation of a National Rural
Cable TV Development Task Force will be used to explore the significant
issues, benefits, and problems (e.g., feigned acquiescence by career
officials) connected with the use of a coordinative approach to public
program implementation.
The main body of this research details the history of a National
Rural Cable TV Development Task Force developed by the Cablecommunica-
tions Resource Center as a support system for disadvantaged groups out-
side the mainstream of those powerful groups who are most able to influ-
ence bureaucratic action and decision making. The Cablecommunications
Resource Center (CRC) was a public advocacy organization, funded by the
Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) , and mandated to provide
7technical assistance to disadvantaged groups interested in organizing
cable TV businesses.
CRC's staff discovered in their early dealings with government
agencies that these agencies tended to be insensitive and resistant to
disadvantaged group's needs for business loan funds. Many government
officials automatically reacted negatively to disadvantaged groups' pro-
jects no matter how feasible or credible, they were. Such projects were
often viewed, or stereotyped, by career bureaucrats as very risky. Hence,
government loan program officials were usually ultraconservative in their
attitudes toward dispensing funds to disadvantaged groups and, histori-
cally, either overlooked or underfinanced their projects. CRC's staff
was aware also that most disadvantaged groups historically distrusted
government programs because they were too stringent, too slow, and tan-
gled in red tape.
Overall, CRC's leadership realized that many frustrations and
time-consuming difficulties were involved in trying to negotiate funding
for clients' projects from resistant government agencies, on a project by
project, or piecemeal basis. This realization led them to the decision
that there was a need for some type of coordinative approach to improve
the chances of their clients' receiving funds from government programs. A
Task Force (made up of various agencies able to fund cable TV projects)
seemed a convenient and accepted government vehicle for pursuing, in a
comprehensive fashion, the elimination of bureaucratic barriers to pro-
ject funding. Some of the bureaucratic problems that the Task Force and
its interagency agreement were created to forestall were: duplication of
client efforts in validating to agencies the eligibility of their pro-
jects; foot dragging by agency officials in processing project
applications; communication problems surrounding project eligibility,
based on misinterpretations of existing national or agency policy direc-
tives; and the lack of total resources in any one agency to meet total
funding and technical assistance needs of target groups.
CRC's staff, with the support of OMBE representatives, orches-
trated the formation on February 4, 1975, of the National Rural Cable TV
Development Task Force. The Task Force was made up primarily of
8government agencies with a broad commitment to economic business
development among disadvantaged groups. The Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) , the Small Business Administration (SBA) , the Economic Development
Administration (EDA) , and OMBE were the key agencies that agreed to
coordinate their efforts, resources (e.g., business loan programs,
technical assistance services, etc.) and staff in supporting the
development of cable TV businesses by disadvantaged groups in various
rural areas.
The early meetings of the Task Force illuminate the bureaucratic
difficulties involved in getting all the participating government agen-
cies to sign a mutually agreeable, yet substantive, interagency agreement
that formally recorded their support of the Task Force effort. This
formal document was viewed by CRC's staff as: a key coordinating tool for
substantiating the commitment of agencies to the Task Force effort; a
tangible device to be used to clearly communicate and convince remote
field offices of National Office knowledge and support of cable TV devel-
opment; and a control mechanism against agency "lip-service" or reneging
on verbal commitments of support. The leadership of CRC theorized that,
if need be, greater outside concern, support, and intervention could be
aroused against agencies that reneged or violated the tenets of a formally
signed document than could be aroused if the commitments were only general
verbal statements of support.
The operational history of the Task Force focuses on the support
and assistance provided Tele-Vu, a Chicano-owned cable TV business in New
Mexico seeking business loan funds from SBA, and Gary Communications
Group (GCG), a black-owned cable TV business in Gary, Indiana seeking
business loan funds from EDA. The background accounts of each of these
experiences outlines the bureaucratic problem(s) encountered with each
given agency, the actions taken by Task Force members, the extended out-
side support systems developed, and the final outcomes of attempts to
resolve bureaucratic snafus via leverage through the existence of the
Task Force and its agreement.
This study chronicles the utility of coordination strategies and
mechanisms in providing disadvantaged groups with leverage for mobilizing
9support to promote projects, as well as to save projects entangled in
bureaucratic snafus. The study's examination of the Tele-Vu and GCG
experiences also provides illustrations of the limitations of the "coor-
dinative approach" as a vehicle for automatically triggering the complete
bureaucratic responsiveness desired. This study records the coordinative
approach's particular vulnerability to sabotage techniques of career
bureaucrats, unforeseen events, and faulty pre-planning. Fundamentally,
the study records the successful utilization of coordination mechanisms
to save the Tele-Vu project, the shortcomings of CRC's initial strategies
to coordinate more effectively, and the coordination process failure in
the GCG experience.
A summation of learned lessons and generalizations about coordi-
nation, that need to be appreciated and heeded by others interested in
this approach to public program implementation, are included in this
study's "Notes Toward a Theory of Coordination." This part of the study
endeavors to order some of the knowledge developed by this work along with
the conventional wisdom found in other government studies, research, and
investigations on the subject.
Research Equation
This study will first review and discuss some basic theoretical
perspectives and concepts significant to understanding the bureaucratic
process in general and the notion of public agency coordination specif-
ically. Within this broad discussion, there will also be a summary of the
importance and the need for leveraging mechanisms by disadvantaged groups
to deal with government business loan programs, that have historically
distributed uneven service to powerless groups. It will then describe the
genesis and historical development of a particular coordination strategy
aimed at improving the delivery of public service to disadvantaged popu-
lations. My basic research equation involves the analysis of the impact
of coordination reforms as an independent variable acting to influence
the dependent variable of public program output or service delivery to
target communities. Essentially, I will be concerned with what real
utility or impact "coordination reforms" have in enhancing or improving
10
the level of public program service delivery to certain disadvantaged
groups.
Many public administrators, scholars, and politicians have begun
to realize that the translation of policy into workable action programs by
public officials is an imperfect art, little understood and seldom prac-
ticed successfully or the same way twice. Paul Berman ("The Study of
Macro and Micro Implementation," Public Policy, 1978), and Robert Levine
(Public Planning: Failure and Redirection, 1973) have both recorded the
tendency of the separate segments of bureaucracy found at various fed-
eral, state, and local levels to generate program mutations (to borrow
Berman's terminology) that often drastically change the original charac-
ter, form, and focus of public programs. Such mutations are most often
exemplified by the arbitrary and capricious manner in which bureaucrats
at various levels of the government system choose to interpret or misin-
terpret program guidelines and project eligibility criteria. Few appli-
cants can successfully satisfy the complicated criteria set by government
programs; and especially not disadvantaged groups, when there is no clear
continuity or consistency found in the way complex bureaucratic require-
ments set for projects are applied at different levels of government
(federal, state, and local) . The common result of such mutations is that
the statutory eligibility criteria for certain programs can become overly
stringent and incompatible with proposed projects, expecially when ruth-
lessly applied by unsympathetic bureaucrats.
Robert Levine (Public Planning, 1972) has cited examples of
programs such as aid to dependent children, urban renewal, aid to educa-
tion and manpower training, all of which are altered and adapted to meet
the needs of local officials; which he suggests, is something signifi-
cantly different from adaptation to meet the needs of local populations.
Likewise, Paul Berman has recorded that the mutation phenomenon (i.e.,
the adaptation of a project to its organizational setting during imple-
mentation) has also been reported in studies of educational reform (Paul
Berman and Milbrey W. McLaughlin, "Implementation of Educational Innova-
tion," The Educational Forum, 1976), bail reform (Lee S. Friedman, "The
Evaluation of a Bail Reform," Policy Sciences, 1976), and Medicaid (Gary
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Brewer and James S. Kahalik, Improving Services to Handicapped Children:
Summary and Recommendations, Rand, 1974).
Eugene Bardach (The Implementation Game: What Happens After a
Bill Becomes a Law, 1977) has also outlined some thoughts on this same
general phenomenon. He states that the goals embodied in a policy mandate
typically undergo some change during the implementation phase. Further-
more, he suggests that the politics of renegotiating goals can often lead
in several directions: trimming them back, distorting or preventing
them, and even ultimately adding to them in such a manner that eventually
leads to unsupportable political burden. Finally, he asserts, in what he
calls the "piling on" process, that as onlookers or public officials see a
"new program begin to move in its intended direction, some see it as a new
political resource, an opportunity to throw their own goals and objec-
tives onto the heap. The net effect of a large number of additional
objectives being added to the heap," Bardach states, "may be to topple
it." 4
The propensity of organizations to seek to maintain the status
quo in terms of general work routines, or to remain the same in respect to
program changes or innvoations, has been highlighted in various ways from
Herbert Simon's early notion of organization "satisficing" (i.e., organi-
zations prefer to satisfice or optimize rather than maximize and to rely
upon existing reportoires and routines to meet new problems rather than to
learn anew about reality and adapt internally in each case) and Donald
Schon's concept of "dynamic conservatism" (the tendency to fight to re-
main the same) to Eugene Bardach's recent "Implementation Game Theories."
Yet, the literature has not drawn from the history of experience the full
implications of such realities for public policy decision making and
program implementation. Most of the existing literature on such areas has
been content with just building or contributing to a resifting of norma-
tive organizational theory, but has not articulated clearly the prerequi-
sites for successful public policy implementation that grow out of these
analyses. For example, it is part of the conventional wisdom dealing with
bureaucracies that by definition they strive to maintain the conditions
necessary for their stability and expansion (i.e., survival).
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Bureaucracies are "essentially neutral, aligned with neither class nor
party, except as such alignments serve jurisdictional claims or determine
the availability of necessary resources."5 They distribute public
benefits in response to organizational power or control over resources.
"The influence of any group upon bureaucracies ultimately depends on its
role in this process--either contributing resources and supporting
jurisdictional claims, or threatening the attainment of these
objectives."6
Important Questions
If these realities hold true, as they appear to do in most bureau-
cratic settings, then what chances of receiving real benefits from public
programs by impacting upon them in any significant way do certain disen-
franchised groups (e.g., minorities) have? Disadvantaged groups obvi-
ously have very few chances for such services when they are essentially
powerless or largely perceived as such by bureaucracies (i.e., popula-
tions to be acted upon as opposed to being responded to as a real constit-
uency or power base) and their general ranks are often pervaded by a sense
of anomie. The real question then becomes what power or leverage mecha-
nisms can be employed by such groups to improve their chances of receiving
a fair share of benefits from the public system in comparison to powerful
vested interest groups that expertly lobby and wield great power in
bureaucratic circles? It is also important to discover what bureaucratic
dynamics seem to precipitate and continuously perpetuate such inequities
(i.e., the consistent exclusion of certain groups from the benefits of
government programs) even when reforms are initiated? And when does
coordination appear to work to solve such problems? Research into such
questions as these is significant to the interests of public administra-
tors, policy makers, government scholars, and public interest groups con-
cerned with minimizing the inherent bureaucratic problems engendered by a
highly fragmented and erratically disjointed, politically entangled,
multi-leveled federal-state-local delivery system that tends to attenu-
ate, distort, or even inhibit the transfer of program benefits to certain
disadvantaged populations.
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These questions are also of particular interest to public-sector
organizations and officials concerned with mobilizing coordinated action
among public organizations more effectively to cope with social problems
too complex for any one agency to solve by itself. A basic assumption
being pursued here is that many of the complex problems focused on by
individual public agencies can be more effectively (i.e., more signifi-
cant impact generated) and efficiently (i.e., less waste of time, money,
effort, and manpower) dealt with through joint interagency planning and
programming. This is because the resources and expertise needed to cope
with such problems are often contained within a wide array of autonomous
organizations, public agencies, and special advocacy groups.
Purpose
The purpose of my proposed investigation is to identify through a
broad historical analysis of the development and operation of a National
Federal Agency Coordinative Task Force, an optimal framework, or theory,
for maximizing the utilization of coordination strategies by disadvan-
taged groups to influence public service delivery. I plan to call widely
upon the available literature in: organizational behavior, public admin-
istration, intergovernmental relations, and public policy implementation
to formulate a theory about coordination, both laterally (across differ-
ent agency lines) and vertically (between different agency levels, i.e.,
federal, state, and local). Specifically, I will seek to identify what
kinds of knowledge from these and other areas appear to be most signifi-
cant to coordinating the delivery of a social program. The underlying
premise on which this research rests is the assumption that coordination
mechanisms can serve to help increase the chances of disadvantaged groups
in lessening many of the typical bureaucratic roadblocks (i.e., frag-
mented and disjointed program activity, unresponsiveness, "red tape,"
etc.) encountered in public program implementation.
General Hypothesis
My major hypothesis is that properly structured coordination can
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provide added power or leverage for disadvantaged groups seeking to shape
the distribution of outputs of public programs to meet their needs. The
fundamental premise being that special coordination mechanisms can help
to increase such groups' chances of overcoming the typical bureaucratic
barriers (i.e., red tape, fragmentation, etc.) experienced in program
implementation.
Primary Concepts
There are two primary concepts whose preferred meanings are
essential to the total comprehension of the basic research of this study.
The first concept that has crucial significance to this study is the whole
notion of coordination itself. In general, coordination can be taken to
mean many things--from simple resolution of conflicts through harmonious
interaction to complex symbiotic government arrangements. Coordination
is both a "process" and a "task" orientated phenomenon.
A significant part of the dynamics of coordination centers around
the communications process--the act of informing. The act of informing
within coordination, however, may run the gamut from simple declarations
and requests, to bargaining and negotiations, or to coercion and exertion
of power. Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, in their classic
work Implementation, view coordination as being the process of "compel-
ling federal agencies and their component parts to act in a desired manner
at the right time, when achieving this purpose is precisely what you
cannot do" under normal circumstances. James L. Sundquist's book,
Making Federalism Work, suggests that:
In terms of process, coordination may be lateral--consultation, shar-
ing of information, and negotiation among equals, a type of coordina-
tion that has been labled "mutual adjustment." Or it may be the
settlement of a conflict by the decision of a "coordinator." Or it
may be a combination of these--a process in which lateral coordina-
tion is expedited, facilitated, and even coerced by leadership and
pressure from an independent or higher level coordinator.8
In a very simplistic sense, the coordination process can be sum-
marized as the politics of reaching agreement. This synopsis of coordina-
tion has been derived from Erwin C. Hargrove's Urban Institute work on the
implementation of social policy (The Missing Link: Study of the
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Implementation of, Social Policy, 1975). On a similar plane, Aaron
Wildavsky in his work entitled The Politics of the Budgetary Process
states that coordination can be understood as the extent to which
participants in a process simply take into account what others do.
9
It is important to note and understand that there are many compet-
ing "process" and "task" definitions for the term coordination. This
review of "process" interpretations of the word coordination illustrates
the illusiveness of coordination as both a term to define and as a process
to achieve. The actual "task" objectives for coordination are more defin-
able. The task objectives of coordination are represented by a wide range
of improvements in interagency, intergovernment, interprogram, and inter-
project relationships--"indeed, almost any change in organization, rela-
tionships, policies, practices, projects, or programs that will resolve
whatever conflict or hiatus in the federal-state-local chain of relation-
ships with which the user of the term may happen to be concerned."10 The
most dominant "task objectives" or themes for improving government opera-
tion via coordination are:
1. Elimination of wasteful practices or repetitious patterns of
action--i.e., unessential personnel, duplicative requirements,
sequential versus simultaneous reviews, etc.
2. Elimination of competing or conflicting programs, policies, and
processes--e.g., government support for tobacco and government's
anti-smoking campaign; Corps of Engineers trying to dam rivers
while Interior and EPA are trying to save them; Department of
Commerce Office of Telecommunications generation of reports cal-
ling for more government support of the growth and development of
new communication technologies like cable TV while the Federal
Communications Commission maintains restrictions that impede
cable TV's growth (1974-1975).
3. Combining a related set of existing resources in a focused attack
on a particular problem--i.e., the uniting of several different
programs, with similar objectives, to concentrate their efforts
on enhancing the position of a target population relative to
others. Usually accomplished through the creation of a new
bureaucratic enterprise or structure to oversee all relevant
activities under some form of central regulating authority.
4. Forestalling of communication problems within agencies, among
different agencies, and between agencies and the public--i.e.,
avoid the turndown of projects because of project eligibility
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confusion, policy misinterpretations, uninformed publics and
bureaucrats, etc.
This study is concerned with coordination in a limited "process"
and "task" oriented sense. For this study's purposes, coordination is
viewed as a process in which government agencies are brought together to
form a collective effort, under the leadership of a central coordinator to
accomplish the following "tasks:" eliminate wasteful practices and repe-
titious actions; concentrate efforts in attacking a particular problem or
in focusing existing resources on enhancing the position of a target
population relative to others; and forestall communication problems on
project eligibility within agencies, among different agencies, and be-
tween agencies and target groups.
The second concept of significance is the notion of "bureaucratic
behavior." This is the broad area which coordination as an implementation
strategy seeks to impact upon in improving the delivery process of social
programs. Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, "bureaucratic
behavior" represents those negative organizational patterns or individual
"routines" and acts that serve to impede, hinder, block, or otherwise
thwart expedient responsiveness by public service systems. For example,
career civil servants often used a wide array of "red tape" gambits to
thwart policy directives or counteract their superiors' efforts to con-
trol their activities.
There are a number of classic examples of the bureaucratic gam-
bits used by subordinates to counteract control from top-level officials.
Robert K. Merton has indicated that if a top-level official "seeks to
dominate too fully, and thus violates the sentiment of self-integrity of
the bureaucrats, he may have documents brought to him in such numbers that
he cannot manage to sign them all, let alone read them." 1 Another work,
The Private Government of Public Money, pulls from the British Civil
service experience a similar observation/imperative. . . "The surest way
of incapacitating a minister is to tie him up in detail so that he cannot
get loose to deal with other matters." (This reference goes on to note
that ministers (top-level officials) perhaps could take a more objective
view of the uses and abuses of civil servants if they were not required to
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depend on them so completely.)
Even if they do not suspect their civil servants of sabotage, indeed,
even if they have every reason to believe civil servants are doing
everything to help them, the nagging doubt remains that a more sympa-
thetic advisor would have done better by them. It is less a question
of officials refusing to follow the dictates of a given policy and
more of excluding from debate the kinds of ideas and follow-through
that the minister might have favored if only he had known about it.12
Thus subordinates often react to pressure from above with the power of
omission--not making known certain technical knowledge or "intelligence"
that they have.
Relevant Literature
Given the history of coordinative attempts already recorded in
the current literature (W. Brook Graves, American Intergovernmental Rela-
tions, 1954; James L. Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, 1959; Jeffrey L.
Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation, 1973; Bernard J. Frieden
and Marshall Kaplan, The Politics of Neglect, 1975; etc.) it would be
redundant and wasteful to embark upon a research effort simply to substan-
tiate the reality that the coordination process is often as difficult to
achieve as the problems it seeks to emeliorate. Rather, it would be more
productive to approach a case study of coordination with an eye toward
describing some rules or guidelines for improving practice. Such is the
intent of this research. Toward this end it is both necessary and prudent
to construct an "ideal-rational-typical" model of coordination operation.
One such general frame of reference from which to judge what
exists is offered by Charles E. Lindblom in his book the Intelligency of
Democracy, 1965. Lindblom's book offers a classic analysis of the methods
and comparative advantages in various circumstances, of two general types
of coordination processes--"central coordination," or coordination by a
decision maker, and "mutual adjustment," or lateral adaptation in the
absence of a central decision maker (plus, of course, combinations of the
two).
Overall, Lindblom has identified four general types of coordina-
tion: central coordination; mutual adjustment; cooperative discussion;
and partisan mutual adjustment. In central coordination, individual
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decision makers adapt to one another on instructions from a central regu-
lating authority. At the other extreme is mutual adjustment, a process in
which no central mind or decision maker exercises any coordinating
responsibility. The most familiar mutual adjustment process is negotia-
tions among independent agencies. The third basic type of coordination
that Lindblom identifies is cooperative discussion among decision makers
in which the group as a whole plays the role of the central regulator. In
this form of coordination, decision makers are in substantial agreement
on criteria for resolving their problems, and they cooperate rather than
bargain or negotiate with each other (this form of coordination is often
typified by a "task force" approach to coordination). This form of
coordination requires the participants to agree on common values and
purposes and to maintain that agreement over time. 1 3
The most significant form of coordination that is discussed at
length by Lindbolm is partisan mutual adjustment. This form seems to be
especially useful as a theoretical base for case study analysis because it
not only raises the most interesting questions while presenting the most
common dilemmas but it also appears to be the most widely practiced and
observable form of coordination in the federal sector. In this form of
coordination, each participant makes decisions calculated to serve his
own goals, not goals necessarily shared by other interdependent decision
makers. He may make decisions counter to his own goals only to the extent
that he is, in turn, controlled by other partisans or by central supervi-
sion. For this process to work, the participants need only agree on a
course of action at a particular time. They do not have to reach consen-
sus on goals or values in order to reach an agreement on what to do. Each
may subscribe to a common decision for his own reasons.14
Overall, Charles E. Lindblom appears to have mapped out in gen-
eral terms a very useful framework for observing, analyzing, and clas-
sifying federal coordination. In fact, close scrutiny of other models of
interagency coordination seem to reveal that they usually are general
variations on the basic themes set forth by Lindblom. For example,
Lindblom's Partisan Mutual Adjustment formulations are also identifiable
in other theoretical circles as basic tenets contributing to what is
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termed a Conflict and Bargaining model approach to implementation by
Richard F. Elmore ("Organizational Models of Social Program Implementa-
tion," Public Policy, 1978). The essence of Richard F. Elmore's bargain-
ing model is embodied in several major propositions:
1. organizations are arenas of conflict in which individuals and
subunits with specific interest compete for relative advantage in
the exercise of power and the allocation of scarce resources.
2. The distribution of power in organizations is never stable. It
depends exclusively on the temporary ability of one individual or
unit to mobilize sufficient resources to manipulate the behavior
of others. The factors that determine the distribution of power
among organizations includes: specialized knowledge, control of
material resources, and the ability to mobilize external politi-
cal support.
3. Decision-making in organizations consists of bargaining within
and among organizational units. Bargained decisions are the re-
sult of convergence among actors with different preferences and
resources. Bargaining does not require that parties agree on a
common set of goals, nor does it even require that all parties
concur in the outcome of the bargaining process. It only requires
that they agree to adjust their behavior mutually in the interest
of preserving the bargaining relationship as a means of allocat-
ing resources.
4. Implementation consists of a complex series of bargained deci-
sions reflecting the preferences and resources of participants.
Success or failure of implementation cannot be judged by compar-
ing a result against a single declaration of intent, because no
single set of purposes can provide an internally consistent
statement of the interests of all parties to the bargaining pro-
cess. Success can only be defined relative to the goals of one
party to the bargaining process itself.1 5
In sum, Elmore asserts that in his Conflict and Bargaining model,
each participating agency is involved in pursuing its own special inter-
est. Consequently, implementation does not progress from a single
declaration of intent to a result, but is instead characterized by con-
stant conflict over purposes and results and by the pursuit of relative
advantage through the use of bargaining.
A composite of Lindblom's and Elmore's conceptualizations will
represent the basic theoretical framework used to guide my case study
evaluation of coordination. For my theoretical insight into the issue of
bureaucratic behavior I will draw liberally from the vast well of
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knowledge watered by the literature on organizational behavior: Herbert
A. Simon and James G. March, Organizations, 1958; public administration,
Luther Gulick and Luther Urwick, "Papers on the Science of Administra-
tion," 1937; intergovernmental relations, Paul Berman, "The Study of
Macro and Micro-Implementation," 1978; and public policy implementation,
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis, 1971, etc.
Research Approach
Human experience inside organizations is a temporal process which
forces all empirical evidence of any testable significance to be
historical by nature. Although no past event can be identically similar
to any present or future event in all respects, past events provide the
only possible experimental evidence--reliable evidence if careful account
is taken of the factors which distinguish one circumstance from another
and if the relevant and irrelevant elements are differentiated.
Furthermore, organizational history does not start and stop in the past;
past experience constantly reaches forward to become the moving present
in which problems are identified and solutions applied by new perceivers
of old situations. Nowhere is this more applicable than as in the area of
public policy implementation by bureaucratic organizations. The
translation of policy and theory into workable action programs is, as
stated earlier, an imperfect art form that is little understood and seldom
practiced successfully. Hence, nowhere is the gap between theory and
useful action more apparent than in the field of public policy
implementation within bureaucracies. Therefore, I plan to use a basic
case study approach for building and researching my dissertation subject
area.
I am aware that the common criticism often leveled at case studies
in social science is that one cannot be sure if they are completely
representative of larger patterns or even what such patterns might look
like under different circumstances. Yet, it is not clear how broad
knowledge about implementation can be secured without many case studies.
Graham T. Allison has noted that we need case studies which are performed
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with "theoretical alertness" to the possibility of developing generaliza-
tions. Erwin C. Hargrove , within his comprehensive study of the imple-
mentation of social policy (The Missing Link--Urban Institute, 1975), has
similarly suggested that there is still a relative empirical lacuna in
terms of research that charts general patterns of institutional behavior
and chronic implementation problems.
Although there are many different implementation patterns accord-
ing to particular problems and programs, only one general theme has been
repeatedly recorded in the prevailing literature (e.g., Martha Derthick,
New Towns-In Town; Pressman-Wildavsky, Implementation; Bernard Frieden
and Marshall Kaplan, Politics of Neglect, etc.)--federal rhetorical
overkill and program disappointment, i.e., unrealistic raising of public
expectations beyond a rational margin of actual obtainment. Hargrove
does not discount the significance of studying such program failures and
analyzing fallout problems (i.e., disillusionment, erosion of basic cred-
ibility and faith in public programs to solve problems, etc.) involved in
major contradictions between government promises versus performance for
the public. In fact, one can assume that such current analysis has helped
bring into proper focus the significance of the classic consequences
resulting from major discrepancies in program promises versus
performance.
However, Hargrove has wondered out loud about what different
types of institutional patterns are observable in program successes.
Specifically, he has posed the question: "Are not patterns different in
cases in which well organized interest groups or militant publics are
involved?"16 My case study investigations will attempt to address such
issues as raised by Hargrove while attempting to maintain the "theoreti-
cal alertness" as specified by Graham T. Allison. My aim is to pinpoint
some general patterns of institutional behavior and chronic implementa-
tion problems as uncovered by the individual circumstance of success and
failure recorded by my case study.
Case Study Method
I intend to use a case study method of analysis which will be
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empirical, deductive, and diagnostic in terms of evaluating the public
policy implementation experiences that I have observed and participated
in. Basically, I will perform a major case study of an attempt to
coordinate the policy and program activities of a group of federal agen-
cies (Farmers Home Administration, Small Business Administration, Eco-
nomic Development Administration, and Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise) that have been found to have both the legislative mandates and
funding programs which could enable them to finance or offer technical
services supportive of the development of cable TV systems. My research
will attempt to review and analyze the efforts involved in trying to
organize and systematically structure the interaction of this select
group of federal agencies toward a common goal of economic business devel-
opment in disadvantaged areas with the creative organizing vehicle being
cable TV.
The main focus of the case study will be on the development and
operation of a National Rural Cable Development Task Force, which has
attempted through a multi-agency agreement, to eliminate some of the
problems associated with the lack of communication between and coordina-
tion among various federal programs. Such problems include the overlap
and duplication of programs, effort, and staff; red tape and foot dragging
in processing paperwork; the operation of field offices unaware of their
ability to finance projects or unwilling to support new projects; lack of
informed communication with certain local communities about programs that
do exist; lack of technical assistance to groups interested in developing
projects, but unsophisticated in dealing with federal programs, etc.
The National Rural Cable Development Task Force experience is
significant both in terms of what it attempted to accomplish and how it
managed to get federal agencies to the conference table using the lure of
cable TV technology. The realm of telecommunications or more specifi-
cally the financing of cable TV systems is an important issue around which
to study public policy implementation, coordination, and administration
of federal agencies because it has been a signficiant topic before White
House Policy Groups, the Congress, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), the Communications Industry, City Governments, and various Public
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Interest Organizations. (local as well as national).
In my case study I will try to recount the genesis, development,
and operation of the National Rural Cable Development Task Force. Acting
from the vantage point of a participant observer I will be able to report
in detail from "inside" knowledge the historical development and opera-
tion of the National Rural Cable Development Task Force. Having been a
major participant in the Task Force development process, I will be able to
give special insights into why certain problems occurred, what "hidden
agendas" existed among participants, what games of power politics were
played, what below the surface actions were taken in contradiction to
public positions, and what unforeseen events changed the course of devel-
opments and program outcomes.
Research Process
My basic research and data gathering activities will be carried
out in four operational phases. Phase I - Analytic Framework Development
will first establish the definitional complexities, dynamic properties,
pros and cons, and historical significance of the concept of public policy
coordination. This phase will also focus on building a background frame-
work of theoretical perspectives and models for analysis of the case study
to be reviewed. Phase II - Historical Background Building will trace the
seeds of development and growth of a National Rural Cable TV Development
Task Force as a coordinative mechanism arising from the bureaucratic
frustrations experienced by a small, underfunded national technical
assistance program for minorities (Cablecommunications Resource Center)
which was attempting more effectively to utilize federal programs to meet
the needs of their client communities.
Personal interviews with key participants (i.e., federal agency
personnel, client groups, public interest organizations, politicians,
etc.) of the Task Force and field observations of the operation of said
Task Force over a period of more than two years (November 1974-
April 1977) will form the basic research foundation of this segment of my
study and the entire study on the whole. Also careful searches of the
files and records of the public agencies, community development
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organizations, and the central quasi-public advocacy organization (CRC)
involved in the total process will form an integral part of the data
gathering effort. Specifically, this segment of the research approach
will focus on the retrieval and analysis of public information bulletins,
press notices, policy statements, memoranda, newspaper articles, etc., as
well as special agency file documents (not normally available for public
release or scrutiny) that deal with the development and operation of the
Task Force. The major aim of this effort is to gather material that will
provide a basic chronological outline of significant developments of the
Task Force's operation based upon major communiques released and
exchanged between, among, and within agencies and organizations involved
with the Task Force. Special efforts will be made to identify past agency
records that show contradictions between past actions and present ad hoc
policy stances, that serve as bureaucratic impediments to change in rela-
tion to Task Force objectives.
The Phase III - Case Study Analysis part of my research effort
will involve the review and analysis of the bureaucratic behavior ob-
served in my "Task Force" case study as based upon the theoretical models
and constructs developed in the first section, my own empirical back-
ground of experience, and "ground-zero" intuitive insights into why cer-
tain processes failed while other succeeded. Fundamentally, I will be
concerned with reviewing and piecing together from the agency file data
(i.e., interagency memoranda, policy statements, private communiques,
etc.) generated by the various organizations and agencies connected with
the Task Force--both the formal and behind-the-scenes informal whys and
wherefores that explain the interorganizational dynamics and the ultimate
outcomes observed.
In the final section of my research, Phase IV - Summary and
Recommendations, I will attempt to draw certain theoretical conclusions
from the learned lessons highlighted in my case study analyses and point
out certain recurring "roadblocks" to successful interorganizational
coordination that must be anticipated and remedied, to make future ef-
forts more fruitful. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to form certain
organizational behavior prescriptions and recommendations for guiding
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similar public policy implementation initiatives. Essentially, this sec-
tion will synthesize the theoretical enlightenment and empirical revela-
tions culled from the analyzed Task Force experience; by developing some
general notes toward a theory of coordination.
CHAPTER I
FEDERAL AGENCY COORDINATION: SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
CHAPTER I
FEDERAL AGENCY COORDINATION: SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Historical Overview
Throughout various periods of history, analysts of federal
programs have called attention to the need for and the problems of coor-
dination. So much so that it has become inextricably ingrained into the
political fabric and dialogue on government program implementation. The
theme of coordination has come to be accepted as a regularized means of
taking action in overcoming bureaucratic problems and improving govern-
ment effectiveness and efficiency. Evidence of this is offered by histor-
ical government publications, the periodic establishment of intergovern-
mental study commissions or coordinative mechanisms, and the words and
actions of men in their capacity as federal and state government offi-
cials. For instance, during the years preceding World War II, the
Roosevelt administration made two attempts to coordinate federal programs
involving intergovernmental relations.
In the first, James McReynolds of the White House staff was assigned
the task, while in the second the assignment went to Guy Moffatt. No
official record of either attempt has been located but both were
short-lived, partly because the administration did not back the ef-
forts of the coordinators and partly because of the almost unlimited
ingenuity of department and agency administrators in finding means of
resisting any attempt to develop uniform policies and procedures and
to coordinate programs."
Such internal resistance is often a recurring "roadblock" to successful
coordination.
In 1945, the Pacific Coast Board of Intergovernmental Relations
was set up. It was continued during the postwar period as an agency for
the discussion of governmental problems by officials at all levels. A
grant was obtained from one of the foundations for a small staff and
incidental expenses. Its purposes were clearly stated in its Principles
of Organization:
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This Board is created purely on a voluntary cooperative basis for the
purpose of mutual discussion and cooperation in administrative ef-
forts to solve problems affecting people, and most especially such
problems as are the responsibility of governments during the postwar
readjustment period. Such mutual discussion and cooperation will
strive for the elimination of duplication in the execution of local,
State, and Federal laws and regulations, the pooling of facts regard-
ing economic and social conditions, especially those due to industri-
alization, and the planning of local, State, and Federal governments
for dealing with these matters constructively.
Membership, on a purely voluntary basis, was confined to local,
state, and federal governments, care being taken that no one should be
over-represented in relation to the others:
From each State the membership shall be the Governor of the State,
the Chairman of the State Commission on Interstate Cooperation, an
official representative of the League or Association of Cities or
Municipalities, and an official representative of the State Associa-
tion of County Supervisors or Commissioners.
From the Federal government membership shall be Field Chiefs of
Federal agencies, selected by the Pacific Coast Federal Regional
Council, and shall be less in number than the combined total of
representatives of the other jurisdictions. 1 8
Frequent regular meetings were held, usually at the capitals of
the participating states, with the Governor of the state presiding
. . .although the conclusions of the Board were purely advisory, par-
ticipants reported that ways and means for cutting through red tape
and obtaining effective action through the cooperative efforts of all
levels of government were developed in the discussions. Uniform
policies on many problems were also developed. The organization
continued to function until, with a change of administration and in
the interests of "economy," the field offices of the Bureau of the
Budget were discontinued in 1953.19
During the late 1940s, a Hoover Commission Report on Federal-
State Relations was presented to Congress. The brief report concluded
that improvement in intergovernmental relations was the key to mainte-
nance of our Federal System, and recommended that:
. . a continuing agency on Federal-State relations be created with
the primary reponsibility for study, information, and guidance in the
field of Federal-State relations. In 1953, President Eisenhower
called for a complete review of intergovernmental relations.
Congress responded by authorizing the establishment of a temporary
commission composed of persons appointed by the President, and desig-
nated members from both houses of Congress. This Commission came to
be known by its Chairman, the late Meyer Kestnbaum of Chicago.2 0
Thus in 1955, a major bench mark in federal program coordination
was reached with the establishment of President Eisenhower's Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (Kestnbaum Commission).
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The Kestnbaum Commission issued the most comprehensive review of
intergovernmental relations since the adoption of the Constitution.
The Kestnbaum Report covered not only the philosophical aspects of
federalism, but also a wide variety of specific recommendations on
the allocation of functions and responsibilities between the National
Government and the States. 21
The Commission warned that:
. . .without careful administrative coordination at the national
level, federal programs might produce confusion at the local level,
might fail to provide mutual support, or in extreme cases, might work
at cross purposes. It found "some evidence that these results have
occurred in the past," and recommended a Presidential staff agency on
intergovernmental relations to avoid such results in the future.2 2
After the House Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee had
studied the recommendations of the Kestnbaum Commission, the subcommittee
agreed upon a bill to create a permanent Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations.
Hearings on this bill were held before a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations. A companion measure was spon-
sored in the Senate by Senator Muskie (Maine) and by 25 other sena-
tors. These bills culminated in the enactment of Public Law 380 in
the first session of the 86th Congress.2 3
In 1959, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR) came into being. ACIR was:
. . the brainchild of those who believed that cooperative federalism
was a fact of life, a doctrine of unity, and a panacea to many of the
country's social and economic ills. Daniel Elazar, in a Later Public
Administration Review article, reported that ACIR was the handiwork
of those who wished to unwind the Federal System to restore the
states' autonomy, and those who wished to preserve the states' integ-
rity within the cooperative framework. He continued by saying that
ACIR's creation marked significant changes in the direction of in-
formed thought on the subject. First the notion of unwinding the
cooperative system was abandoned in favor of learning how to live
within its framework. Second, the idea that an improvement in the
federal balance must come from retrenchment in Washington was modi-
fied, to incorporate the notion that states had a primary role to play
by assuming new responsibilities. At the same time demands for new
forms of government action to meet the needs of the postwar period
were about to bear fruit in the return of an activist Democratic
administration to national power. 2 4
The major findings of the Kestnbaum Commission over the need for
greater administrative coordination within the public sector were largely
accepted as established facts by 1961. In fact after:
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. . .the newly established Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations studied the impact of federal grant programs in metropoli-
tan areas it observed: "The fragmented and conflicting impact at the
State and local level of disparate Federal programs concerning urban
highways, urban renewal, housing, airport and sewage facility con-
struction, and so on, are well known." In sharper language, the
Advisory Commission emphasized that intergovernmental relations with
respect to urban affairs were "unnecessarily impaired because of in-
adequate coordination of Federal programs;" it urged prompt and ef-
fective steps to improve the situation.4 7
Primarily the concern over coordination was prompted by a per-
ceived need to improve the administration of federal programs. It was
believed that with better coordination:
. . .programs would be more effective, federal expenditures would
yield greater returns, and the process of urban development would
become more efficient. As a later Advisory Commission report put it,
"Coordination among Federal programs is essential if the objective of
orderly urban development is to be attained." This assessment was
directed mainly at problems of waste, duplication, and misuse of
resources and strongly appealed to widely held public and Congres-
sional concern with government efficiency and economy.2 6
By the mid 1960s public concern, academic scrutiny, and congres-
sional interest in coordination reached a new peak. During this time
period (March 1966), Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, chiarman of the
Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, presented a detailed
analysis of the coordination problem at all levels of government and a
series of proposed remedial measures, which he said had grown out of a
three-year subcommittee study. He told the Senate:
We found substantial competing and overlapping of federal programs,
sometimes as a direct result of legislation and sometimes as a result
of empire building. Similar competition and duplication were found
at the state and local levels. We learned that too many federal aid
officials are not interested in, and in fact are even hostile to
coordinating programs within and between departments, and that they
are reluctant to encourage coordination and planning at state and
local levels. These conditions frequently and predictably result in
confusing and conflicting requirements which discourage state and
local participation, and adversely affect the administrative struc-
ture and fiscal organization in these jurisdictions. . . .
In short, we found conflict between professional administrators
at the Federal level and less professional administrators at the
state and local levels, between line agency officials and elected
policymakers at all levels, between administrators of one aid program
and those of another; between specialized middle-management officials
and generalists in the top-management category, and between standpat
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bureau heads and innovators seeking to strengthen the decision-making
process at all levels.
The picture, then, is one of too much tension and conflict rather
than coordination and cooperation all along the line of administra-
tion - from top federal policy-makers and administrators to the state
and local professional administrators and elected officials.2 7
During the same period John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare told the Muskie subcommittee:
. . coordination among Federal agencies leaves much to be desired.
Communication between the various levels of government - Federal,
State and local - is casual and ineffective. State and local govern-
ment is in most areas seriously inadequate. 2 8
Such criticism continued throughout the sixties.
In March 1968, for example, Mayor Henry W. Maier of Milwaukee,
appearing on a national television show, protested that "a whole maze
of some thirty possible agencies involving the city, the county, the
state, and the Federal Government, and yes, the private sector" might
be dealing with the welfare problems of a single family, and went on:
The thing is duplicated from top to bottom. We have now a general in
HUD, we have a general in OEO, we have a general in HEW, at the top,
and each one of these generals goes down the line to deal with the
generals at the county level, the city level, the private sector. And
I think that what we ought to have is. . .something that parallels a
Joint Chiefs of Staff, starting at the top, some models of coordina-
tion going down to the bottom. . . .29
And later in that year both party platforms took cognizance of the admin-
istrative problems. The Republicans promised "a complete overhaul and
restructuring of the competing and overlapping jumble of Federal programs
to enable state and local government to focus on priority objectives."
The Democrats pledged to "give priority to simplifying and streamlining
the processes of government, particularly in the management of the great
innovative programs enacted in the 1960s." Acknowledging the existence
of "duplication, administrative confusion, and delay," the platform
pledged to "seek to streamline this machinery by improving coordination
and management of federal programs." 3 0
That was in the late sixties. During the late seventies the
present Carter Administration in its early reports and plans for reorgan-
ization of the government reactivated many of the old key "buzz words" and
phrases often heard before, i.e., promote coordination, streamline admin-
istration, improve manageability, minimize duplication and overlap, etc.
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In a specific memorandum on the administration of the grant-in-aid system
(September 9, 1977), the President first noted that "as programs have
proliferated, (the system) has grown increasingly irrational, ineffi-
cient, and insensitive to the various local needs and idiosyncracies it
was originally designed to accommodate."31 The President then in the same
memorandum asked the ACIR to "suggest, after one year, appropriate ways to
further streamline federal aid administration practices." 3 2
In March of 1978 the American Society for Public Administration
appointed a Special Task Force on Intergovernmental Management to examine
the needs for the improvement of managerial techniques in such intergov-
ernmental areas as program evaluation, measurement and enhancement of
productivity and effectiveness, personnel management, and red tape cut-
ting. The task force goal was to help ensure that "responsible officials
at the national, state, and local levels join together in planning with
care and thoroughness how public programs should be administered."33 The
task force after a year's study and operation noted in its final report
titled Strengthening Intergovernmental Management: An Agenda for Reform,
April 1979, that "vital domestic programs are severely handicapped and
sometimes fail because of the frequent failure to provide effective coor-
dination and management at each level of the Federal system."34 Overall,
it seems nothing much has changed through history except that there are
now new perceivers of old problems. Yet, it is clear that the theme of
coordination has emerged as an "action channel" or regularized means of
taking action in overcoming bureaucratic problems and improving govern-
ment effectiveness and efficiency.
Dynamic Properties
Historically then, no phrase seems to express as frequent a
complaint about the federal government as does "lack of coordination."
Nor does there appear to be a suggestion for reform more common than "what
we need is more coordination."35 Slimilarly, no term seems to be as simple
in intent and sound but as complex in definition and execution as coordi-
nation.
Aaron Wildavsky quite profoundly summarizes the "coordination
33
dilemma" in his work entitled, The Politics of the Budgetary Process. He
states that:
* . .as long as the lack of coordination is the result of ignorance of
other people's activities or the complexity of organization, there is
a good chance of overcoming it by dedicated staff work or some formal
mechanism to accomplish the intended result. But in many cases, lack
of coordination is a result of conflicting views about policy that are
held by men and agencies that have independent bases of influence in
society and in Congress. The only way to secure coordination in these
cases is for one side to convince or coerce or bargain with the other.
When it is understood that "coordination" is often just another word
for "coercion," the full magnitude of the problem becomes apparent. 3 6
Perhaps Wildavsky is too extreme in viewing coordination as being
synonymous with "coercion." Hopefully, coordination in its early stages
attempts, through amicable means, to achieve mutually advantageous ends
among organizations or agencies not necessarily in conflict--just obliv-
ious to each other's activities or potential for supportive interaction.
The "catch 22" of coordination may be that its achievement is often just
as complex and burdensome if not more so than the problems it seeks to
ameliorate in the federal sector. In other words, the solution becomes a
problem because of the nature of the problems it seeks to solve and the
nature of the arena in which it must be implemented.
The fact that many journalists, scholars, and politicians have
given great attention to the problems of securing agreement among con-
tending groups, attests to both the significance, and the complexity of
the coordination process.37 The central theme in such unresolved inter-
est appears to be the belief that greater knowledge of how successful
coordination of federal agencies can be achieved could improve the design
of initial program implementation strategies and enhance the successful
administrative operation of programs.
Literature Review
In terms of defining planning in relation to coordination, a HUD
document entitled State Planning: Intergovernmental Policy Coordination
notes the Utah State Planning Advisory Committee's concept of agency
planning coordination as very significant. The philosophy of the Utah
approach is as follows:
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If planning is not coordinated it is not comprehensive; it is there-
fore functional (where functional planning is that planning oriented
toward a response to a single problem or set of problems). Such
planning involves a single-agency perspective, and most often due to
its rather restricted scope, is incapable of dealing with the complex
causes underlying any problem and largely responds merely to symp-
toms. Functional planning is incapable of providing the basis for
truly effective government which requires a far more comprehensive
understanding of problems, accumulation of data, and formulation
analysis of alternatives as a minimum requirement. A coordinated
approach to such matters among all agencies is a necessary element of
comprehensive planning and a rational decision process.3 8
In a very simplistic sense, as stated earlier, coordination can
be best summarized as the politics of reaching agreement. This is a view
of coordination derived from Erwin C. Hargrove's Urban Institute work on
the implementation of social policy. Similarly Aaron Wildavsky in his
work entitled The Politics of the Budgetary Process states that coordina-
tion can be understood as the extent to which participants in a process
simply take into account what others do. Wildavsky sees coordination as
largely including those great many adjustments made in public programs in
"anticipation" of what other participants are likely to do. Specifically
he states:
To some the procedure by which agencies try to gauge 'what will go'
(in terms of new programs) can be defined as coordination. Conse-
quently the justification for certain programs becomes based on the
subjective interpretations of signals from the environment and is
directly linked to the fact that they are deemed desirable by others.
What is often overlooked is that these informal procedures are also
powerful coordinating mechanisms. When one thinks of all the parti-
cipants who are continuously engaged in interpreting the wishes of
others, who try to feel the pulse of Congress, the President, interest
groups and special publics, it is clear that a great many adjustment
are made in anticipation of what other participants are likely to
do.39
Finally, Charles E. Lindblom's (an often quoted original thinker
on government and organizational issues) tentative definition of coordi-
nation implies that "a set of interdependent decisions is coordinated if
each decision is adapted to the others in such a way that for each
adjusted decision, the adjustment is thought to be better than no adjust-
ment in the eyes of at least one decision maker." 4 0
In general, the objective of coordination has come to embrace in
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public consciousness and discussion, a wide range of improvements in
intergovernmental relationships:
Indeed, almost any change in organization, relationships, policies,
practices, projects, or programs that might resolve whatever conflict
or hiatus in the federal-state-local chain of relationships the user
of the term may happen to be concerned with. A term whose meanings
are so broad, so loose, and so varied may seem virtually without
meaning at all. But this is a problem--recognized by Presidents,
cabinet members, governors, mayors, and observers of every station. 4 1
The use of a single term to so comprehensively describe the
potential solution to a whole array of bureaucratic problems is a recogni-
tion that, in all its many and varied aspects there is still only a single
problem to be dealt with. Thus "coordination" serves the purpose of a
convenient shorthand for a range of concepts related to bureaucratic
functioning.
Basically, the concept of coordination appears to be predicted on
the assumption that participants enmeshed in a common enterprise, linked
by a common framework or seeking similar ends whether by design or happen-
stance may act in a contradictory or antagonistic fashion because of
ignorance. However, it is assumed that when informed of their place in
the scheme of things, they may be expected to interact more harmoniously.
The essence of coordination then appears to be embodied in the "communica-
tion process" the act of informing.
My research definition for coordination is more specific and nar-
row in scope. I view coordination as an accepted governmental process in
which Federal agencies are brought together to form a collective effort
to: expedite project processing by eliminating wasteful practices or
repetitious patterns of action; combine their related sets of existing
resources to focus on a particular problem or target population's needs
and forestall communication problems on or discrepancies over project
eligibility among different agencies and between different levels of the
same agency.
Operational Frameworks
Just as complex and challenging as the basic definition of coor-
dination, is the array of operational frameworks or classifications of
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types of coordination to be observed. Several illustrations should make
the case in point. However, the following illustrations do not represent
the entire universe of possibility but rather reflect the general sub-
stance of reality (what exists).
James D. Mooney
One early operational perspective on coordination has been
offered by James D. Mooney in an essay found in a 1937 public administra-
tion document entitled "Papers on the Science of Administration" by L. H.
Gulick and L. Urwick. Mooney specifies five "principles:" (1) perpendic-
ular coordination; (2) horizontal coordination; (3) leadership; (4) dele-
gation; and (5) authority as significant to understanding organizational
interaction. The main body of his writing rests on describing two forms
of coordination, the perpendicular and the horizontal. He states the
principle of perpendicular coordination is expressed in the single word
authority. Specifically, he adds that authority must have a clearly
defined process through which it projects itself throughout an entire
organization, so that everyone in the institutions participates in the
exercise of this authority according to the nature of his duties.4 2
Perpendicular Coordination
Thus perpendicular coordination operates through leadership and
the delegation of authority. This form of coordination seems to revolve
around the control of operations by some central authority or acknowl-
edged decision maker. Hence, the exercise of power decisions or accommo-
dations is strictly a top-down phenomenon with precise follow through on
delegated responsibilities by subordinates mandated from above.
Horizontal Coordination
On the other hand horizontal coordination operates not through
authority and the function of command, but through the universal service
of knowledge. A key factor connected with horizontal coordination is that
of "indoctination in the common purpose, which is essential to the true
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intelligence of concerted effort."43 Mooney states that horizontal coor-
dination is:
. . the principle that indoctrinates every member of the group in
the common purpose, and thus insures the highest collective effi-
ciency and intelligence in the pursuit of the objective. It is not
the leader alone who has things to make known to his subordinates
through the usual channels of staff service. These subordinates may
likewise have something important to tell the leader; things that he
should know in the exercise of his leadership. They may also have
important things to tell each other, and this mutuality of things to
be made known extends upwards, downwards, and sideways, from the very
top to the bottom of the organized structure.4 4
Essentially Mooney's principle of horizontal coordination
embraces the notion that effective lines of communication dictate the
capacity of an organization to maintain a complex, highly productive and
efficient pattern of activity. In a larger view, horizontal coordination
insures productive involvement in a process through effective communica-
tion of a common purpose or goal and the internalization of said objec-
tives by all participants.
Charles E. Lindblom
Mooney's theories of perpendicular and horizontal coordination
seem to be early formulations that might have laid the foundation of
thought for later theoretical frameworks like that of Charles E.
Lindblom. The most indelible imprint on the thinking of political scien-
tists with regard to interagency relationships appears to have been made
by Charles E. Lindblom and his book The Intelligence of Democracy.
Lindblom's book offers a classic analysis of the methods and comparative
advantages in various circumstances, of two general types of coordination
processes--"central coordination," or coordination by a decision maker,
and "mutual adjustment," or lateral adaptation in the absence of a central
decision maker (plus of course, combinations of the two).
Overall, Lindblom has identified four general types of coordina-
tion: central coordination; mutual adjustment; cooperative discussion,
and partisan mutual adjustment. In central coordination, individual de-
cision makers adapt to one another on instructions from a central regulat-
ing authority. At the other extreme is mutual adjustment, a process in
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which no central mind or decision maker exercises any coordinating re-
sponsibility. The most familiar mutual adjustment process is negotia-
tions among independent agencies. The third basic type of coordination
that Lindblom identifies, is cooperative discussion among decision makers
in which the group as a whole plays the role of the central regulator. In
this form of coordination, decision makers are in substantial agreement
on criteria for resolving their problems, and they cooperate rather than
bargain or negotiate with each other (this form of coordination is often
typified by a "task force" approach to coordination). This form of
coordination requires the participants to agree on common values and
purposes and to maintain that agreement overtime.4 5
Partisan Mutual Adjustment
The most significant form of coordination that is discussed at
length by Lindblom is partisan mutual adjustment, which appears to be the
most typical interagency relationship to be found in the federal govern-
ment. In this form of coordination, each participant makes decisions
calculated to serve his own goals, not goals necessarily shared by other
interdependent decision makers. He may make decisions counter to his own
goals only to the extent that he is in turn controlled by other partisans
or by central supervision. For this process to work, the participants
need only agree on a course of action at a particular time. They do not
have to reach consensus on goals or values in order to reach an agreement
on what to do. Each may subscribe to a common decision for his own
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reasons.
Overall, Charles E. Lindblom appears to have mapped out in gen-
eral terms a very useful framework for analyzing or viewing federal coor-
dination. In fact, close scrutiny of other models of interagency coordi-
nation seem to reveal that they usually are general variations on the
basic themes set forth by Lindblom. For example, the San Francisco
Federal Executive Board-Oakland Task Force published a 1968 report, An
Analysis of Federal Decision Making in Urban Areas that offers three
coordinative models termed "central direction," "mutual interaction," and
"adaptation." The first model seems to be a renaming or slight word
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modification of Lindblom's central coordination concept, while the last
two models appear to be subtypes of Lindblom's "mutual adjustment" model.
The San Francisco Federal Executive Board (SF/FEB) coordination
model largely reflects the consolidation of information and knowledge
drawn from a self-critique of federal involvement in Oakland and then
offered as a basic insight into federal decision making in urban areas in
general. Although the Oakland study focuses on discussing many of the
impediments to interagency coordination, its major contribution to the
present discussion is its development of a very simplistic typology for
classifying types of coordination. For example, Central Direction, ac-
cording to the SF/FEB typology is a form of coordination which is usually
carried out through some type of executive mandate or formal order and
whose participants or players as a prerequisite must share some kind of
defined common purposes. The SF/FEB contend that Central Direction is
illustrated by efforts at overall departmental planning or synoptic long
and short range planning. The SF/FEB views Mutual Interaction as a form
of coordination when interaction between participants is represented by a
general sharing of information, goal advancement through persuasive be-
havior (i.e., verbal attempts to win over the support of different players
to the cause at hand by appeals to reason) and nonviolation of some code
of ethics (i.e., playing by the rules of the game, however they may be
defined). In Mutual Interaction there are some shared defined purposes
and some degree of mutual understanding as to inter-and intra-departmen-
tal objectives. Mutual Interaction is illustrated by both functional
short and long range planning. Finally in Adaptation, the SF/FEB sees the
coordination process as involving negotiation, bargaining, and chance.
In this form of coordination, participants often may only minimally share
defined purposes or have limited knowledge of other departments' or agen-
cies' purposes. In fact, to some degree there may exist competing pur-
poses between participants. This form of coordination is largely person-
ified by ad hoc or short range planning such as found in coalitional
structures. The coordination models used in this typology primarily
represent abstractions from the various types of coordination observed in
the Oakland experience. It is possible that various combinations and
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permutations incorporating one of more of the characteristics of each
model may be observed in analyzing other coordinative processes. How-
ever, despite problems of achieving a pure typology, this basic classifi-
cation system offers a means to identify and measure coordination tenden-
cies in different situations and among different agencies. 4 7
Problems and Promises
Problems
The FEB/Oakland study provides some useful examples of problems
and lessons to be learned in coordinating federal agencies. The
FEB/Oakland study was essentially an introspective analysis of federal
processes, federal decision makers, and federal programs in Oakland. The
general mission of the Oakland Task Force (initiated in July 1967) which
worked in cooperation with the mayor and city council was to: evaluate the
federal tools then available in terms of the total problems in Oakland,
design a more coordinated mix of these tools, and propose priorities for
federal investment in Oakland.
The FEB/Oakland study besides chronicling some of the common
impediments to interagency coordination (i.e., complex variations in:
agency mission and objectives; sign-off processes, application processing
systems; program routing systems; program eligibility and funding
requirements, as well as differing patterns of authority) identifies some
common failings in approaches taken to develop coordinative process from
which some learned lessons might be drawn. For example, the study notes
that two programs (the Concentrated Employment Program and the Neighbor-
hood Center Pilot Program) reflected attempts to develop a common federal
strategy via different approaches. 4 8
Both programs were premised on an interventionist strategy, that
is, both programs were introduced into Oakland without their being asked
for by the city. Conversely, other programs reflected a federal strategy
premises on response. The city of Oakland prepared and filed an applica-
tion asking for program funds before it was designated as a recipient of
said assistance. The inference that might be drawn here is that
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coordinative approaches which tend to be the result of "outside planning"
and impinge (i.e., do not seek or invite preliminary participation,
consideration, advice, or discussion with consumers or key facilitators
of the process) run the risk of alienating key segments of the
bureaucratic delivery system.
My experience with federal agencies greatly supports this thesis.
Seemingly when coordination planning originates outside the closed circle
of key agency program facilitators (i.e., career civil servants) then
automatic barriers are set up. This is especially true if "structured
participation" opportunities are not created to at least give the illu-
sion of democratic involvement. The most dramatic illustration of the
need to have some sensitivity to the "up front participation" problem in
coordination decision planning is given by some NCPP dialogue drawn from
the Oakland experience. One city official stated the following:
Look, we didn't ask for the program. It came to us. Now they tell us
funds are being cut back, and they're changing the rules of the game.
If we had known this was going to happen, we wouldn't have gotten
involved. Why accept the headaches? The program doesn't really solve
our problems anyway.4 9
Promises
The positive implications of federal agency coordination are
often based on an imprecise set of general objectives and/or anticipated
results. For example, some of the common objectives or incentives that
are used to bring agencies to the coordination conference table are: to
control fragmented and disjointed program activity; to eliminate duplica-
tion and inefficient efforts; to curtail the nonstrategic use of limited
resources; to decrease red tape and untimely delays in project develop-
ment; to decrease complicated and vague communications on programs to the
public, within and between agencies, and/or to clear up misleading policy
stances that are counterproductive to interagency cooperation. Most
often, however, the federal case for coordination is stated in terms of
the need to avoid the development of strategies and programs that are
inconsistent, duplicative, or in conflict with one another.5 0
Basically, the coordinative process implies a decision making
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system which illustrates conscious and purposeful interaction between two
or more decision makers. An assumption is made that the results of a
common strategy and a coordinative process will be more satisfactory to
one or more of the decision makers than individual action taken by any one
of them, without a common strategy and a coordinated process. Put more
succinctly, a coordinated decision would be a "decision which, at best, is
in harmony with other decisions, and at worst, is not inimical to other
decisions."51
The interrelatedness and interdependencies of federal-state-
local government operation should make the necessity for coodination evi-
dent to anyone involved in public policy formulation or program adminis-
tration. Hence a formal purpose for federal agency coordination can be
stated as being to harmonize relations, activities, and objectives within
and between governmental units to improve the intergovernmental delivery
of services.52 The real challenge or promise of coordination is to evolve
a uniform approach to attacking and managing specific problems in a manner
that reflects administrative priorities of a number of agencies.53
One of the key promises of coordination, from the perspective of
disadvantaged target populations, is its potential to overcome the prob-
lems of piecemeal implementation of new programs or projects. For exam-
ple, the need to overcome such problems was a major motivating factor
behind the development of a National Rural Cable TV Development Task Force
as a coordinative mechanism (I was significantly involved in the develop-
ment of this task force while working for the Cablecommunications
Resource Center). CRC, in developing this task force, had gleaned one
highly important fact from its past experience with federal agencies and
that was the piecemeal or "cafeteria shopping" approach to finding finan-
cial support for new minority ventures was a di.fficult undertaking
fraught with endless and repetitive tasks, bureaucratic red tape, and
basic communication problems surrounding just defining and qualifying new
projects like cable TV as fundable ventures under different program
guidelines. Furthermore, the project-by-project approach, besides being
cumbersome and time consuming, often resulted in delays which discouraged
clients, and ultimately resulted in the dissipation of well conceived
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projects because of loss of carefully recruited participants. Sar A.
Levitan echoes these same realities on the project-by-project approach in
his book Federal Training and Work Programs in the Sixties, 1969.54
In a certain sense the key to successful coordination rests in the
communication of priorities or mandates along a network of organizational
units. This notion supports a "communications theory" of coordination in
which a lack of coordination is viewed as the result of ignorance of other
people's activities or the complexity of organizations that subvert imme-
diate information flow or action. Within a "communications theory" of
coordination, anything that slows down, impedes, or distorts the communi-
cative process, i.e., bureaucratic "red tape", would be seen as "noise" or
interference.
Although basic communication among agencies about common goals,
objectives, or projects is a necessary part of coordination, it is not
sufficient unto itself. Effective coordination requires a formal proce-
dure for putting people who need to talk to one another in a position of
having to talk to one another. In addition, they must work to identify
and understand their areas of mutual interest and conflict, and then must
cooperate in pursuit of common interests and in negotiating their
differences.55 A formal multi-agency planning process often provides the
proper environment for integrating common interest and the framework for
negotiating individual differences. A major coordinative mechanism that
can help to create a forum for such communication is an ad hoc multi-
agency task force.
Coordinative Mechanisms
Task Force
The utilization of coordination structures such as task forces
usually offers the opportunity of creating a forum or positive environ-
ment for mediating interagency program conflicts, opening lines of com-
munications, facilitating jointly-funded projects, and prodding slow mov-
ing bureaucrats.
Business firms and government agencies resort often to task
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forces to respond to crisis. In industry, the emergency may be due to the
loss of production capacity, to the threat of competitive innovation, or
to drastic change in the economic climate. In public affairs new problems
affecting the community may urgently require solution. In all these
cases, answers of adequate scope obviously call for coordinated, consoli-
dated efforts and conclusions of a composite team of specialists and
decision makers.5 6
In a hypothetical public crisis situation after some internal or
external prodding, a chief official usually calls together senior repre-
sentatives from major agencies or departments to organize a crash attack
on some significant issue. The problem is analyzed, possible remedies are
weighed, and a plan of action is adopted. High priority is assigned to
the program. The diverse skills, experience, manpower, political clout,
and financial resources of the participating organizations are mobilized,
coordination of all activities is exerted by a task force leader, and in
due course, the selected response to the crisis is put into operation.
Eventually an open forum for communication is created.
This is a basic scenario for a coordinated task force attack on a
major problem. The emphasis is on drawing upon the collective talents and
resources of various agencies to solve the problem at hand. The signifi-
cance of the problem or issue presumably demands or calls forth vigorous
efforts from agency representatives and top administrators. Initiative
and creative thinking are encouraged. Channels of communication are
forced open among operating departments and staff groups. In essence,
task forces are those entities in which the efforts of the group are
coordinated toward the solving of a defined task. 5 7
Too often, however, attempts at coordinating federal activity
through the activation of task force structures can become ineffectual
beyond providing a forum for discussion of mutual problems. This is
because such mechanisms do not possess (or more precisely do not seek to
establish) any real power for administratively expediting newly proposed
project development priorities among involved agencies. Basically, most
task force structures lack control over funds (present budgets and future
appropriations) or contracting procedures of member organizations and
45
hence lack "power" to promote compliance through budgetary rewards or to
discourage foot-dragging through cutbacks. As a result the success of
such coordination processes is usually dependent upon the personal re-
sources and effectiveness of task force members, some appointed for their
ability and others for their availability.58 Too often the latter case
tends to supercede the former, resulting in only lip service being paid to
proposed initiatives. In fact the functional capacity of task force
mechanisms to mediate interagency disputes, unclog lines of communica-
tion, finesse jointly-funded projects, and/or prod slow-moving bureau-
crats is usually inextricably linked to the participation and commitment
of top level career agency officials and decision makers in the task force
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process.
Interagency Councils
Besides basic ad hoc task force structures there are several
other mechanisms that can provide an "active forum" for promoting the high
level of communication and dynamic interaction needed to achieve success-
ful coordination. In some instances formal interagency and intergovern-
mental councils provide the mechanism for communication among certain
agencies and ensure coordination. For example, the focal point to mobi-
lize federal departments and agencies to support minority entrepreneurs
is the Interagency Council for Minority Business Enterprise (IAC).
Chaired by the Under Secretary of Commerce, IAC members include under
secretary level officials of almost every federal agency. The Council
works through task forces for procurement, concessions, education and
training, and data; and it meets periodically to review progress and to
develop new initiatives. Interagency activities are coordinated locally
by Minority Business Opportunity Committees (MBOCs). MBOC members are
officials of various federal agencies who are based in the field. 6 0
On a regional level within the government there are Federal
Regional Councils (FRCs). FRCs have been in existence since 1969, but
they were first given official status by an Executive Order issued in
February 1972. This order established an FRC for each of the ten standard
federal regions. Council members include the regional director,
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administrator, or secretarial representative of each of the eleven member
agencies and two ad hoc member agencies:
Department of the Interior
Department of the Agriculture
Department of the Commerce
Department of the Labor
Department of the Health, Education, and Welfare
Department of the Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Transportation
Community Services Administration
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Energy Administration
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
Civil Service Commission (ad hoc)
Appalachian Regional Commission (ad hoc)
The overall purpose of the FRC is the effective coordination of
the grant-making activities of the Federal government. If effectively
accomplished, the end result will be more productive use of federal dol-
lars, better relations between federal, state, and local units of govern-
ment, and greater responsiveness to the needs of the people. The Execu-
tive Order which established the FRCs prescribed eight functions that
should be performed to accomplish these goals:
1, The development of short-term regional interagency strategies and
mechanisms for program delivery.
2. The development of integrated program and funding plans with
governors and local chief executives.
3. The encouragement of joint and complementary grant applications
for related programs.
4. The expeditious resolution of interagency conflicts and coordina-
tion problems.
5. The evaluation of programs in which two or more member agencies
participate.
6. The development of long-term regional interagency and intergov-
ernmental strategies for resource allocations to better respond
to the needs of states and local communities.
7. The supervision of regional interagency program coordination
mechanisms.
8. The development of administrative procedures to facilitate day-
to-day interagency and intergovernmental cooperation.6 1
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Interagency Agreements
Another tool used to formalize the coordination process is the
interagency agreement. On the programmatic level of day-to-day opera-
tion, a number of ad hoc interdepartmental agreements have been negoti-
ated between various agencies. In practice such written agreements help
to: formalize the commitment of an agency to a specific undertaking;
serve as a program leveraging tool (an agreed upon mandate to be used to
prod slow-moving segments of the agency when needed) to elicit positive
responses from administrative agency personnel in processing new project
materials and developing a yardstick of responsibilities by which com-
pliance to agreed upon goals and objectives can be measured. Overall, the
general intent of such agreements is essentially to protect agency juris-
dictions and, as all treaties among equals, these agreements are subject
to revocation by either party. Nevertheless, they have provided for joint
operation of programs, transfer of funds, or the purchase and exchange of
services. There have been several hundred ad hoc interagency agreements
drawn up between agencies that can be defined as either joint funding or
coupling contracts for specific projects. Under the former, one or more
federal funding sources transfer funds to a single agency which acts as
sponsor of a local project. Conversely, the coupled contracts involve
negotiations by a local agency with a number of funding sources for the
operation of a single project.6 2
A 1976 research report, Economic Development Through State Plan-
ning, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce made a survey of
48 states' utilization of various kinds of program coordination mecha-
nisms. Within the findings of this survey the largest number of states
(25) mentioned interagency cabinets, councils, commissions, and task
forces as the coordinative mechanisms used the most. The second highest
number of states (20) mentioned the review of agency plans and programs as
one of their modes for program coordination. Interagency contract par-
ticipation as a coordination mechanism was among a group of mechanisms
used with the least amount of frequency by the states surveyed (see
exhibit 1 for detailed summary of responses).63 Overall this study lends
further support to the realization that coordination is both an accepted
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EXHIBIT I*
Number of states
listing each
mechanism
By what institutional or program mechanisms does
the state planning agency link Policy and
Coordinative Planning (presumably done by the state
planning agency) with the Functional and Management
Planning activities of state agencies:
25 Interagency cabinets, councils, commissions, and
task forces
20 Review of agency plans and programs, and MBO
18 A-95 review
9 State comprehensive plan
9 Informal relationships
7 Written policy guidance
3 Special research and issue papers
3 Intergovernmental relations council and substate
regional councils
3 State budget and capital programming process
3 Technical assistance
3 Futures commissions and goal-setting processes
with public participation
1 Uniform data base
1 Integrated Grants Administration (IGA)
1 Multi-state regional organizations
1 Imposition of planning requirements
1 Program implementation by state planning agency
1 Formulation and review of legislation
1 Environmental Impact Statement process
1 Governor's office
1 Interagency contract participation
SOURCE: David K. Hartley, Economic Development Through State
Planning (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce Economic
Development Administration, August 1976) :31, chart 3.
*Responses to State Survey, question 111 (6)
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goal or pursuit within government operation and a regularized process for
handling bureaucratic interface problems as evidenced by the varied mech-
anisms chronicled in use.
Coordination: An Established Government Action Channel
A review of the extensive history, various theories, detailed
literature, and different mechanisms for coordination attest to the
reality that despite the fact that coordination is a difficult process to
achieve, it has emerged institutionally as an accepted or regularized
means of taking governmental action in handling certain bureaucratic
problems. Graham T. Allison, in his book Essence of Decision has defined
any regularized means of taking governmental action as an "action-
channel." Allison indicates that action-channels structure the govern-
ment game by "preselecting the major players, determining their usual
points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages
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and disadvantages for each game." In a simplistic sense, the major
activity from which government decision and action (e.g., arbitrating the
beneficiaries of scarce resources) emerge can be best characterized as
bargaining along various regularized channels among individual members of
the government and outside interest groups or power forces.65 If one
accepts the notion that government is a more or less complex arena for
internal bargaining among different bureaucratic elements, political per-
sonalities, and external vested interest groups that collectively, but
disjointedly comprise its working apparatus--then government action can
be viewed as the political resultant or product of their interaction. The
influence that any target population has over receiving benefits from
this system are based on the bargaining advantages that any group pos-
sesses and their ability to enter the circle of key players in the deci-
sion making process. Thus, "what moves the chess pieces in the government
game is not simply the reasons that support a course of action, or the
routines of organizations that enact an alternative, but the power and
skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question."6 6
Coordination: Addressing the Uneven Power Balance
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Studies and research concerned with the improvement of Federal
policy and program implementation via coordination or other means make
some prior assumption about the need for and desirability of such improve-
ment. Furthermore, in making this assumption one cannot and should not
sidestep the issue of the distribution of political power, since the idea
for improving government service takes the notion of uneven distribution
of power among competing interests for granted.67 Basically, the public
administrative process can be conceived in terms of a continuous arbitra-
tion over the distribution of scarce resources among conflicting inter-
ests who possess, and exercise, uneven power or influence over such gov-
ernment decision making.
Persons in powerful positions, corporations with professional
lobbyists, and organizations in a position to influence the media often
outmaneuver, outbargain, and outcommunicate disadvantaged groups that
lack clear channels, platforms, money, and influence with which to
amplify their voices and concerns.68 A newspaper blurb in The Washington
Post (March 9, 1980) has recorded that many congressmen have noted that
the public good is often ignored by many public officials under the
influence of big business. Specifically, the article chronicles the fact
that Representative Richard Nolan (D-Minnesota) has decided to retire
after only three congressional terms upon observing that "Justice, public
need and truth are too often ignored, compromised and trampled on through
the excessive and abusing influence over public policy by big money and
multinational corporations."69 Consequently, government policies and pro-
grams often militate against disadvantaged groups, who are less well
organized and less vociferous than other more politically powerful
groups.
Walter E. Williams, in a 1977 Policy Review article titled
"Government Sanctioned Restraints That Reduce Economic Opportunities for
Minorities," has indicated that many if not most of the problems encoun-
tered by minorities in entering the mainstream of society are "due to the
excessess of governments dominated by politically powerful interest
groups."70 Williams goes on to suggest that in the governmental/politi-
cal arena "the decision-making criteria approximates majority rule.
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Almost by definition competition in the political arena is one where a
minority group is going to be most handicapped."71 He further states that
while "occasionally the majority will take measures that will benefit
minorities, most often the majority (those in positions of power for
decision making) will act in ways that it perceives as being in its own
best interest, which may not coincide with minority interests."7 2
When the allocation of resources occurs through a politically
power-bias system, the peculiar (often arbitrary and capricious) inter-
pretations and execution of "the rules of the game" spell disaster for
certain segments of the population. Most often the way the "rules of the
game" are played produce adverse effects for minorities in such areas as
housing, education, economic development, and other public services. 7 3
Business Loan Programs: An Example of Uneven Service
Disadvantaged populations without power, informal influence, or
significant bargaining advantages have not faired well in successfully
lobbying the government system for their fair share of services. Nowhere
has this reality been borne out more than in disadvantaged populations'
attempts to access funds and receive due process from various government
business loan programs such as those of the Small Business Administration
(SBA) and the Economic Development Administration (EDA).
Negative Attitudes and Stigmas
Studies that have dealt with the politics of business loan pro-
grams have recorded the negative attitudes held by loan officials against
disadvantaged groups. Pressman and Wildavsky's book Implementation, has
recorded some of the prevailing philosophies that have often guided busi-
ness loan officials to automatically react unfavorably to project appli-
cations submitted by disadvantaged groups. For example, most EDA busi-
ness loan officers are of the opinion that "if a man needed a great deal
of assistance he couldn't be a good businessman." Business loan offi-
cials' low expectations for disadvantaged groups' success even with
assistance has been sarcastically summarized as follows:
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You start with poor borrowers. Then the poor borrower has to hire the
world's poorest work force. Then we expect him to compete with rich
businessmen with experienced work forces. 7 5
Furthermore, in the minds of most loan officials the process of just
applying for government funds casts an added negative stigma on disadvan-
taged groups. It is generally felt that anyone who applies for a govern-
ment loan because he cannot get financing through commercial channels
must be a bad risk. 7 6
Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart's book, The Promise of Great-
ness, has recorded that a prevailing opinion which has surfaced among SBA
officials since its creation is that business development in low-income
communities and support of minority entrepreneurship are very risky ven-
tures. In consequence to this belief, SBA tends to be just as conser-
vative if not more so than traditional banking institutions. Further-
more, a double standard seems to exist where disadvantaged entrepreneurs
with legitimate needs are often sidetracked or completely ignored while
more attractive majority businesses gain fluid access to SBA funds. A New
York Times article dated Sunday, May 28, 1978, has chronicled that:
. . there were charges leveled against SBA, at Senate hearings in
1977 that the program was used for political purposes. Witnesses
contended that, as the 1972 election approached, Government contracts
for minority businesses were awarded as fast as possible to make the
Republican party look good. 7 8
The article goes on to indicate that the failure rate of Section 8-A
minority businesses ran as high as 80 percent. Testimony at the hearings
also disclosed that "many minority companies in the program were really
fronts controlled by white businessmen, who siphoned off the profits."7 9
There have been other documented cases of questionable actions taken by
SBA. In 1978, The Washington Post, Jet Magazine, and the New York Times,
among a number of publications, carried the story that a white TV host
(Tom Brokaw) of the NBC, "Today Show" received a "minority" loan to
purchase a radio station in South Dakota. To quote one article directly:
"The original intent of the SBA minority loans was to stir interest among
minorities to purchase broadcast properties." 80 Brokaw, in 1978, earned
a yearly salary of $259,000 and owned a home in Washington, D.C. valued at
more than $250,000. But, as the head of "Tom Tom Communications," he was
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loaned the cash to buy the station.8 1
"A spokesman for the SBA said that the agency thought Brokaw's
company was 'an indian enterprise.'" 8 2 Government insiders realize that
such a statement is a complete farce since all applicants for SBA loans
must file forms that list complete business and personal information on
every member of the corporation.
The Washington Post article on the brouhaha indicated that SBA's
special broadcasting loan program "was designed to help potential minor-
ity businessmen."83 Yet, "only 7 of the 32 firms that have received the
first loans or loan guarantees from the Small Business Administration"
have been owned by minorities. An FCC Commissioner, Tyrone Brown, who was
asked to comment on the situation stated that the Brokaw transaction
"certainly does not fall into the category of assistance to entrepreneurs
from disadvantaged and minority groups which was announced with much
fanfare in January (when the SBA program was first announced)."84 What
was most ironic about the situation, but not reported in the papers, was
the fact that the SBA special broadcasting loan program only came about
after various minority groups (lead by CRC) and the FCC (again prompted by
CRC) convinced "SBA to reverse its long-standing policy of not loaning or
guaranteeing money for broadcasting outlets."8 5
Overlooked and Under Financed
Much of the literature on SBA and EDA programs relate a history of
either funding projects of non-disadvantaged groups that really do not
have a valid need for a loan (meaning they could have gotten money from
other sources, e.g., commercial banks), or when lending money to disad-
vantaged groups, making critical errors that have increased their failure
risk. Pressman and Wildavsky's book, Implementation, has offered a past
example of the first reality in reporting EDA's funding of a Colombo
Baking Company. The book indicates that the Colombo Baking Company, a
majority owned company, used an EDA loan "to finance expansion and automa-
tion rather than employment positions."86 EDA's own internal report on
the loan indicated that "it is apparent that Colombo did not need a loan
from EDA. Clearly, Colombo was in a financial position to seek and get
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commercial money or possibly finance the proposed expansion itself." 8 7
The internal EDA report also chronicled the fact that Colombo Bakery only
minimally contributed to job creation for minorities. 8 8
Disadvantaged entrepreneurs that have gotten government business
loan assistance, historically have tended to be under finance, often
leading to their ultimate demise. SBA, for example, has a reputation of
letting money out, that it does give to minorities, "in drips and drabs,"
or in such a fashion that it significantly under capitalizes and seriously
undermines the chances for success of a business.89 The common SBA
pattern and practice of not giving out the entire working capital loan
needed by a minority business, but to dispense it in small amounts makes
it very difficult for such businesses to operate effectively. Such condi-
tions make business development a hazardous enterprise, and often lead to
structured failure.
Surveys of minority businessmen have reinforced the reality of
SBA's dysfunctional practices that adversely affect the disadvantaged.
For instance, Robert J. Yancy's 1974 book, Federal Government Policy and
Black Business Enterprise, has reviewed several studies which have evalu-
ated federal programs to assist minority business enterprise. Within one
group of studies performed under contract to SBA and based on interviews
with loan recipients, banks, SBA officials, and community organizations,
it was revealed that:
Fifty-six percent of the loan applicants believed that they had
received less money than they needed because their operating costs
had been underestimated by SBA officials. Seventy-four percent of
them also said that they had received no assistance from the partic-
ipating banks. 9 0
In support of this second finding, a Yale Journal study ("Commercial Banks
and Minority Entrepreneurship", 1971) has concluded that "banks exercise
a great deal of conservatism even in making SBA guananteed loans to
minority businesses. "91
Most of the studies reviewed by Yancy's book coincided in point-
ing out the inadequacy of funds made available to the businesses assisted
and mention the lack of management and technical assistance as being
significant factors.92 Furthermore, these studies and Yancy's book have
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observed a pattern of SBA funding of "mom and pop" operations (small
enterprises) rather than concentrating on new market opportunities (i.e.,
unsaturated or unexploited markets) for large scale growth and profit-
ability. Other business scholars have observed this trend within SBA and
have cautioned against the expenditure of scarce federal funds to prop up
only marginal businesses.9 3
In a March 1970 report, "Improving the Prospects of Small
Business: The Report of the President's Task Force on Improving the
Prospects of Small Business," J. Wilson Newman (Chairman of the task force
and member of the financial committee of Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.) made
the following assessment of SBA business assistance:
With regard to the lending functions of SBA, they have not had great
impact, even considering that they have been directed at marginal
situations. Also, they are variously criticized as being too strin-
gent, too slow and tangled in red tape. 9 4
Robert J. Yancy's book, Federal Government Policy and Black Busi-
ness Enterprise, reviewed the 1970 Task Force study among several studies
that evaluated federal programs' assistance to minority business enter-
prise. Yancy concluded in his analysis of these studies that they pointed
up "the failure of federal programs to be of significant assistance to the
businesses they were designed to serve and that federal programs are not
directly related to improvements in the status of black business
enterprise."95
Conflicting Interests and Demands
A great deal of the inequity surrounding the administration of
government business loan programs stems from the fact that loan programs
involve deeply rooted conflicts of interests. Thus, business loan pro-
gram decision rules are very complex in order to take into account such
competing interest.96 The net effect, however, is few applicants can
successfully satisfy the criteria set by such programs and especially not
disadvantaged groups who also often lack the resources (i.e., finances,
time, expertise, etc.) needed to outlast dilatory tactics and overcome
complex bureaucratic requirements. Most significantly, business loan
programs often involve a sequence of "catch 22" problems. "The statutory
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criteria for eligibility of borrowers are often overly stringent and
incompatible" when ruthlessly applied by unsympathetic bureaucrats. 9 7
Furthermore, it is often difficult for a potential borrower to demon-
strate that his firm would provide new employment in an area that did not
compete with existing business. It is often even more "difficult for a
borrower to show that he could not finance his proposal through private
lending facilities (which meant that he was considered a poor risk), while
convincing the EDA and SBA that he would not default on his loan." 9 8
Most often, the central business of government is big business--
either helping start businesses, assisting existing businesses, regulat-
ing industries, bailing out bankrupt industries (e.g., Chrysler Corpora-
tion), and in general setting policies that affect the future growth and
development of big business. Politicians and public officials in their
rhetoric to the general public often express a will to help people in
areas of low employment by attracting new industries or expanding old
ones. But they do not want to subsidize competitors (often the disadvan-
taged who have lacked major involvement in business ownership) against
their "own people." When their constituents complain that government
funds are being spent to support business competitors, the congressmen
naturally write in provisions stating that aid to industry must not com-
pete with existing firms. Since most conceivable enterprises compete in
some way with others, the dilemma is passed on to the administrators who
discover that they cannot apply the criteria with any consistency. This
was one moral of the EDA business loans program as recorded by Pressman
and Wildavsky in their book. 9 9
Pressman and Wildavsky explain further that the use of public
money to stimulate private enterprise has considerable appeal for many
congressmen and their constituents. But in practice such programs soon
cause resentment among that same consitutency because they inevitably
subsidize, or in other ways assist, some firms while ignoring others.1 0 0
Those "others" most often ignored or rebuffed by bureaucratic delaying
tactics are usually the disadvantaged populations that need funds the
most, but do not possess the political influence or power to make the
system work in their favor.
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Scarce Resources, Unequal Power Groups, and Government Choice
Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart's book, The Promise of Great-
ness, in reviewing EDA's business development programs, indicates "that
because their funds have been so widely and thinly spread, the economic
effect has been marginal and therefore difficult to discern except in a
few isolated cases."1 0 1 Levitan and Taggart suggest it is problematic how
to equitably allocate scarce resources among numerous competing areas,
102
needs, and demands. Eugene Bardach in his work The Implementation Game
captures the reality behind why the business loan funds of agencies like
EDA are so often thinly spread in his notion of the "Pork Barrel" game.
Scarce financial resources are often diverted and dissipated through
the venerable political game of Pork Barrel. The Pork Barrel aspects
of a program often come to define expectations and to legitimize
demands. An excess of such demands may undermine the ability of the
program managers to focus and concentrate resources up to some sup-
posed threshold point below which any expenditures at all are likely
to be ineffective.1 0 3
Bardach elaborates further by indicating that:
. . .when EDA was created out of the ashes of the Area Redevelopment
Administration (ARA) , in 1965, every consultant to EDA recommended
that projects be concentrated in a single growth center in each dis-
trict. The consultants recommended in vain, however, because con-
gressmen had to gain support from constituents all over, the
resources were spread.1 0 4
Everyone can't participate in the political spoils of the system
even when spread thin. Quite obviously, critical choices have to be made
and priorities set as to who an agency's perceived clientele are--in
short, who is in and who is out of the game. For career officials or
"street-level" bureaucrats, who most often face such choices, decisions
are made based on what sub-populations or groups they perceive assistance
rendered to will return rewards that both promote the agency's long range
goals as they understand them and also insure their own personal advance-
ment. Levitan observes that "much of the criticism of the EDA has focused
on such choices."1 0 5  A Brookings Institution's book, Bureaucratic
Politics and Foreign Policy, by Morton H. Halperin generally notes the
prime motivations that move career officials to take action or make
choices. Halperin suggests that:
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The desire for promotion will lead a career official to support the
interests of the organization of which he is a member, since he
recognizes that promotion will, in large meeasure, depend on the
individual being seen as advancing the interest of his organization.
For immediate purposes he tends to demonstrate loyalty to the partic-
ular subgroup that is believed to be the source of promotion.1 0 6
Generally, powerless disadvantaged populations are not usually regarded
as being part of such subgroups. Consequently, their needs and requests
are seldom prioritized to the same degree as more politically influential
groups. Delbert A. Taebel, in an Adminstrative Review article titled
"Strategies to Make Bureaucrats Responsive," clearly notes that "when the
gap between the bureaucrat's capability and the client's demand become
too great, the bureaucrat devises various defense mechanisms that result
in unequal client treatment which penalizes minorities and the poor more
severely."107
Michael Lipsky, in his work on "Street-Level Bureaucrats" has
developed the concept of bureaucrats' use of defense mechanisms to the
detriment of the disadvantaged more comprehensively. He indicates
bureaucrats "develop defense mechanisms, in order to reach accommodation
and resolution of stress tendencies that result in a distortion of the
perceived reality." 1 0 8  One such reaction is the tendency to segment
psychologically, or fragment conceptually, the population which the
bureaucrat considers his clientele. Basically, bureaucrats reduce their
own stress by defining certain groups (mostly the disadvantaged) as being
outside their service clientele (i.e., beyond help or needing more assis-
tance than they are willing or able to give) usually because of a per-
ceived lack of disadvantaged groups' power to help career bureaucrats or
hurt them politically.1 0 9
Development of perceptual simplifications and subtle redefinitions of
the population to be served -- these phenomena significantly affect
both the perception of the bureaucrats and the reactions of clien-
teles to the bureaucracies. Perceptual modes which assist bureau-
crats in processing work and which, though not developed to achieve
discriminatory goals, result in discriminatory bias may be considered
a manifestation of institutional as opposed to individual racism.11 0
But does it matter to disadvantaged groups if you kill their hopes
with the revolver of institutional bias rather than the gun of racism,
when the result is the same? Lipsky points out that there must be a clear
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distinction between institutional routinized procedures which result in
bias and personal prejudice. But, who can judge where one starts and the
other stops. This distinction is not always so clear to either its
victims, or its perpetrators.
Government Choice
Much of the literature on the theory of government choice and
realistic expectations about government behavior suggests that when
people turn to the government, or when businessmen must make decisions in
the light of the government's functioning, they need to have some feeling
about what to expect. Most references like James W. McKie's book, Social
Responsibility and the Business Predicament, conclude that "one should
not naively assume that government will automatically behave in accord-
ance with one's own concept of the public interest." il More specifi-
cally, it has been suggested that governments, like business firms, con-
sist of individuals who make choices and take actions centered around
their own "self-interest." The self-interest goals of government bureau-
crats have been well documented in the literature on public administra-
tion. Bureaucracies strive chiefly to maintain the conditions necessary
for their stability and expansion. They are essentially neutral, aligned
with neither class nor party, except as such alignments serve jurisdic-
tional claims or determine the availability of necessary resources. The
influence of any group upon bureaucracies ultimately depends on its role
in the process of either contributing resources and supporting
jurisdictional claims, or threatening the attainment of these objectives.
Public agencies strive to maintain themselves with the least possible
internal stress and change and therefore try to use their organizational
capacity to limit both the occasion and the extent of their vulnerability
to outside groups. Organizational equilibrium and enhancement are, in
short, the compelling forces in bureaucratic action.1 1 2
Perhaps the "utility-maximizing" model of government behavior
best captures the reality for predicting bureaucratic behavior in making
service delivery choices between competing, but unequal power groups.
The emphasis of this model is on the "various costs and rewards that
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confront bureaucrats as they try to maximize utility." The general
idea is that anything that alters a person's abilities to capture net
gains (nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary) will affect behavior: individ-
uals, in government no less than elsewhere, will shift toward activities
that become more rewarding or less costly to those individuals and away
from activities that become less rewarding or more costly to them.1 1 4
Power Profile
Similarly, a monograph titled Understanding Urban Government,
published by The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, indicates that:
. . both public officials and professional public servants may be
quite insensitive to the discrete interests and problems of citizen-
constituents or citizen-clients. Public officials are likely to
identify their interests with majority coalitions and to presume that
maiority votes provide the basic justification to guide their
decisions.--
This analysis seems to support career public servants' adoption of a "power
image" or profile for deciding who is inside or outside their perceived
service community, and who will and will not benefit from their services.
The individuals or groups that are able to influence government
action are usually better connected or "politically endowed" with the pro-
per bargaining tools, advantages, and resources than disadvantaged groups.
Those who find themselves in the "old boy network" of government power
wielders usually have a "power profile" made up of a wide assortment of
different elements:
1. Influential political contacts who owe them favors.
2. Established network of relationships with government agency offi-
cials.
3. Established track record and expertise in their business of record
or profession.
4. Background knowledge about government programs.
5. Inside information on the inner workings, routines, performance
patterns, pressure points, etc., of government programs.
6. Skill, experience, and expertise in handling and massaging
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government forms through various procedural steps.
7. Financial margins to acquire specialized assistance (i.e., legal,
accounting, etc.) as needed.
8. The lure of some form of "quid pro quo" arrangement to compensate
contacts for deference paid to their concerns.
9. An acknowledged image of wealth, power, and/or position.
This, of course, is not an exhaustive list of potential elements,
rather it is illustrative of the types of characteristics that are usually
helpful or significant in bureaucratic bargaining situations, and that tend
to set politically influential groups off from most disadvantaged popula-
tions.
Historically, disadvantaged groups have not been perceived (a dis-
tinction which will become clear later) as fitting any "power profile" used
by career officials to simplify their decision making routines, especially,
if one accepts Graham T. Allison's definition of power in government.
Graham states that "power (i.e., effective influence on government deci-
sions and actions) is an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargain-
ing advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages and other
players' perceptions of the first two ingredients."1 1 6
In the past, disadvantaged groups have not had access to major
bargaining advantages (e.g., important business or political positions,
industrial wealth, control of inside information, etc.) that fuel govern-
ment action. Thus, disadvantaged groups have not been allowed to cultivate
the skills or build the requisite expertise in using them, and consequently,
have not been perceived on the whole as powerful. Oft times perception in
government interaction can be everything. If a group is not immediately
perceived as a power force to be dealt with, they will not even be given a
legitimate chance to sit at the bargaining table to vie for what they need.
More often than not, career bureaucrats count on being able to rebuff or put
off with their dilatory tactics most groups they perceive as powerless
and/or without the "staying power" (i.e., time, financial resources, exper-
tise, etc.) needed to outlast their blocking maneuvers. Thus, even the most
casual observer of government business loan programs' uneven service to
disadvantaged groups would have to conclude, that some sort of support
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system is needed to bolster and undergird the efforts of those groups that
largely perceive themselves as defenseless against a recalcitrant bureau-
cratic system, that generally perceives disadvantaged groups as uninfluen-
tial or powerless.
Coordination: A Vehicle for Support System Building
In 1974, the Cablecommunications Resourc.e Center (a public advocacy
organization) was confronted with a complex set of realities related to many
of the broad themes previously outlined. Primarily, CRC's leadership had
become concerned and perplexed over the numerous difficulties involved in
assisting disadvantaged groups obtain funds from government agencies to
build cable TV businesses. First of all, they realized that while busi-
nesses are traditionally built with other people's money, minorities have
not had equa3. access to these sources of capital. Discrimination against
minorities in securing credit and the difficulties of minority businessmen
in breaking into national markets because of discrimination by financial
institutions (plus the continuing down turn of the economy) have forced
minorities, or: the disadvantaged to look ever increasingly to the Federal
government foDr help, despite the equally formidable hardships posed by this
decision.
Second, economic development programs of the Federal government
have been largely directed to rural areas and smaller cities. Disadvantaged
groups are often unaware that potentially helpful programs exist in large
urban areas, let alone isolated rural locales. Third, CRC's leaders,
through their own experience and the public record, recognized that local
and state officials of the Federal departments and agencies administering
government programs often exhibit negative attitudes toward disadvantaged
groups that seek assistance and use practices that undermine their obtain-
ment of services. It is common knowledge that many local and state programs
"promise to conform to Federal equal opportunity guidelines in order to
obtain Federal funds but later ignore their promises and the Federal guide-
lines onco funds are obtained."119 For example, such
. . factors undoubtedly relate to the fact that in Tennessee, in the
year ending June 30, 1973, a total of 329 SBA loans amounting to
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$19,647,000 were made; of this total, 35 loans amounting to $690,000
went to minority businesses. For the period July 1, 1973-April 30,
1974, in Tennessee, 157 loans for $12,096,000 were made, of which 14
loans amounting to $483,000 went to minority businesses. . . .For the
entire nation, in fiscal year 1974, through May 31, a total of 24,821
loans amounting to $1,762.6 million were made, of which 6,081 loans for
a total of $251.1 million went to minority businesses.12 0
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, CRC fully understood that
there had developed among disadvantaged groups a distrust of, and disillu-
sionment over government programs' ability to meet their needs. Disadvan-
taged groups were reluctant to become involved with public programs that
historically had been insensitive and resistant to disadvantaged groups'
attempts at lobbying for needed business loan funds. Case in point, Robert
J. Yancy's book, Federal Government Policy and Black Business Enterprise,
reports on a field study of the problems of minority businesses which was
carried out in Atlanta, Georgia in 1972. The survey revealed that half of
the respondents indicated no interest in receiving assistance under SBA
programs.
They indicated their distrust of federal programs, and the delay and red
tape, as the major reasons for not wantinq to become involved in the
programs. Distrust included the refusal to believe that the programs
were genuinely designed to help them in their businesses.Z.A
Thus, CRC realized it needed to take certain measures to assure and safe-
guard the chances of disadvantaged groups receiving due process at the hands
of government business loan programs. Without such protective measures,
disadvantaged groups could not be convinced to participate because they
would feel that once again "outsiders" were raising their level of expecta-
tions beyond the range of reasonable obtainment.
The essential theme behind the consideration of alternative means
for assuring disadvantaged groups due process at the hands of government
agencies is empowerment. One of the most debilitating results of increased
bureaucratization is a feeling of powerlessness by disadvantaged groups who
face institutions controlled by people they do not know, do not trust, and
whose values they often do not share.122 Upper-income people and powerful
organizations have ways and resources for influencing the actions of gov-
ernment megastructures. Disadvantaged populations have not traditionally
held, perceived themselves as holding, nor consequently been perceived by
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others as holding such powers.123 The notion then, of coordinating mecha-
nisms aims at empowering disadvantaged groups to do the things that the more
affluent and influential can already do, aims at spreading the power around
a bit more--and to do so in government arenas where disadvantaged groups
most often lack influence over the key decision making, that usually affects
their lives the most.1 2 4
In considering these various realities, CRC's leadership concluded
that some type of countervailing force or mechanism was necessary to safe-
guard the handling of their clients' projects from bureaucratic snafus, by
offsetting the "power imbalance" between disadvantaged groups, and a recal-
citrant government system of business loan programs. The mechanism
desired, needed to be able to serve as a surrogate for the informal power
persuasion often used by politically more powerful groups to influence the
government system. CRC's staff seized the theme of improving coordination
among business loan programs as the organizing vehicle to build a support
system for its clients, since the pursuit of greater coordination among
government programs, and the use of coordination mechanisms are accepted
and regularized means for securing government attention and action in
handling certain traditional bureaucratic problems.
CRC's staff considered the initiation and use of coordination
mechanisms (i.e., task force and interagency agreement) as a method for
improving the odds of their disadvantaged clients receiving Federal agency
business loans. Primarily, CRC was seeking to create a "support system" to
help shepherd clients' projects successfully through the review processes
of business loan agencies' field offices, located in various isolated rural
areas. Traditionally, it has been difficult for powerless disadvantaged
groups to successfully lobby for business loans in areas remote from
Washington, D.C.--where career officials tend to follow their own rules in
giving funds to a "select constituency." CRC staff members viewed a coor-
dinative task force, and an interagency agreement, as leveraging mechanisms
which would create "bargaining advantages" to compensate for disadvantaged
groups' lack of the usual political clout (e.g., owed favors, informal
persuasion, inside contacts, etc.) used by more powerful groups and indi-
viduals to win approval of loan requests.
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It was envisioned that these "bargaining advantages" would help CRC
to safeguard the handling of their clients' cable TV projects from the
classic abuses (i.e., dilatory tactics, stringent policy and rule interpre-
tations, "red-tape," etc.) suffered to extreme degrees by groups not poli-
tically plugged into the system. Basically, a central aim in the move to
build a support system (i.e., a task force and an interagency agreement) was
to have in existence formal power leveraging mechanisms that could be used
to overcome bureaucratic resistance from agency field office bureaucrats,
who when first presented with cable TV projects might balk and try to insist
cable TV was not a fundable venture within their programs. It was also
theorized that with a signed interagency agreement, greater political at-
tention and pressure could be marshalled and focused on any agency that
tried to renege on its commitments--especially when it could be easily shown
that a public agency was backing out of a formal written commitment to
support a major program.
Overall, it was the understanding of coordination's historical
significance as an established government action channel and the acute
appreciation of the problems faced by disadvantaged groups in accessing
funds from business loan programs, that motivated the development of the
Cable TV Task Force, whose operation is the focal point of this research.
Basic Premises
A basic awareness of the broad areas that might affect how well
institutional coordination works in the implementation process could im-
prove the design of initial program strategies and enhance the successful
operation of programs. A basic question that emerges from such a realiza-
tion is: what kinds of knowledge factors are important to understanding the
coordination process inside bureaucratic institutions? There is a great
deal of public administration research on institutions (i.e., "bureaucratic
behavior," program politics, civil servant performance, citizen/government
relations, etc.) that can possibly be used to help explain and anticipate
the complexities of coordination. However, the various pieces of the theo-
retical perspectives in these different areas have not been adequately
joined together to form a basic theory of coordination dynamics.
66
Various kinds of approaches to dealing with and understanding the
dynamics of the coordination process have been taken and observed in the
literature. For example, researchers at the Urban Institute, in a book
entitled Program Analysis for State and Local Governments, offer a list of
significant questions to be raised before actions are taken (see exhibit
II). Other researchers have developed rosters of the enduring problems to
be circumnavigated or made suggestions based on signficant insights, rev-
elations, or learned lessons gained from past experience (e.g., case study
approach). Still other investigators, like those involved in The San
Francisco Federal Executive Board-Oakland Task Force experience, have de-
veloped the categorization of different types or levels of coordination
that can be pursued; in hopes of aiding program developers in choosing the
most appropriate form of coordination to meet their particular situation.
Finally, some researchers in this area have sought to isolate a special
cluster of variables that seem to influence the coordination process.
In regard to this last approach, Donald S. Van Meter, Carl E. Van
Horn, and Randall Ripley of the Department of Political Science, Ohio
University, have been studying the need for an implementation framework.
Van Meter and Van Horn have developed a seven-variable model of the imple-
mentation process as a theoretical framework for research. The direct
carryover of this model to the coordination process as a method of implemen-
tation is clear as one reviews the variables listed. The seven clusters of
variables that affect policy impact and service delivery are: program
standards and objectives; resources; interorganizational communication;
interorganization enforcement and follow-up; characteristics of the imple-
menting agencies; economic, social, and political conditions within the
implementing jurisdiction; and the dispositions of implementors. Overall,
the developers of this model suggest that process and program performance
will vary depending upon the amount of change involved and the extent to
which there is consensus upon goals among relevant actors.1 2 5
A review of the substance of these different approaches, however,
seems to suggest that there are certain broad areas to be focused upon in
the coordination process. The knowledge areas that seem to suggest them-
selves as useful tools for understanding the coordination process are:
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EXHIBIT II
FACTORS TO EXAMINE IN ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION
FEASIBILITY OF EACH PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE
1. How many agencies (both internal and external to the government)
must cooperate or participate in order to ensure successful implementa-
tion? In some cases, agencies of other government or components of the
private sector (such as business concerns or citizen groups) might be
involved. Since such groups are not responsible to the governmental unit,
their actions may render any given alternative infeasible. The more
people and groups that are required to provide approval or support, the
more difficult implementation is likely to be. External agencies might be
weighted more than internal agencies in estimating implementation diffi-
culty.
2. To what extent does the alternative directgly affect services in
a way clearly visible to the public? Are there existing client groups
whose interests will be affected, particularly by a cutback in existing
services? Alternatives that propose maintaining or increasing existing
levels of services will be less likely to present implementation diffi-
culties than ones that reduce the level of service. For example, the
choice of different types of refuse collection vehicles will probably be
less controversial than the question of whether refuse should be
collected at the curb instead of at the back door.
3. To what extent does the alternative threaten important officials
by reductions in power, prestige, or privileges? Such individuals, of
course, can be expected to resist implementation.
4. To what extent does the alternative threaten jobs? Especially
where a strong employees' organization is present, opposition can be
great. Special compensation might be required to gain acceptance. Esti-
mated cost savings may be considerable less than initially estimated.
5. To what extent are special personnel capabilities required? Will
additional training be required? Are needed personnel likely to be avail-
able and obtainable within the existing civil service system? If not,
can special provisions be made for obtaining such personnel?
6. To what extent does the alternative require changes in the be-
havior of governmental employees? Employees may be unable to unwilling to
behave as intended by the alternative. For example, an alternative may
involve assumptions about police officers' behavior towards suspected
criminals or the care with which sold waste collectors handle containers.
Or it may require different working hours or location of employees, all of
which might lead to resistance.
7. Are the sources of funds and their availability fairly definite?
To what extent does the alternative call for added amounts of funds in the
face of tight revenue constraints? Some sources of funds may be more
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EXHIBIT II (Continued)
likely to be realized than others. Alternatives involving special fund-
ing support may be subject to considerable uncertainties. An alternative
that requires bond issue approval is likely to encounter considerable
uncertaintly and lengthy delays.
8. Are there complicated legal questions, and if so, are changes
such as new legislation required? What is the likelihood that these
changes would be made? At the very least, this factor will probably
impose delays.
9. To what extent has public debate galvanized opinions for or
against the alternative?
10. To what extent does the alternative require space or facilities
that may be difficult to obtain? For example, neighborhood populations
may resist locating drug treatment centers, mental health facilities,
nursing homes, half-way homes, etc., in their neighborhoods.
11. To what extent does the alternative involve significant techno-
logical uncertainties? New technologies typically involve operational
problems that may increase costs, reduce effectiveness, and delay or even'
prevent implementation.
12. Has a recent crisis lent support to one of the alternatives?
Implementation problems might be alleviated if the problem is clearl,
recognized by the community. For example, a recent wave of burglaries
might greatly improve the chances of gaining rapid acceptance for more
police patrol units. On the other hand, programs that emphasize pre,;en-
tion before a problem is generally recognized tend to be more difficu' t to
sell. (Note, however, that one of the advantages of systematic analysis
is the opportunity to identify emerging problems and to produce evidence
for encouraging preventitive action.)
SOURCE: Harry Hatry, Louis Blair, Donald Fisk, and Wayne Kimmel,
Program Analysis for State and Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute, 1976):100-102, exhibit 21.
69
1. The politics of program coordination.
2. The functioning of organizations.
3. The performance of professionals.
4. The citizen/government relationship.
By no means should these areas be considered as being all inclusive
or as representative of the entire universe of what could be. Rather these
focus areas appear to be a convenient way to order the conventional wisdom
that relates to the coordination process, and helps to explain its dynamic
flux. There is obvious "spill over" and overlap of information between
these broad areas, but each area maintains a unique focus integrity of its
own. For example, the politics of coordination focuses on the relationships
and interaction between interested parties as they try to shape programs to
fit their vested interests, needs, priorities, official mandates, or
demands. The chief participants are politicians, administrators, interest
groups, and officials at all levels of government. The broad area on
organizations focuses on how organization theory might help to explain the
behavior of institutions in the coordination process. The specific empha-
sis in this area is on the internal functioning of organizations as it
affects their external behavior. The organizations to be analyzed are not
just bureaucracies, but include legislatures, patterns of executive deci-
sion, and expecially the workings of any organized group that activates a
coordination process which impinges upon or influences public program
operation. 126
The topic of professionals zeros in on the reality that the dif-
ferent behavioral motivations of professionals (i.e., status quo orientated
civil servants versus social advocates' change orientation) involved in the
delivery or planning of public services affects organizational outcomes.
In other words, the motivation of professionals influences their perform-
ance in regard to carrying out work commitments, which include their predis-
position to change, as possibly represented by a coordination process.
Furthermore, the different functional actions of professionals in the
public bureaucracy as opposed to those found in quasi public/special inter-
est groups, or even in academic settings may be explained by their selection
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of a work setting supportive of their internal value system. This is to say
that career civil servants as a group tend to select public service setings
(either consciously or subconsciously) because of its known characteristics
of indulging or even rewarding conservativeness, the maintenance of the
status quo, and tolerating varying levels of administrative sovereignty.
While on the other hand, professionals who tend to embrace or desire to
promote change or innovation are more likely to be found in quasi public,
special interest groups, academic settings or other settings "outside the
system" which are supportive of their goal behavior.
All of the explained categories outlined focus on the implementa-
tors of public policy. There is an express need to also analyze coordina-
tion from the perspective of citizen impact upon governmental decisions.
Thus, the dynamic relationships between citizens and the government is a
category of interest which seeks to reveal the consequences, significance,
and outcome of citizen involvement in the coordination process. The broad
areas just discussed, will provide a basic framework for organizing the most
significant insights and learned lessons to be considered in planning
public program coordination as drawn from the case study I will analyze.
Critical Variables
Besides considering the development of a framework of conventional
wisdom to be drawn from the prevailing literature, past experience and my
case study specifically, I also plan to observe what key variables seem to
influence the coordination process. There are a number of important areas
discussed in the current literature that appear to significantly affect in
some manner the level and degree of coordination to be achieved within the
implementation process. Some of these critical variables are: the type of
coordination strived for; the complexity and scope of the enterprise (how
ambitious is it) ; the number of essential decision points or consensus nodes
needed to carry out the process; the socio-political arena(s) where negoti-
ations and bargaining are to be carried out (on whose turf are deals struck
or propositions made); duration of the process over which coordination is to
be maintained; level of perceived "common ground" existing among partici-
pants; type and substance of commitment vehicles used to formalize mission
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control (i.e., task force structures, written agreements, etc.); level of
participation and briefing of agency technicians who must carry out admin-
istrative details and processing procedures; the extent of "power" avail-
able to chief coordinator to reward or sanction participants' behavior and
the amount of conflict between new coordination goals and established goals
of participating agencies and career bureaucrats.
Summary
My case study analysis will be primarily guided by Charles E.
Lindblom's framework for observing, analyzing, and classifying federal
coordination. His conceptualizations of central coordination, mutual ad-
justment, cooperative discussion, and partisan mutual adjustment seem to
constitute the most comprehensive appraisal of what exists as well as being
the most widely acknowledged basic classifications of coordination. I will
supplement Lindblom's fundamental definitions of different types of coor-
dination with more recent variations on his main themes by individuals like
Richard F. Elmore ("Organizational Models of Social Program Implementa-
tion," Public Policy, 1980) and with works like Graham T. Allison's writings
on regularized "action channels" in his book Essence of Decision.
My research definition of coordination largely views it as an ac-
cepted governmental process in which federal agencies are brought together
to form a collective effort to: expedite project processing by eliminating
wasteful practices or repetitious patterns of action; combine their related
sets of existing resources to focus on a particular problem or target
population's needs and forestall communication problems on or discrepancies
over project eligibility among different agencies and between different
levels of the same agency.
Also, in my case study analysis I plan to maintain a sensitivity for
what kinds of coordination mechanisms are used to influence the behavior of
the federal-state-local program delivery system and what primary variables
appear to be significant in facilitating the coordination process. Overall
I will be concerned with ordering and organizing to some degree the basic
knowledge that presently exists and can be drawn from my reserach into some
type of conventional wisdom framework for understanding the basic dynamic
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areas (i.e., the politics of program coordination, the functioning of or-
ganizations, the performance of professionals, and the citizen/government
relationship) that fuel the coordination process.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL RURAL CABLE DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL RURAL CABLE DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE
Overview
This chapter involves a case study of an attempt by a public
advocacy organization, Cablecommunications Resource Center (CRC) , to
coordinate the policy and program activities of a group of federal agen-
cies (Farmers Home Administration, Small Business Administration, Eco-
nomic Development Association, and Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise) that were found to have common legislative mandates and program
goals which could enable them to collectively support the development of
cable TV systems. This case study reviews and analyzes the process
involved in trying to organize and systematically structure the interac-
tion of a select group of federal agencies toward a common goal of eco-
nomic business development in disadvantaged areas.
The main focus of this case study is on the development and
operation of a National Rural Cable Development Task Force organized and
initiated by CRC, which attempted through a multi-agency agreement to
eliminate some of the basic problems associated with the lack of communi-
cation between and coordination among various federal programs. Such
problems include the overlap and duplication of programs, efforts, and
staff*; "red tape" and foot dragging in processing paper work; the opera-
tion of field offices unaware of their ability to finance projects or
unwilling to support new projects; lack of informed communication with
certain local communities about programs that do exist; lack of technical
assistance to groups interested in developing projects but unsophisti-
cated in dealing with federal programs, etc.
*There are over 30 different federal agencies and offices that
have some direct involvement and impact on telecommunications policy (see
appendix A).
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The National Rural Cable Development Task Force experience is
significant both in terms of what it attempted to accomplish and how it
managed to get federal agencies to the coordination conference table
using the lure of cable TV technology. The realm of telecommunications or
more specifically the financing of cable TV systems has become an impor-
tant issue around which to study the coordination and administration of
federal agencies because it has been the subject of numerous government
reports and a significant topic before White House Telecommunications
Policy groups, the Congress, the FCC, the communications industry, city
governments, and public interest organizations.
This case study gives an account of the history, development, and
operation of the National Rural Cable Development Task Force. Besides
pointing out the basic achievements and shortcomings, I (as a major par-
ticipant in the task force process) will offer special insights into why
certain problems occurred, what hidden agendas existed among partici-
pants, and what unforeseen events changed the course of developments.
Program Genesis
During the late summer and early autumn of 1974, the Booker T.
Washington Foundation/Cablecommunications Resouce Center* initiated a
basic research process to develop a more aggressive, productive, and
comprehensive approach to financing cable TV businesses throughout the
United States. Working as a Senior Market Analyst for this organization,
I played a Key role in the research and planning process that led to the
development of a National Task Force mandated to coordinate the policies
and programs of a select group of federal agencies to support minority
cable TV business development. This case study is a participant-
*Cablecommunications Resource Center--Charles Tate, Executive
Director, 2000 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Established
January 1973 by Booker T. Washington Foundation. Its primary function was
to develop and disseminate technical and economic data on the cable indus-
try in order to encourage minority ownership of cable TV systems. CRC
performed marketing, policy, economic, and financial analyses for commu-
nities and client groups, and focused on the uses of telecommunications
for the delivery of health, education, and welfare services. Published
Cablelines, a monthly newsletter.
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observer's account and examination of the historical development of the
task force structure and the federal coordinative policies aimed for in
this enterprise.
The CRC, in pursuing its objective of supporing minority cable TV
development, investigated and sought cable TV finance funds for its
clients from various public (i.e., federal loan guarantee programs like
the Small Business Administration and quasi-public organizations like the
Opportunity Funding Corporation) and private (i.e., banks, limited part-
nership arrangements, and specialized lending institutions) sources.
Over time, CRC soon realized that the piecemeal or "cafeteria shopping"
approach to finding financing for minority cable TV ventures was a diffi-
cult undertaking fraught with endless and repetitive tasks, bureaucratic
red tape, and basic problems surrounding the definition and qualification
of cable TV as a fundable venture under different, vague, and conflicting
funding program guidelines and procedures.
CRC's program directors and staff, after reviewing their experi-
ence with such problems, concluded that what was needed to produce some
order and improvement in this situation was a basic public policy imple-
mentation vehicle which could systematically assure financial support for
minority cable TV businesses. With this goal in mind, CRC staff set about
the task of researching and identifying what minority communities existed
that both needed (i.e., had poor or inadequate TV reception) and could
support such businesses. Before any policy vehicle could be constructed
or implemented to finance cable TV systems en masse, it was realized that
some significant proof of the need and the scale of communities to be
affected had to be established.
Study and Research Process
Thus, CRC in seeking to meet its program objectives of signifi-
cantly increasing the number of viable minority-owned and community-
controlled cable television systems--embarked upon a project to develop
an aggressive outreach cable development strategy. Within the time span
of four months, CRC staff members designed and executed a multi-phased
research process linked to the development of an aggressive outreach
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cable development strategy.
The first stage of this research process focused on the isolation
of areas around the country which might offer potential for minority cable
venture development. The initial task of the research effort involved
collecting and analyzing demographic data on all U.S. cities with a total
population of 5,000 to 50,000 people. Next, those cities having a minor-
ity population base of at least 20 percent were selected for evaluation of
their potential for minority cable development. A resultant list of some
420 places was compiled for further examination. These 420 cities were
then evaluated and prioritized according to the degree in which they met
the following established criteria:
1. The presence of a significant minority population of 30 percent
or more.
2. The presence of minority elected officials in local executive and
legislative positions (i.e., Black mayors, city councilmen,
etc.).
3. The absence of an operating cable system in the immediate commu-
nity.
4. The existence of weak or inadequate TV signal reception.
5. The location in relative close proximity to existing cable TV
systems.
On the basis of these evaluative standards, 70 (see appendix B)
small and rural cities displayed a significant demand for cable TV and
were ranked highest for their attractiveness for minority cable develop-
ment. A majority of these "cable-ready" areas were found to be clustered
in the South and Southwestern regions of the country. From this reality
materialized the decision to engineer a specific rural cable development
plan to service the needs of these areas. Next, CRC staff selected 42 of
these places as primary targets for cable opportunity and began to prepare
an information profile that would validate and expand the in-house data
already acquired on these rural areas. While compiling data which
described the social and economic characteristics of these rural commu-
nities, CRC staff contacted several local economic development organiza-
tions in the selected "cable-ready" communities to reveal the findings of
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the initial research and to discuss the potential impact that cable tele-
vision could have on economic development in their service areas.
Field Survey
Discussions of this nature resulted in one organization in
Louisiana, the Federation of Southern Co-ops (FSC), sending a member of
its staff to Washington, D.C. for a one-week CRC orientation on cable TV.
As will be revealed later, this agency resource sharing approach became an
essential element of the program implementation strategy.
The second part of this information exchange and coordination
process took place when a team of CRC staff, accompanied by FSC staff,
visited the Louisiana Delta Region and conducted a site assessment of
several communities in four parishes (counties). Specific observations
were made which indicated a strong market for cable TV existed:
1. All small towns visited had a very dense housing configuration.
2. Reception was poor to fair with an average of only three stations
received.
3. Most families owned at least one television set as exhibited by
the predominance of high outdoor antennas.
4. Most homes surveyed had a color TV set.
The viability of cable TV was also evidenced in the strong demand
for the service of cable systems that were operating in several Alabama
communities. Penetration rates--the percentage of total homes served--
ranged from 38 percent in a relatively new system in Opelika to 78 percent
in a mature system in Alexander City.*
*Historical Note: Cable television began in rural and isolated
areas surrounded by hills in Pennsylvania and Oregon. From a few systems
in small and rural areas, the industry expanded to cities and major
metropolitan areas. This expansion was precipitated by three factors:
cable has been an extremely profitable business venture; the vast signal
transmission capacity of cable affords an opportunity to receive a wide
range of programming; and the Federal Communications Commission initiated
a policy to allow the importation of distant signals. More importantly,
cable TV continued to grow in 1974 despite a lagging economic, adding an
esimated 1.25 million subscribers. Increased subscriber penetration in
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The socio-economic needs of small and rural areas were revealed
in the information profiles developed on target areas. For example,
Madison Parish--a rural Louisiana area where CRC staff conducted an
extensive site assessment--typified the economic plight of rural commu-
nities. Madison Parish was used by CRC staff as a model to display data
illustrative of the need for intensive development of these communities.
In Madison Parish it was observed that:
1. The unemployed, an important component of the population of per-
sons in poverty, represented 8.1 percent of the total civilian
labor force in Madison Parish in 1970, a somewhat higher propor-
tion than the national unemployment rate in 1970 of 4.4 percent.
2. Among characteristics of the labor force which are also related
to poverty is the proportion of workers holding jobs in skilled
and highly paid positions. In rural communities where the educa-
tional and hence, economic opportunities are limited, this pro-
portion tends to be low, implying underemployment of skills and
the existence of underdeveloped human resources. Among the
employed in Madison Parish in 1970, 35.4 percent were occupying
white collar jobs. In 1970, 48.3 percent of all employed persons
in the United States occupied white collar jobs, a proportion
much larger than that which existed in the county.
3. The level of educational achievement in a community is usually a
reliable indicator of its socio-economic status. The median
school years completed by persons in Madison Parish aged 25 years
and over were 8.5 years in 1970. Madison parish had, therefore, a
level of educational achievement lower than the nation as a whole
where the median school years completed stood at 12.1 percent.
4. The extent of functional illiteracy in a community can be meas-
ured by the number of persons 25 years of age or more who have
completed less than 5 years of school. In 1970, 5.5 percent of
the U.S. population aged 25 or over had not finished more than 4
years of school. A worse showing than that is found in Madison
Parish, where 25.5 percent of the adult population had not gone
beyond 4 school years. In the same age group, 52.3 percent of the
population of the nation had completed at least a secondary level
education compared to the much lower proportion of 26.2 percent
in Madison Parish.
areas already covered by existing systems contributed significantly to
subscriber growth in 1974. Basic subscribers' revenues from cable TV were
$590 million in 1974, up 20 percent from 1973--a rate of increase more
than 3 times the 6 percent increase of radio and TV broadcasting for the
same period.
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5. The two major components of population change for any area are net
migration and natural increase. Net migration represents the
difference between the number of persons moving into a particular
area and the number moving away from the area. Net migration in
Madison County was 20.9 percent in 1970. This figure indicates a
significant amount of out-migration which is normally true
throughout the rural south and southwest. 1 2 7
This data as well as other statistics and studies were used to document
the problems of rural America and attest to the fact that rural America
could clearly utilize the special services and advantages of cable TV
businesses (i.e., communications, economic growth, social service deliv-
ery, etc.).
After establishing the needs of rural areas, CRC's director,
Charles Tate, decided to utilize cable TV systems to assist in the devel-
opment of small towns in the South and Southwest by providing people in
these areas with jobs and a variety of social, cultural, and economic
opportunities. Cable TV, with its broadband communications capability--
besides offering rural viewers information, entertainment, and ideas--
could provide a wide range of services, i.e., education, health care, and
job training programs. This belief was reinforced by a White House policy
report on cable TV that had recently been released.
Visualizing cable communications as a constructive force in rural
areas, a 1974 White House report--issued by a cabinet committee under the
direction of the President's telecommunications advisor, Dr. Clay T.
Whitehead--recommended that federal agencies be directed to examine the
feasibility and cost of using cable to assist in delivering a variety of
services to rural and poor areas. The report further recommended that
federally-funded programs be used to support the public service aspects
of cable communications.1 28
After reviewing this report and the information collected on
rural needs, CRC's staff began to develop a strategy for cable TV develop-
ment in the South and Southwest. Consideration was given to the different
financial investment and ownership models that could be easily developed
in rural areas. Research and investigation pointed toward cooperatives
as one potentially viable business development model.
CRC's interest in cooperatives was generated by discussions
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regarding cable TV held with the Federation of Southern Cooperatives. The
Federation has played a signficant role in expanding the impact of cooper-
atives in the lives of the rural poor in the southern United States. The
low income agriculture co-ops have enable many farmers to market more
profitability by doing it cooperatively.
The decision by CRC's staff to focus on cooperatives was fostered
by several factors. First, the cooperative form of business is indigenous
to rural areas. Second, the cooperative business model has become a
widely accepted and highly successful vehicle for getting things done for
residents of economically disadvantaged and sparsely populated areas.
The chief selling point of a cooperative business operation is in its
purpose of providing service to members--thus, making the delivery of
services the prime motivation for participation. Third, rural government
programs like the Farmers Home Administration tended to fund more cooper-
ative ventures than other types of projects.
ORGANIZING PHASE
Public Program Evaluation
Recognition of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) as a tradi-
tional funding mechanism for cooperatives lead the CRC staff to develop
detailed information on its programs. FmHA's potential as a cable venture
funding source was first established through my discovery of a loan appli-
cation for over $1 million submitted by a Western Wisconsin
Communications Cooperative (see appendix C) to develop a county-wide
viewer-owned cable system. This five-year project cost $5 million and
planned to interconnect eight towns, seven schools, the small villages,
and all rural farms and homes. FmHA's value as a funding source was
substantiated through my review of the Guide to the Rural Development Act
of 1972 which specifically listed cable television as eligible for FmHA
loans.
The Rural Development Act of 1972 was an act created to provide
for improving the economy and living conditions in rural America. FmHA,
through its special program, was mandated by this act to provide new
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employment and business opportunities and upgrade the standard of living
for all who wish to live in small towns or open country.
Cable television was categorized within the Rural Development Act
as a community facility which provides essential service to rural resi-
dents. This categorization related cable TV directly with three basic
service goals of the FmHA: to help build the economic and social base of
rural communities; to expand businesses and industry, increase income and
employment; and "to install community facilities that will help rural
areas upgrade the quality of living and promote economic development and
growth. "129
Resource Leveraging Approach
CRC's director decided that several agencies like FmHA were
essential to strengthen the planning and resource allocation process
needed to implement a major cable development program. CRC staff members
investigated and identified several other local organizations and federal
institutions with a primary focus on economic development of disadvan-
taged areas.
After reviewing the enabling legislation, official mandates, and
program statements of the federal agencies (OMBE, SBA, FmHA, etc.) , CRC's
staff confirmed that although there existed a common commitment to new
business and economic development no one federal agency had either the
manpower, financial resources, or locational advantage to take on the
total responsibility of supporting a major rural cable development
effort.
Sol Levine and Paul White in their article entitled "Exchange as a
Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relation-
ships" (Administrative Science Quarterly, 1961) have noted that "be-
cause organizations can seldom marshall the necessary resources to
attain their goals independently, they must establish exchange rela-
tionships with other organizations. Organizational exchange is any
voluntary activity between two or more organizations which has conse-
quences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respec-
tive goals or objectives." 1 3 0  Resource leveraging, the term coined
by CRC staff, embodies this general theme. Going a step further
Andrew H. Van De Ven ("On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of
Relations Among Organizations", Academy of Management Review, 1976)
states that an interorganizational relationship (IR) occurs when two
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or more organizations transact resources (money, physical facilities
and materials, customer or client referrals, technical staff ser-
vices) among each other. The end objective of organizations involved
in an IR is the attainment of goals that are unachievable by organiza-
tions independently.13 1  Finally, William Evan ("The Organization
Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations", 1966) has
asserted that in efforts to obtain resources, organizations are often
obliged to "develop greater interdependencies involving a network or
set of other organizations, groups, and parties."1 3 2
Thus, it became clear to CRC's executive director, Charles Tate, that the
successful initiation of a massive rural cable development program would
require the concerted effort of a task force of widely influencial and
diverse organizations. The organizational plan for the collective par-
ticipation of these agencies became based on a "resource leveraging" or
sharing approach. This was how the idea for a rural cable development
program based on a resource leveraging approach was conceived.
The "resource leveraging" approach was predicated on the notion
that collectively, agencies could more effectively and efficiently bring
to bear their unique expertise, field experience, resources (e.g., loan
programs), and administrative "know-how" to the rural cable planning and
development process. Basically, the "resource leveraging" approach
called for the planned use of the collective administrative clout, man-
power, and financial resources of a select group of federal agencies to
support rural cable TV development. The main emphasis of this approach
was on the strategic and coordinated use of limited federal resources to
achieve the successful financing of rural cable businesses. Toward this
end, the coordinative process sought to remedy some of the common failings
of bureaucracies: fragmented and disjointed program activity; duplication
of services and inefficient efforts; the non-strategic use of limited
resources; "red tape," untimely delays in project development; compli-
cated and vague communications on programs to the public, within and
between agencies; and misleading policy stances that are counter-produc-
tive to interagency cooperation.
Important to the "resource leveraging" concept of federal agency
coordination is the identification of some "common ground" of experience,
interest, and commitment to a set of objectives to be achieved. The
promotion of economic development in disadvantaged areas was a unifying
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theme used by CRC's director to marshall the resources of FmHA, OMBE, SBA,
and EDA to support a Cable TV Task Force. Overall, the analysis of these
agencies indicated a common commitment to economic development, the
active support of new business opportunities, and a history of working
cooperatively with other agencies. This is why they were selected. The
high public promise and White House attention given to cable TV as a new
broadband communications technology was another key factor played upon to
organize the efforts of this group of agencies. In effect, the resource
leveraging approach was a concept used to formally entice, organize, and
systematically structure the interaction of various organizations toward
a common goal of cable TV development in disadvantaged areas.
Program Design
CRC's original program design and plan for the task force called
for a three-tiered structure of organizational involvement. The first
tier at the "grass roots" or local level was to be made up of a cadre of
community economic development organizations who were to act as community
based liaisons to help to finesse and facilitate the cable venture group
development process in local communities. CRC only had a limited number
(5) of market analysts who could be assigned to actually work out in the
"field" with cable groups in various "cable-ready" areas. The scope and
the anticipated long term time frame needed for the development of various
individual projects necessitated the ongoing involvement of local commu-
nity economic development organizations to help supplement CRC's efforts
by supporting the cable development process on a daily basis. The Rural
Cable Program's indigenous "spokes" into the various communities selected
as "cable-ready" were the Federation of Southern Cooperatives (Epes,
Alabama), the Delta Foundation (Greenville, Mississippi), and the South-
east Alabama Self-Help Association. Interstate Research Associates
(Texas), National Council of La Raza (Phoenix, Arizona), and the National
Economic Development Association (New Mexico) were the program's commu-
nity links to be used to pioneer cable ventures in various Southwest
Chicano communities. These various organizations had business and commu-
nity contacts throughout the areas where they were based and beyond.
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Collectively, these community development organizations were to
serve as cable control centers for day-to-day local coordination and
collaboration on information dealing with cable issues and technical ser-
vice needs. Above and beyond serving as local information centers in
various states on cable TV, these groups were to be instrumental in
identifying key minority leadership in various communities, serving as a
manpower pool, and as major advisors on collecting and analyzing basic
data and statistics from local agencies. Overall, the program needed such
organizations to serve as the key operational channels through which it
could establish ties with communities, plot local business strategies,
and exercise social and political clout on local matters.
The second tier of organizational responsibility was occupied by
CRC. CRC's role was to serve basically as the technical resource on cable
technology, community group organization, and business development mat-
ters for the selected "cable-ready" areas. Generally, CRC represented
the motivational force behind identifying, educating, and organizing suc-
cessful cable business groups. Specifically, CRC staff would provide all
the backup legal, financial, political, and technical expertise needed to
lead groups through all the various steps from the first strategy meeting
to system "turn-on."
The technical assistance services provided by CRC included:
design of corporate structures; organizing local investors; preparation
of preliminary feasibility statements, cash flow projections, and capi-
talization requirements; analysis of local, state, and federal franchise
requirements; developing contacts with national venture capital organiza-
tions, finance companies, hardware suppliers, construction companies, en-
gineering, legal management, and marketing consultants; development of
business plans; review of financial proposals, financing options, consul-
tant reports, and contract proposals; and analysis of franchise applica-
tions. CRC also was responsible for linking cable groups up with the best
federal agency funding opportunity available, setting up meetings for
groups with agency officials, lending backup support and continously lob-
bying task force agencies on behalf of client groups. CRC's role was one
of a promoter, which often involved defending projects against attacks of
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lawyers, financial analysts, business specialists, and any other agency
officials.
The third tier of program organization was made up of federal
agencies able to support and fund cable TV businesses through their var-
ious technical assistance and loan programs. These key agencies were
OMBE, FmHA, EDA, and SBA.
The research performed by CRC staff members during the develop-
ment of the task force strategy uncovered the fact that these agencies
were officially mandated by White House Office of Telecommunications
Policy Directives, their enabling legislation, executive orders regarding
interagency/intergovernmental cooperation, and program guidelines to not
only support cable TV as a viable business enterprise for disadvantaged
groups, but to also follow OMBE's lead in implementing federal policy in
support of minority business enterprise, and to allow OMBE to coordinate
the participation of all federal departments and agencies in contributing
to the growth of minority business enterprises.
A brief review of some of these official mandates, executive
orders, and directives will illustrate the strong grounds CRC was able to
use to attract and involve federal agencies in a task force effort.
Furthermore, any agency refusal to participate in the first task force
planning meeting could have been challenged by the directors of CRC and
OMBE through the Secretary of Commerce's White House mandated authority
to "convene for purposes of coordination, meetings of the heads of such
departments and agencies, or their designees, whose programs and activi-
ties may affect or contribute to" the support of the minority business
enterprise program (White House Executive Order 11625/October 13,
1971) 133
White House
First and foremost, in 1974 a White House Report to the President by the
Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications recommended a "comprehensive
new national policy for cable communications" which included the follow-
ing major directive:
Governmental authorities should assure that basic cable or other
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broadband communications are available to residents of rural areas
and to the poor.
The government should take affirmative action to assure a basic
level of cable TV service for residents of outlying rural areas and
that federally funded programs be used to support the public service
aspects of cable communications. The Secretary of Agriculture should
follow the development of cable in rural areas and make recommenda-
tions for appropriate government action. 1 3 4
Participation by minority groups in cable system ownership,
operation and programming should be facilitated.
The development of cable represents a unique opportunity for
minority, racial, and ethnic groups to become actively involved in a
new communications medium. Minority groups not only should have
employment opportunities, but also full opportunity to participate in
all aspects of cable ownership, operation, and programming.
The general policy for the structure and regulation of the cable
industry that we recommend would facilitate participation by all seg-
ments of society in cable ownership or control of channel use. More-
over, the local franchising authority should ensure opportunities for
minority ownership and control in cable systems and programming.
At the federal level, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
should devote special attention to the development of the cable in-
dustry to assure employment opportunities for minority group members.
We also recommend that the office of Minority Business and the Small
Business Administration of the Department of Commerce be directed to
give high priority to cable and to propose any necessary special
provisions, such as loan guarantees, to foster significant minority
ownership or control of cable operation.1 75
A Technical Draft of a Governmental Policy Report entitled
"Lowering Barriers to Telecommunications Growth" (prepared in 1974 but
released in 1975 by the Science and Technology Task Force of U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce) officially categorized telecommunications "as a vital
national asset that is not being fully exploited." Specifically, cable
television in the report, was pictured as "particularly in need of govern-
mental intervention to help it achieve its full potential." The report
recommended a $1 million development program be developed within Commerce
to accelerate the cable industry's growth. 1 3 6
White House Executive Order 11625 (October 13, 1971) prescribes the
official mandates and commitments of the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise and clarifies the authority of the Secretary of Commerce in
assisting OMBE in fulfilling its objectives. This Executive Order spe-
cifically stated the following:
The Secretary of Commerce is authorized--
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(a) to implement Federal policy in support of the minority busi-
ness enterprise program; (b) provide additional technical and manage-
ment assistance to disadvantaged businesses; (c) to assist in demon-
stration projects; and (d) to coordinate the participation of all
Federal departments and agencies in an increased minority enterprise
effort.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
Section 1. Functions of the Secretary of Commerce. (a) The
Secretary of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretary")
shall--
(1) Coordinate as consistent with law the plans, programs, and
operations of the Federal Government which affect or may contribute
to the establishment, preservation, and strengthening of minority
business enterprise.
(2) Promote the mobilization of activities and resources of State
and local governments, businesses and trade associations, universi-
ties, foundations, professional organizations, and volunteer and
other groups toward the growth of minority business enterprises, and
facilitate the coordination of the efforts of these groups with those
of Federal departments and agencies. 1 31
(3) Within constraints of law and appropriations therefore, and
according to his discretion, provide financial assistance to public
and private organizations so that they may render technical and man-
agement assistance to minority business enterprises, and defray all
or part of the cost of pilot or demonstration projects conducted by
public or private agencies or organizations which are designed to
overcome the special problems of minority business enterprises or
otherwise to further the purposes of this order. . . .
. . . (b) The secretary, as he deems necessary or appropriate to
enable him to better fulfill the responsibilities vested in him by
subsection (a), may--
(1) With the participation of other Federal Departments and agen-
cies as appropriate, develop comprehensive plans and specific program
goals for the minority enterprise program; establish regular perfor-
mance monitoring and reporting systems to assure that goals are being
achieved; and evaluate the impact of Federal support in achieving the
objectives established by this order.
(2) Require a coordinated review of all proposed Federal training
and assistance activities in direct support of the minority enter-
prise program to assure consistency with program goals and to avoid
duplication.
(3) Convene, for purposes of coordination, meetings of the heads
of such departments and agencies, or their designees, whose programs
and activities may affect or contribute to the purposes of this order.
(4) Convene business leaders, educators, and other representa-
tives of the private sector who are engaged in assisting the develop-
ment of minority business enterprise or who could contribute to its
development, for the purpose of proposing, evaluating and coordinat-
ing governmental and private activities in furtherance of the objec-
tives of this order.
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(5) Confer with and advise officials of State and local govern-
ments. . . .
Section 3. Responsibilities of Other Federal Departments and
Agencies.
(a) The head of each Federal department and agency, or a repre-
sentative designated by him, when and in the manner so requested by
the Secretary, shall furnish information, assistance, and reports to,
and shall otherwise cooperate with, the Secretary in the performance
of his functions hereunder.
(b) The head of each Federal department or agency shall, when so
requested by the Secretary, designate his Under Secretary or such
other similar official to have primary and continuing responsibility
for the participation and cooperation of that department or agency in
matters concerning minority business enterprise.
(c) Each Federal department or agency shall, within constraints
of law and appropriations therefore, continue all current efforts to
foster and promote minority business enterprises and to support the
program herein set forth, and shall cooperate with the Secretary of
Commerce in increasing the total Federal effort. . . .
Section 4. Policies and Standards. The Secretary may establish
such policies, standards, definitions, criteria, and procedures to
govern the implementation, interpretation, and application of this
order, and generally perform such functions and take such steps as he
may deem to be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purpose and
carry out the provision hereof.13 9
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On March 5, 1969, in one of my first executive orders as
President, I established two new mechanisms for promoting expanded
minority business activites: an Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise with the Department of Commerce to coordinate and oversee all
Federal efforts in this field and to stimulate private sector initia-
tives; and an Advisory Council for Minority Business Enterprise to
study this complex subject and recommend further action. Since that
time, both of these units have been diligently carrying out these
assignments. The further steps which I am announcing today have rown
in large measure from their suggestions and their experience.14
(1) Lower the level of private financing required to qualify for
financing from the Small Business Adminstration on a three-for-one
basis.
(2) Promote better coordination.
I am also issuing today an executive order giving the Secretary of
Commerce -- and, through him, the Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise -- increased authority over all Federal activities in the mi-
nority enterprise field. This order gives the Secretary a clear
mandate to establish and carry out Federal policy concerning minority
enterprise and to coordinate the related efforts of all Federal de-
partments and agencies. It also directs the departments and agencies
to develop systematic data collection processes concerning their mi-
nority enterprise programs and to cooperate in expanding the overall
Federal effort. The substantive provisions or Executive Order 11458
of March 5, 1969 are also carried over into the new order. 1 41
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OMBE
The program literature on the Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise indicated that OMBE was required to act as the lead agency in the
Federal Government for minority business development.142 A 1974 progress
report on the OMBE program indicated further that since its creation in
1969 under Executive Order 11458, OMBE has enjoyed the extensive coopera-
tion of other government agencies through the Inter-Agency Council for
Minority Business Enterprise. The focal point to mobilize Federal
departments and agencies to support minority entrepreneurs was the Inter-
Agency Council for Minority Business Enterprise (IAC). Chaired by the
Under Secretary of Commerce, IAC members included under secretary-level
officials of almost every Federal agency. The Council worked through task
forces for procurements, concessions, education and training, and data;
and it met periodically to review progress and to develop new initia-
tives.143 OMBE was properly experienced and mandated to not only serve on
task forces concerned with developing minority business initiatives but
also to take the lead in such efforts.
SBA
A Fiscal Year 1975 U.S. Small Business Adminstration report out-
lines the basic elements of SBA's program and policy focus that predis-
posed it to be supportive of a Cable TV Task Force:
SBA, by the direction of Congress, has as its primary goal the preser-
vation of free, competitive enterprise in order to strengthen the
nation's economy. SBA's specific lending objectives are to (1) stim-
ulate small business in deprived areas, (2) promote minority enter-
prise opportunity and (3) promote small business contribution to eco-
nomic growth.144
Official designation and recognition of SBA's capability to sup-
port minority business enterprise commenced in full force in 1968.
In 1968, the Federal effort in minority enterprise development was
accorded top Presidential priority and the position of Assistant
Administrator for Minority Enterprise was established. As evidence
of the continuing Presidential and congressional priority for this
program, in 1974 Congress elevated the position of Assistant Adminis-
trator for Minority Small Business. The President on December 11,
1975, urged Federal agencies to pull out all stops in supporting the
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national effort in minority economic development. These actions by
the legislative and executive branches serve to reiterate and inten-
sify the priority position they have assigned to the development of
minor ity enterprise.14"
Rural Development Act-1972
A mandate for the coordination of Federal agencies, in respect to
rural development, was set forth by the Rural Development Act of 1972
(Public Law 92-419).
The Rural Development Act added rural development as a basic concern
of the Department of Agriculture and directed the Secretary of
Agriculture to advise the President and the Congress on policies and
programs designed to improve the quality of life for people in rural
and nonmetropolitan areas (Section 603). The Secretary was charged
with the responsibility for coordinating a nationwide rural develop-
ment program utilizing not only the programs of his own department but
of all Federal departments and agencies.1 4 6
This act was to be implemented in coordination with related programs of
state and local governments.
FMHA
The FmHA's potential as a cable business funding source was first
established through the discovery of a loan application for over $1
million submitted by a Western Wisconsin Communications Cooperative to
develop a county-wide viewer owned cable system. A review of FmHA's
enabling legislation, the Guide to the Rural Development Act of 1972,
revealed that it specifically listed cable television as one of the fund-
able enterprises for which loans could be made. FmHA was also officially
mandated to provide new employment and business opportunities and upgrade
the standard of living for all who wish to live in small towns or open
country. Furthermore, the FmHA was officially mandated to install commu-
nity facilities that would help rural areas upgrade the quality of living
and promote economic development and growth. The Rural Development Act
categorized cable TV as a community facility which provided essential
service to rural residents. FmHA was ideally suited to participate in a
Cable TV Task Force.
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EDA
The EDA (a sister agency to OMBE within the Department of
Commerce) was mandated to provide funds and technical assistance to busi-
ness enterprises in disadvantaged areas. Specifically, "the Economic
Development Administration was established under the Public Works and
Economic Development Act of 1965 to help generate employment opportuni-
ties and improve levels of living in areas that have not shared our
national prosperity."147 The program literature on the EDA stipulates
that the "key to finding new sources of jobs and income in a lagging area
often lies in furnishing missing know-how, technical information, expert
opinion and counseling."l48 Thus, EDA as an agency understood the impor-
tance of providing disadvantaged communities with chances for new busi-
ness opportunities like cable TV by offering technical assistance in this
area. Since EDA's staff was not specialized in providing technical assis-
tance dealing with cable TV, as CRC was, it was logical that a cooperative
effort could serve the interest of both organizations more effectively.
Also, the EDA had a history of working with other agencies in cooperative
efforts to stimulate new types of employment opportunities for disadvan-
taged populations. One of EDA's program publications, "EDA - Building
Communities With Jobs," states the following:
. . to be successful, the EDA program requires cooperation between
public and private enterprise. It requires an active partnership
among officials at every level of government -- local, county, State
and Federal.1 4 9
Thus, the EDA was adequately mandated to take part in a Cable TV Task
Force with other agencies concerned with economic development among dis-
advantaged populations.
The main focus for task force support was on OMBE, FmHA, EDA, and
SBA. These Federal programs had both the administrative authority and
funding programs to support such an effort. Overall, the following
Federal and community organizations were selected to participate in the
first meeting of the National Rural cable Development Task Force (see
appendix D for listing of actual names of participants):*
*EDA did not participate in the first meeting because it had not
yet been identified or fully researched by CRC's staff during the initial
planning.
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o The Farmers Home Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture
(FmHA)
o The Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE)
o The Small Business Administration (SBA)
o The Federation of Southern Cooperatives (FSC)
o The Southeast Alabama Self-Help Association (SEASHA)
o National Economic Development Association (NEDA)
o The Delta Foundation (DF)
o Southern Cooperative Development Fund (SCDF)
Each of the selected task force participants were personally contacted
and briefed by CRC staff on the importance of the task force and mailed
formal letters from CRC's executive director and OMBE's National Coordi-
nator for Business Development (Charles Stein) requesting their partici-
pation in an official task force planning meeting. OMBE was a natural
ally of CRC both because of its official mandate to support minority
business development and because CRC was a funded technical assistance
program under OMBE.
TASK FORCE DEVEIDPMENT
First Planning Session
The executive director of CRC, Charles Tate and the National
Coordinator for Business Development for OMBE, Charles Stein, convened
the first meeting of the National Rural Cable TV Development Task Force
participants on February 4, 1975. The meeting was held in a formal
Department of Commerce meeting room arranged for by Charles Stein at the
request of Charles Tate and his staff. CRC's staff members felt it was
important to hold the first meeting in a very formal government setting to
help impress all participants with the Department of Commerce/OMBE's sup-
port of the Task Force effort, in providing such facilities, and to set a
proper tone for the meeting. Decisions on how to best orchestrate this
first meeting were made among CRC members during earlier in-house
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strategy sessions. Such strategy sessions were held periodically
throughout the operation of the Task Force to plot tactics to handle
various situations as they arose.
The first meeting was arranged by CRC's director and staff to have
Charles Stein open the meeting and to serve as the main chairman. This
was because of his status as an OMBE government official and his close
relationship to the CRC program. Charles Stein was the chief contract
officer who administered CRC's contract funding from OMBE.
Stein was highly motivated to support the Task Force effort be-
cause anything that made the CRC program more successful or more visible
made his OMBE job as their contract manager more important, easier, and
rewarding. Charles Stein could be trusted to fully support the Task Force
because working with CRC was already part of his everyday job, as was
working with other agencies to help support minority business develop-
ment. Generally, it was hoped by CRC's executive director and staff that
Charles Stein's presence and leadership would lend greater creditability
to the proceedings.
The first meeting was well attended by representatives from
federal and private organizations. The Small Business Administration was
represented by Louis F. Laun (Deputy Administrator), Connie Mack Higgins
(Associate Administrator for Minority Enterprise), and Warren Boyd (Busi-
ness Development Officer). The Farmers Home Administration was repre-
sented by Frank B. Elliot (Administrator), Royce Jones (Special Assistant
to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Rural Development) and Judd Hanson
(Community Facilities Loan Officer). The largest group of federal repre-
sentatives present was from the Office of Minority Business Enterprise.
OMBE was represented by its Director, Alex Armendaris, Charles Stein,
Charles McMillan (Atlanta-Regional Director), Henry Zuniga (Dallas
Regional Director), and Bill Brewster (Development Specialist).
It was important that OMBE give a strong show of support because
this task force effort was part of their official program responsibility
of coordinating the activities of other agencies whose programs could be
used to support minority business enterprise. Furthermore, CRC was one of
their funded technical assistance programs. Thus, for OMBE, supporting
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the Task Force was a self-serving necessity. It was a highly visible way
of demonstrating that they were doing their official job of supporting
minority business development.1 5 0
The other federal agencies present at the first meeting were
initially motivated to participate by CRC's staff briefing efforts.
During these briefings it was outlined that cable TV development was a
significant area of interest to the present administration, as evidenced
by various policy statements, executive orders and White House direc-
tives, and this was an opportunity for these agencies to increase their
program accomplishments by supporting the development of a very visible
new growth technology with significant public service potential. The
more official motivation used to secure and ensure public agency involve-
ment was the fact that government agencies were mandated to cooperate and
coordinate their efforts in supporting minority business enterprise.
Charles Stein's letter officially requesting various agencies to partici-
pate in the Task Force effort was consequently very important. Since OMBE
was mandated and had authority to convene for purposes of coordination,
meetings of the heads of departments and agencies whose programs and
activities could be used to contribute to the support of the minority
business enterprise program. Any refusal to participate could have been
challenged by OMBE through the Secretary of Commerce. Thus, agencies were
officially obligated to participate in such meeting by the government
mandate for coordination and cooperation between agencies in implementing
public programs.
There were eleven community development organizations (CDOs) pre-
sent at the meeting. Each CDO was represented by its president or an
executive officer. Seven staff members from the various CDOs were also
present. The CDOs in attendance were: the Federation of Southern Coopera-
tives, SEASHA, the Delta Foundation, Southern Cooperative Development
Fund, National Economic Development Association, Opportunity Funding Cor-
poration, National Council of La Raza, Interstate Research Associates,
Emergency Land Fund, and Mid-West Piedmont Association. These organiza-
tions were motivated to participate in the Task Force because it
represented a chance to form some inside contacts with various national
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officials of government agencies that had the potential of funding
various economic development projects in their communities.15 1
For the CDOs, a cable TV Task Force was an opportunity to form
some important government relationships that might help them get funding
not just for cable TV projects but for other development projects as well.
Also, participation in a federal task force was a unique chance to gain
some national visibility for their organizations and some added impor-
tance in their local areas. Such "free floating" incentives enabled CRC's
staff to recruit an additional number of CDOs to become a part of the
first meeting. CRC staff felt it was important to have a significant
number of CDOs present at the first meeting because they symbolically
represented local community interest and support of this effort.
During the meeting, I with some support from other CRC staff
members gave the key oral presentation which mapped out: the background
research which indicated that a massive rural cable development program
was a viable and important undertaking; the basic need and potential
impact of cable in rural areas; the organizational flow design of respon-
sibility needed to operationalize a large scale program; and a step-by-
step plan for developing rural cable systems.
Participants at the planning meeting received from CRC's staff a
task force planning guide, an information packet on cable development and
program literature on all the organizations present.
A wide array of visuals were used in CRC's presentations to illu-
strate: rural areas' socio-economic needs; the organizational support
needed to operationalize the program; the program development plan; the
"cable-ready" areas in various South and Southwest States (pinpointed on
a large U.S. map); and the social and economic impact of a cable business
on a rural community. Also on display were key elements of a media
package developed for delivering seminars on cable TV to rural residents.
These media aids included a flip chart illustrating cable TV as a technol-
ogy and as a business, a model of a cable TV system, a slide show, and a
cable film.
The participants present at this first meeting were impressed by
the projection that over the long term the Rural Cable Program would
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attempt to impact upon some 100 communities in 18 different states. It
was pointed out, however, that the program's initial thrust would focus on
42 out of the 100 cities identified as "cable-ready" in the South and the
Southwest. The first phase focus would eventually influence the lives of
no less than 500,000 rural residents in 6 different states (South
Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona).
After the background presentation, the meeting was opened for
discussion of the information presented, the plans developed and the
viability of the task force concept.
The energetic participation of one of the representatives of the
FmHA, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Royce Jones) stimulated many crea-
tive interchanges between participants during the general discussion of
task force organizational roles and plans. Royce Jones's candid discus-
sion of manpower constraints suffered by all organizations, helped point
out the plausibility of a task force resource sharing approach to support-
ing new economic development opportunities in rural areas. Jones
observed that "rural communities often suffered because of agencies's
limited manpower" available to address all their needs. He indicated that
agencies needed to pool their resources to support projects like cable TV
because individually agencies did not have the specialized manpower to
identify and organize community groups to take advantage of such economic
development opportunities.1 5 2
Royce Jones had been handpicked by Dr. James E. Bostic, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Rural Development, Deartment of Agricul-
ture to participate at this meeting along with a FmHA loan officer Judd
Hanson. During the early planning stages for the first Task Force meet-
ing, Dr. Bostic (the highest ranking black official inside FmHA) was one
of several top-level officials within various target agencies who were
personally contacted and briefed by CRC staff on the major significance of
the Task Force and its objectives. Dr. Bostic was so impressed with the
Task Force's objectives that he committed his support and pledged the
active involvement of one of his special assistants, Royce Jones. Jones
also happened to be a periodic participant for the Department of Agricul-
ture on the Special Programs Committee of the Interagency Council for
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Minority Business Enterprise, a committee whose function included: to
develop special programs that increase the effectiveness of the Federal
minority business assistance effort and to coordinate Federal programs and
resources that result in increased numbers, size, and types of business
opportunities for minority entrepreneurs. Consequently Royce Jones was
highly motivated to actively support the Task Force process.153
At the end of the general discussion, Charles Stein suggested it might
be helpful to have a task force agreement that would outline the basic
commitment of all those involved, to the proposed cable TV program.
Charles Tate, CRC staff members, and Charles Stein had agreed among them-
selves before this meeting that there needed to be some type of formal
document that could be used to hold agencies accountable for a certain
level of cooperation and participation in the task force. Although the
idea for an interagency agreement originated with CRC staff, it was de-
cided that Charles Stein would make the suggestion at the meeting because
it was hoped that as a government official his suggestions would be more
readily accepted by the other agency participants. After a general dis-
cussion at the meeting of the idea, Charles Stein was able to convince the
other agencies that because of the importance of the undertaking, an
interagency agreement was needed to help record government agency support
and to promote greater publicity of the program among their different
agency levels and the public at large. Thus, it was decided that a
written task force agreement spelling out agency role commitments would
be drawn up. The representatives of the SBA and FmHA indicated that they
needed time to consider and to develop appropriate role statements of
tasks that they would be able to assume. Charles Stein suggested that a
second task force meeting be held on February 18, 1975 to discuss the
basic tasks and role statements that each agency would develop. He also
indicated that a model task force agreement would be developed by CRC/OMBE
legal staff and circulated at this meeting for comments and revisions.
After it was decided that another meeting would be held, Royce
Jones suggested that Charles Stein be designated as the formal chairman of
all future Task Force meetings and that Charles Tate and CRC serve as the
recording secretaries for all meetings. Royce Jones stated at the meeting
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that he made the suggestion based on the well-organized manner in which
this first meeting had been planned and run by Charles Stein and Charles
Tate. Behind the scenes, one of CRC's staff members had prompted Ramon
Tyson (a friend of CRC and a representative of the Federation of Southern
Cooperatives) to get Jones to make the suggestion to help keep things
moving ahead. Warren Boyd (SBA representative) seconded Royce Jones's
motion and the rest of the participants concurred.
CRC's staff members were very satisfied with this arrangement
because they knew Charles Stein could be depended on to help keep agencies
in line in terms of supporting cable TV projects. Charles Stein would
serve as the visible spokesman for the Task Force while Charles Tate and
CRC would attend to all the "housekeeping" details that would keep the
Task Force meetings and program functioning.
Task Force Activity
The second meeting of Task Force members on February 18, 1975,
focused on hammering out a specific written agreement which would formal-
ize organizations' commitments to the program effort.
The second meeting was attended just by representatives from each
of the federal agencies and CRC. The community development organizations
did not attend because they did not have the funds to make frequent trips
to Washington. The meeting participants were: Connie Mack Higgins and
Warren Boyd--SBA; Royce Jones and Judd Hanson--FmHA; Charles Stein--OMBE;
Charles Tate, Reginald Dunn, and George Burns--CRC.
Charles Stein, as chairman of the Task Force, handed out the first
draft of the agreement at the meeting. The first draft of the Task Force
agreement was actually developed by CRC's legal advisor, George Burns and
the Corporate Market Development staff. It was very detailed in outlining
each agency's specific responsibilities for coordinating, prioritizing,
and expediting cable TV projects as well as trouble shooting any problems
that might surface in the application process. Basic language was put
into the first draft of the agreement by CRC's staff which attempted to
commit agencies to earmarking funds for cable TV projects and simplifying
agency reviews. Also, CRC's staff wanted to establish within the
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agreement that local development teams would be a single point of entry
and review of federal programs by clients seeking cable TV project
funding.
During the second meeting of the Task Force, SBA and FmHA repre-
sentatives indicated that changes needed to be made in the first draft of
the agreement to make it legally acceptable to each agency. Judd Hanson
of the FmHA indicated that some general format and language changes would
have to be made by FmHA's legal staff to make the agreement conform to
"standard" government agreements.154 The SBA representatives concurred
that their legal staff would also have to review the agreement in more
detail for similar reasons. Charles Stein indicated that a new draft of
the agreement would be developed by OMBE's legal staff based on any
changes suggested by the other agencies. Finally, it was agreed that a
third meeting would be held as soon as an agreement structure acceptable
to all federal agencies' legal advisors could be established.
CRC's staff had thought that getting an interagency agreement
signed after a successful first meeting would be easy. They were greatly
mistaken. The second meeting was the beginning of a long struggle to get
a final Task Force agreement that would be agreeable to all the agencies
participating. CRC and OMBE staff in their early drafts tried repeatedly
to make sure that clear and detailed language was used in the agreement
that laid out specific and hard commitments point-by-point for each par-
ticipating agency. Simultaneously, the legal counselors for the SBA and
the FmHA were equally steadfast in their attempts to "water down" the
document so that it would just commit their agencies to only the most
basic activities already in keeping with their general work tasks.
During the interim, CRC market analysts with the support of local
economic development organizations began contacting community leaders in
various "cable-ready" rural areas and making on-site visits in order to
plan individual cable development strategies.
In Arizona, CRC's market analyst, Juan Moreno, using the help of
NEDA, met with the mayor and city officials of South Tucson to discuss
cable development. In Louisiana, Ed Ratcliff teamed up with two members
of the FSC to visit several "cable-ready" communities. In South Carolina,
I began working with Jim Williams of the Emergency Land Fund in making
101
on-site assessments of cable-ready areas.
All in all, visits were made by task force teams to "cable-ready"
areas in New Mexico, Texas, California, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
During such visits, preliminary "interest raising sessions" on cable TV
were held with a number of local community groups in the state. In some
areas, cable groups had been organized and were moving towards incorpor-
ation. While in at least three other states, cable franchises* had been
won in selected cable-ready areas (Espanola, New Mexico; Roosevelt,
Alabama; and Pine Ridge, South Dakota).
Besides these market activities, Charles Tate and Reginald Dunn,
director of market development of CRC, had been periodically meeting with
representatives from EDA. The focus of these meetings had been on discus-
sing with the national directors of EDA's loan, grant, and research pro-
grams, the specific applicability of these programs to task force needs;
their prerequisites for application approval and coordination of their
program to meet Task Force objectives. Acting administrator Jeff Cahill
indicated to CRC's executive director that he would be interested in EDA
being a part of the Task Force.
Meanwhile, the various federal representatives of the Task Force
were working on finalizing a written agreement. By March 1, 1975, the
director of OMBE, Alex Armendaris, and Deputy Administrator of SBA, Louis
*Background Note: Cable TV groups, after being organized, had to
successfully assemble cable TV development plans for a given service area
so that they could vie for and be granted a cable TV franchise or license
to develop and operate a cable TV system. The cable TV franchise was
granted by the city council of a given territory to the group it believed
could best serve the needs of its community. The granting of a franchise
was a very political process with preference going to groups that had:
local owners, established track records, political influence, community
support, and/or technical expertise. CRC was able to provide the techni-
cal backup needed by local organizations to sway the political support to
win a cable TV franchise. The possession of a franchise enabled a group
to be taken seriously when approaching venture capital sources (i.e.,
banks, specialized lending institutions, government programs, etc.) for
the monies needed to build a cable TV system. In effect, holding a cable
TV franchise was an essential requirement for basic venture capital nego-
tiations.
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Laun, had reviewed the revised agreement and had agreed to sign it. How-
ever, FmHA's administrator, Frank Elliot (even after several meetings
with CRC and OMBE representatives), was still reluctant to sign off on the
document. He indicated that historically the FmHA did not as a policy
enter into written agreements which suggested that special attention
would be given to certain applicants over others under their various
155
programs.
This was in spite of the fact that recommendation 11 of the 1974
Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications clearly instructed the
Secretary of Agriculture to follow the development of cable in rural areas
and make recommendations for appropriate Government action. Thus, the
agreement seemed to be a logical extension of the demonstrated interest
that the Secretary of Agriculture was supposed to maintain in the develop-
ment of cable in rural areas. In addition, under OMBE's executive order
11625, Section 3, Responsibilities of Other Federal Departments and Agen-
cies, part (b) stated that "the head of each federal department or agency
shall when so requested by the Secretary designate his undersecretary or
such other similar official to have primary and continuing responsibility
for the participation and cooperation of that department or agency in
matters concerning minority business enterprise."l56 The "cooperation of
federal agencies" talked about here would seem to include written agree-
ments that attest to the level of commitment and responsibility of federal
agencies to matters concerning minority business enterprise.
Outside Interference
During this same time frame, news of the Task Force had reached
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)--the trade association of
the broadcast industry. They had made several phone calls to CRC and
other attempts to gain copies of CRC's research list of "cable-ready"
areas, but failed. It might be well to note here that broadcasters and
their trade association--the NAB (regular TV and radio station owners)
were and still are greatly opposed to cable TV development and any efforts
aimed at aiding the proliferation of cable TV. Hence any information
given to the NAB about the Task Force's target communities would have been
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used to undermine the program's objectives. I and the rest of my col-
leagues at CRC did everything in our power to protect our research infor-
mation on these communities.
Informal intelligence from several reliable sources (one being a
representative of the National Rural Electrical Cooperative Association)
had also indicated that the NAB had contacted and was trying to exert some
influence over the then Secretary of Agriculture (Earl Butz) by challeng-
ing, behind the scenes, the appropriateness of government support vis-a-
vis their Community Facilities program of cable TV systems.157 The fact
that a major presidential election was fast approaching also seemed to
place pressure on the FmHA officials not to do anything too controversial,
especially if it involved incurring the wrath of the broadcast media.
Given this backdrop of reality, it wasn't too hard to realize why the FmHA
was becoming reluctant over giving a written commitment to a program not
focused on one of their traditional constituency groups.
This situation posed a real stumbling block for CRC staff because
they viewed a signed written agreement as a key tool in obtaining fair
treatment from federal agency field offices when funding applications
were processed. This was how the agreement was viewed and discussed
during various in-house staff meetings. CRC's director of market devel-
opment activities, often commented during such meetings that without
clear and tangible proof that national agency offices in Washington knew
about and supported the cable TV program, most field offices would no
doubt give our clients the "runaround."158 Furthermore, since the FmHA
had already made a sizable and well publicized commitment to a rural cable
system, their leadoff signature was viewed as being crucial in maintain-
ing the confidence of the other federal agencies in committing themselves
to the program.
Task Force Agreement Negotiations
Over the course of the next five months lengthy discussions were
held and detailed policy papers were presented to the FmHA administrators
by CRC's executive director in an effort to motivate them to sign the
federal agreement. The policy papers presented to the FmHA outlined such
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facts as the Rural Development Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-419) added rural
development as a basic concern of the Department of Agriculture and di-
rected the Secretary to support all policies and programs designed to
improve the quality of life for people in rural and nonmetropolitan areas
(Section 603). In addition, the Secretary was charged with the responsi-
bility for coordinating a nationwide rural development program utilizing
not only the programs of his own department but of all federal departments
and agencies.
The FmHA's signature on the task force agreement was viewed as
significant because their program specifically listed cable TV as an
essential community facility; offered low interest long-term loans to
fund such ventures and had already set a funding precedent by making a
loan commitment of $1,238,000 to a cooperative cable venture.
In case the FmHA could not be persuaded to take the lead in
committing itself to a task force agreement CRC's executive director
identified the Economic Development Administration as the second most
significant organization to get to sign the agreement. This was because,
its business funding programs seemed to be open to funding cable TV based
on discussions held with agency staff, EDA's Office of Economic Research
had already funded a small research paper by CRC on Telecommunications'
potential impact on rural development, and Jeff Cahill, EDA's acting
administrator, expressed significant interest in supporting the Task
Force. While the signing of the Task Force agreement was still in limbo,
CRC market analysts continued contacting community leaders in various
"cable-ready" rural areas and making on-site visits to plan cable strate-
gies.
Finally, after much discussion and format revision in August of
1975, FmHA's Frank B. Elliott decided to sign the written agreement after
it was realized that: all other federal agencies had signed the document;
they were already committed by the Rural Development Act of 1972 and the
OTP Report of 1974 to participate in such a multi-agency coordination
process; and their continued reluctance to respond to the needs of a
minority oriented program could have led to significant adverse publicity
and political fallout (it was informally made known to FmHA that certain
members of the Congressional Rural Caucus (see appendix E), the
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Congressional Black Caucus, and the Black Media Advisory Groups supported
the task force concept and would be greatly dismayed if FmHA reneged in
signing the written agreement.)
The final written document outlined the cooperative responsibili-
ties of all those involved (see appendix F). Besides the obvious implica-
tions of the agreement's impact on expediting the attainment of the goals
of the Task Force, the agreement represented a first in multi-federal
agency action in the area of minority economic development. This agree-
ment was a major benchmark in federal agency coordination since it marked
the first time these agencies had ever pursued a common goal together.
Progress Review Meeting
Because of the protracted negotiations over the signing of the
agreement, the Task Force's full membership had not met in several months.
However, CRC had mailed task force members periodic reports of events and
progress since the last meeting. After receiving the written commitment
of federal agencies, it was decided by CRC's executive director that a
progress review and strategy meeting of the Task Force would be held on
October 15, 1975. The basic objectives of this meeting were to completely
update Task Force members on activities in various "cable-ready" markets,
activate the first strategy sessions over funding cable systems, and to
begin to publicize the task force agreement and its significance.
Present at this meeting were all the federal agency officials and
community organization representatives invited to the first meeting.
There were two additional participants, William Henkel (Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Operations) and Stephen Dunne (Business Development Offi-
cer) from the Economic Development Administration.
During the third meeting of the Task Force, CRC representatives
William Polk and Juan Moreno informed the organizations present that on-
site visits made to a number of selected communities in New Mexico, Texas,
California, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina had verified their cable development
potential. Also, a total of about seven franchises had actually been won
in identified "cable-ready" areas: Espanola, New Mexico; Roosevelt City,
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Alabama; Pine Ridge, South Dakota; Grambling, Louisiana; Tuskegee,
Alabama; Tullulah, Louisiana; and Muskegan Heights, Michigan.
It was also made known that besides these market activities,
CRC's executive director had periodically met with representatives from
EDA (Jeff Cahill) and FHA (Frank B. Elliot). The focus of these meetings
in each case was to discuss with the various national directors of their
loan, grant, and research programs, the specific applicability of their
programs to task force needs; their prerequisites for application ap-
proval; and the use of their programs to meet task force objectives. It
was noted that these meetings had been very productive and a definite
rapport had developed between CRC's staff and the agencies contacted
which resulted in these agencies' signatures on the Task Force agreement.
Charles Tate of CRC discussed the signficance and impact of the agreement.
The review and discussion of these and other accomplishments (see
appendix G summary list) was used to set a positive tone for the rest of
the meeting and to help underplay the long time it took to negotiate a
cooperative agreement between agencies. Charles Stein and Charles Tate
set as one of their main goals for this meeting to map out a basic process
to be followed in involving federal agencies (through their regional and
field offices) in assessing the most appropriate funding strategy for
recently franchised communities.159 After a general discussion of this
topic area, it was agreed that each agency, through its appropriate re-
gional or local field office, would designate a representative team.
Besides representatives from each of the federal agencies, the Local
Development Team (LDT) would be made up of a CRC market analyst and the
cable franchise holder.
Another major agenda of this meeting from CRC's perspective, was
to ballyhoo the significance and impact of the agreement in facilitating
funds for cable development projects.160 Charles Stein announced that
OMBE, Department of Commerce had sent out a major press release outlining
the Rural Cable Program and the agreement signed by participating federal
agencies (see appendix H). CRC through its Cablelines newsletter/
magazine had already run a special issue on the Task Force's development.
The director of CRC indicated that they would be placing continuing
articles on the Task Force agreement and cable system
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development in it. CRC's hidden agenda was that using a positive
publicity approach they hoped to motivate the federal agencies involved
to follow through on their written agreement. With representation of the
top officials of these federal agencies (OMBE, SBA, FmHA, and EDA) locked
into the written agreement, it was theorized that the Task Force could
generate the kind of cooperation and coordination required to maximize
the impact of federal resources. This was the general thinking that was
expressed by CRC staff members during in-house strategy meetings.
It was anticipated that through the Task Force, the economic
development goals of these various federal agencies could be more effec-
tively carried out. With interagency coordination and cooperation, it
was hoped that unnecessary delay, policy misinterpretations, and duplica-
tion of client efforts in establishing project eligibility could be
avoided. Most important, the flow of services and assistance to activate
local cable development could move more smoothly.161 This was the driving
theory behind convening this Task Force. While the written agreement was
viewed by CRC's staff as a backup mechanism to be used to keep agencies
from just paying lip-service to the intent of this approach. These were
the main views held and expressed by CRC market analysts and directors
during staff strategy meetings that took place before the development of
the Task Force and during its operation.
TASK FORCE OPERATION
SBA Test Case I
The first test of this task force theory in action was a quiet
success. Starting in June of 1974, CRC had begun to have periodic contact
with Eddie Pena (a Mexican-American) in Grants, New Mexico. Pena was
president of Tele-Vu, Inc., a cable TV corporation started in 1972. Be-
fore taking the plunge into cable TV ownership, Eddie Pena had been a
uranium miner, rodeo rider, sheep rancher, and successful operator of a
chain of laundromats. When the city council in his town began discussing
granting a new cable TV franchise after the previous operator had allowed
the system to deteriorate, Pena indicated his interest in operating the
system.
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Four other applicants--including several large Multiple Systems
Operators (MSOs)--were also interested in the franchise for this area.
However, Pena was the only local operator, a major factor in obtaining the
one additional vote he needed to get a majority of the five-member city
council.
Pena's move into cable ownership meant a significant financial
risk. After Pena had been awarded the franchise, no local bank would lend
him money, despite his lifelong residency in Grants and his successful
laundry business. Ultimately the banks required personal guarantees on
loans secured by his other business assets, and on the ranches of his
father and father-in-law.
At first, Pena had problems with the system design, with the
construction company, and, just as the system became operational, a 7-
month strike at the uranium mines, the town's major employer, occurred.
Eventually, Pena overcame these problems and hooked up about 65% of the
town in 17 months.
When CRC became involved with Eddie Pena, his cable TV system was
serving 12 motels, 50 apartments, and over 2,350 individual homes in
Grants and Milan, New Mexico. The 10-channel, 52 mile system provided
subscribers with three Albuquerque signals, plus an educational station,
four Los Angeles signals via microwave, and a weather channel for a $7.50
monthly fee. Without the consistently high quality of the cable TV
system, the local reception of Albuquerque stations was very poor because
of Grants' location in a valley which blocked the signals. By fiscal year
1974, the system's second full year of operation, the system showed a
positive cash flow of almost $8,000 and a net loss after depreciation of
$15,500.
In early 1975, Pena began seeking to obtain $330,000 to refinance
certain debt that was coming due, consolidate his long-term debts as well
as provide for some plant expansion. Eddie Pena's father and father-in-
law held long-term notes of $125,000 each from Pena, secured against the
system. Pena's relatives had borrowed the $250,000 from other lending
institutions secured by mortgages on their homes and ranches based upon an
agreement that the loans would be repaid as soon as the system could be
refinanced. The initial loans were incurred in 1972 to help finance the
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construction of the system.
When CRC staff members Gil Mendelson and Juan Moreno met with
Pena, they discussed with him the merits of trying to borrow the full
amount of the $250,000 just to retire the loans from his father and
father-in-law. In conversations with Pena, CRC's Gil Mendelson expressed
concern over whether it was prudent to refinance loans that were carrying
low interest for new cable money that was going for 15 percent. After a
review of his realistic financial needs and the then current state of
cable financing, Pena was persuaded to hold off on refinancing the major-
ity of his system until interest rates were more reasonable. Instead,
Eddie Pena decided to go after an appropriate sum of money that would meet
his immediate need for a new loan to finance additional construction and
plant expansion. It was projected by CRC staff that such new construction
could add considerable new revenue at minimum costs.1 6 2
In late June of 1975, Pena submitted a loan request for $100,000
to the SBA to help him expand his existing system. He was first informed
by a local SBA official that this request had been approved and as soon as
funds were allocated to the SBA State Albuquerque office, the loan would
be dispensed. However, later in February of 1976, when the funds for the
State SBA office came through, Pena's request for funding was turned down
because he had not supposedly met certain requirements. Eddie Pena was
informed that SBA could not loan money to a cable system that performed
any type of local origination programming--not even an automatic time and
weather channel which was the type of community service Pena was going to
provide. Local origination is a term used to describe any type of pro-
gramming that is locally produced by a cable TV operation in addition to
its basic retransmission service. Pena, wanting to get a second opinion
on SBA's actions, contacted CRC to explain his situation. During this
time CRC's Task Force had begun operation and Pena was informed by Gil
Mendelson of its existence and potential help in his predicament.
Since the loan application process had already been completed
there was no need to call into operation the local development team
mechanism. Instead CRC's executive director decided to use the policy
commitment embodied in the task force agreement as leverage to assist Pena
in contacting certain New Mexican political officials to appraise them of
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the situation. A letter drafted by CRC staff but signed by Pena was sent
to these political officials. The letter informed them of the task force
agreement and outlined how state SBA offices had willfully "mishandled"
one of their constituent's loan requests.
It was reasoned by CRC's executive director and staff that the
involvement of political officials (i.e., New Mexican congressman and
senator) would trigger more direct action by SBA Task Force representa-
tives and in turn stimulate immediate responsiveness to resolving the
situation by local SBA officials. As one of CRC's staff members put it,
"if the Task Force and SBA get a letter from Congressman or Senator so and
so saying, 'hey SBA if you play around with one of our constituents we are
going to play around with your appropriations. . .then things are going
to happen alot faster than if we (CRC) launched the investigation into
Pena's problem.'"l63 The strategy was to induce political officials with
clout to initiate inquiries and make the SBA and Task Force answerable to
them, in reporting back the resolution of the situation. The executive
director and staff of CRC theorized that once local SBA officials became
aware that supporting cable TV projects was a priority of a federal Task
Force (that included the SBA) and that political officials were "inter-
ested" in the approval of Pena's project then they would be motivated to
resolve the problem quickly in Pena's favor.
The New Mexican political officials were informed by letter that
Pena was ready to drop any plans for a time and weather channel which
might put him in conflict with SBA policy regarding local origination.
They were also told that Pena was first assured his loan would be approved
when money became available, but when it did, his loan proposal was vetoed
as being in violation of SBA policy on local origination. The explanation
of why such a conflict was not pointed out earlier was that John Bush, the
local SBA official thought "that the loan monies for his state office
probably would not be allocated and therefore he didn't feel it was
necessary to fully evaluate the original package." 1 6 4
Chester Barnard has stated that if there are no inducements that
exceed the burdens and sacrifices to be made by a bureaucrat in
accepting certain new or different orders of action that ultimately
force him to alter his established standard cperating procedures or
bureaucratic "routines" then his "zone of indifference" over whether
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to follow such orders will be negatively violated.16 5 Thus he will
not feel compelled to perform duties or render services above a bare
minimum level of acceptable behavior. This appears to be the dynamic
at work when the SBA local official only superficially reviewed
Pena's loan package. He figured that there would not be any monies to
fund the project and that over an extended period of time, Pena would
get tired of waiting and eventually seek out other loan sources.
Letters explaining the complete situation were also sent under
Pena's signature to SBA Task Force members and their chairman (see
appendix I for example of the communique sent) . Letters inquiring into
the mishap were forwarded by the political officials contacted by Pena to
the Task Force Chairman, the director of the SBA New Mexican field office,
and the Chief Administrator of SBA's National office in Washington, D.C.
Soon after the Task Force was contacted by Pena, the SBA members in
Washington began to make informal investigations into the situation
through in-house channels and by contacting the New Mexican SBA field
office director for further information.
Warren Boyd, a black SBA loan official and Task Force representa-
tive, contacted the New Mexican SBA office for an explanation. The office
director informed Boyd that he didn't realize there was such "high inter-
est" in cable TV. Boyd told him about the Task Force, his role, and that
because of the political inquiries there was "a keen interest in what was
going on." The director told Boyd they were still "backtracking" the
situation but would keep him posted. Boyd's intervention was motivated by
several factors. He was acting to honor the request of New Mexican
politicians and to head off a political flap for SBA.166 As a Task Force
participant, he had an increased obligation to act and stay informed on
the situation. On a personal level, as a member of a minority group, he
was concerned with seeing some equity being brought to the Pena situa-
tion.1 6 7
Boyd, by virtue of his Task Force role and personal interest in
minority business development, had been cultivated by CRC's executive
director and staff as a close confidant. The Task Force provided CRC's
staff with the opportunity to "groom" and prime certain agency contacts
like Boyd to initiate supportive client actions under a protective man-
tle, inform CRC on internal agency developments, and provide "feedback"
on Task Force strategies. The Task Force afforded Boyd a protective
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mantle of legitimacy (i.e., the "right") in making direct inquiries with-
out being challenged by field officials as "trying to make waves" or being
accused of kibitzing field office affairs.
Charles Stein, as Task Force Chairman, officially informed the
SBA officials in Washington and New Mexico by letter that the field
office's handling of the Tele-Vu project was not in general accord with
the basic spirit and intent of the interagency agreement directives that
instructed all signatory agencies to "provide all possible national and
local assistance to minority businessmen and user-groups qualified to
participate in the cable TV program."168 Nor was it in accord with the
directive indicating that signatory agencies were responsible for
"notifying regional, district, county, and/or local representatives of
the signatory agencies of the terms and intent of this agreement, and to
encourage active support and assistance by such representatives in carry-
ing out the local aspects of the program."l69 He then asked that he be
sent an explanation of their handling of the Tele-Vu project.
Charles Stein's firm follow through in the Pena case was enhanced
by the fact that OMBE's national director was Alex Armendaris, a Mexican-
American. As a member of a Spanish-speaking minority group there is
little doubt he took a dim view of SBA's callous mishandling of Eddie
Pena's (a fellow Chicano) project and strongly backed up Charles Stein's
actions.
The director of SBA's National office responded to Charles
Stein's letter by indicating that his office was in the process of re-
questing further information from their field office on its handling of
the Tele-Vu project. The National SBA administrators were compelled to
follow up on the Pena situation because of their Task Force obligation to
support cable TV, the Task Force chairman's official request for their
investigation, and the inquiries made by New Mexican politicians. As one
SBA staff member put it:
Being tied to a Task Force and agreement certainly colored the review
of actions taken by field offices. There was little leeway in terms
of acting or not acting. I think it's fair to say certain moves had
to be made to reduce SBA's vulnerability. 17 0
The presence of the Task Force and an interagency agreement were
visible indications and acknowledgments that minority cable TV applicants
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were entitled to special assistance and support. They created a "fish
bowl effect" where agency transgressions in defiance of the Task Force
mandate and signed agreement could be easily scrutinized and denounced by
politicians and other outside observers.
The SBA's membership on the Task Force and the signed agreement
increased the National office's accountability for their field office's
actions and made it a fait accompli that responsive action had to be
taken. The Task Force and its agreement signified that disadvantaged
cable TV groups could expect, and were entitled to, support from SBA.
When this standard was violated, it placed the burden on SBA to explain
why--given the highly visible Task Force preparations made to avoid bu-
reaucratic problems and the clear support signals given off by the inter-
agency agreement. The political interest in the Pena case intensified and
reinforced the need for direct action.
After numerous inquiries started being made into the Tele-Vu pro-
ject, the SBA New Mexican field office director indicated to his super-
visors that his office would need several weeks to review the handling of
the Tele-Vu project.
Within two months after significant attention and pressure had
been focused on the SBA local field office to explain why Mr. Pena should
be penalized for their indiscretion in terms of not providing adequate and
timely information on a major project funding prerequisite before his
proposal submission, the funds were relinquished to Eddie Pena.
However, to save face the SBA field office maintained that Mr.
Pena, in order to receive funds, had to agree not to originate any pro-
gramming. Even though this was not a restriction placed upon him when his
original loan request was approved, Eddie Pena acquiesced in order to
facilitate an amiable process.171
The Task Force agreement helped to trigger an immediate sensi-
tivity by the New Mexican political officials to the "unfair treatment" of
one of their constituents. It likewise forced SBA Task Force representa-
tives to ask some hard questions of their local field office about proper
operating procedures in service delivery to the public. The interagency
agreement was a concrete document which established SBA's, among other
agencies, commitment to facilitating the service delivery process in the
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area of cable TV. It was a document which in its initial intent did not
condone last minute disapproval of loans based on criteria not made known
at the beginning of the project evaluation process. In fact its whole
intent was to assure to some extent that basic clear communications to
community groups from participating agencies were forthcoming in support
of proper funding of cable TV projects.
The agreement in conjunction with political official interest
helped give extraordinary publicity and high visibility to an otherwise
mundane bureaucratic occurrence. The publicity generated by the agree-
ment basically forced the local SBA officials to rethink their mishan-
dling of the Pena project within the spotlight of attention from certain
politicians and national administrators which helped to forestall subse-
quent bureaucratic maneuvers aimed at sabotaging Pena's project. Over-
all, the agreement created a policy platform for outside observers (po-
litical officials), inside national administrators (Task Force represen-
tatives), and public interest organizations (i.e., CRC) and most impor-
tantly, community groups to stand on to review and scrutinize bureaucra-
tic actions.
EDA TEST CASE II
After achieving a major breakthrough in resolving the Eddie
Pena/SBA case with the help of the Task Force agreement, CRC's staff
wanted to build on this success. CRC's director and staff members theo-
rized that it might be prudent to finance another already existing cable
TV system. This would be easier and less time consuming than starting at
ground zero. The most logical site at the time was Gary, Indiana. This
would be a major test of the influence of the Task Force and its agree-
ment: a funding application process had yet to be initiated and the system
was urban rather than rural.
The question might arise why take such a chance with an urban
system? Well, there were many political as well as pragmatic reasons as
alluded to earlier but the two most important were: the system in Gary
needed financing desperately and, as the first black-owned cable TV sys-
tem in a major TV market, it would receive a great deal of negative
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attention and publicity if it should fail. Thus, making it more difficult
in the future for other minority urban and rural cable systems to acquire
financing.
Up to this point, the Task Force had proved to be an effective
conflict resolution system for addressing and rectifying bureaucratic
snafus. The existence of the Task Force and its agreement had been
significant in providing Eddie Pena with a backup mechanism for challeng-
ing SBA's mishandling of his project and giving his group greater public
"voice" and credibility in getting their grievances responded to by out-
side political officials as well as SBA top-level officials. The theory
and practice behind the establishment of a coordinative Task Force, which
would provide disadvantaged groups with greater "leverage" and redress
during their attempts to use public programs, was working ever so slowly,
but working. In Gary, however, this coordinative mechanism met its se-
verest test. The Gary Communications Group (GCG) project presented a
unique set of problems, pitfalls, and circumstances that perhaps few
coordinative mechanisms could have realistically hoped to overcome.
Significance
Nevertheless, the GCG project, as a part of the overall Task Force
experience, stands out as an important case study of public policy and
program intervention by an advocacy organization on the behalf of disad-
vantaged populations. The GCG case is unique because it demonstrates the
complexity and consequences of an attempt to achieve: the strategic pro-
motion of common objectives (e.g., business development by disadvantaged
groups) among two agencies within the same department; the concentration
of the resources of several organizations in a comprehensive manner on a
target group's needs; and a process (i.e., use of coordinative mechanisms
and strategies) for resolving areas of dispute, avoiding conflicts, and
expediting project funding. The GCG case study is special because it
deals with a coordination process conceived, developed, and implemented
by a minority advocacy organization supported by a wide array of community
groups and political actors.
The GCG case study records an attempt by minority planners and
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administrators to place clients (i.e., disadvantaged groups) in a posi-
tion where they become active participants in the service delivery and
decision making process and not just passive potential receivers of pro-
gram benefits. This case study is especially noteworthy because it is an
attempt to alleviate or at least minimize public program disappointment
and the unrealistic raising of public expectations beyond a rational
margin of actual obtainment.
Too often, a community effort is organized around some special
project and just as the group begins to believe in itself, its hopes are
dashed by public programs that fail to respond to their needs. A major
goal of the strategy behind the Task Force coordinative process was to set
up a mechanism for reducing some of the hardships faced by disadvantaged
groups attempting to face a maze of bureaucratic programs alone, without
any past experience (i.e., track record in dealing with public programs),
inside contacts, or knowledge of their real chances of getting projects
funded. In fact the real goal was to attempt to iron out bureaucratic
problems before a community group was even approached or organized to get
involved in seeking project funding from a public program. The plan was
to clear the way for smooth project funding to guarantee community group
success.
Too many studies only review "how the bureaucracy or producer of
services organizationally copes with publics and seldom turns the ques-
tion around to ask what alternative strategies are available to consumers
to influence the producer and how the consumer perceives his needs and
wants and evaluates the kind of job the producer is doing."l72 Thus, many
government studies like the bureaucracy itself are preoccupied with the
bureaucracy's internal processes to the exclusion of the clients.1 7 3
Albert Hirschman (Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 1970):
. . .has combined the idea of "exit" from economics with that of
"voice" from political science to suggest ways in which consumers can
affect producers. Either they may withdraw themselves from use of the
services (which is not feasible when there are no alternative sources
of services) or they can act openly to try to get the producer to
change his ways.1 7 4
The GCG case study captures an attempt at the latter solution. That is an
attempt to give greater voice to consumers within the service delivery
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process. The coordinative process is studied here as a vehicle for giving
greater voice to disadvantaged groups as well as legitimatizing their
right to communicate with the bureaucracy not just their needs but the
inequities they encounter in the service delivery process. Such added
help for consumers is important when it is realized that normal channels
for such communication are often "weak because of the remoteness between a
producer bureaucracy and consumers, the limited organization of consumer
groups, the absence of a real market mechanism to support 'exit' and the
general aggregative and untimely character of a traditional 'voice' mech-
anism such as voting."1 7 5
The GCG case study is also significant because it focuses on EDA,
an agency which has been the subject of several past studies, investiga-
tions, and examinations. The most notable being Jeffrey L. Pressman and
Aaron Wildavsky's work Implementation. On May 20, 1979, CBS's
"60 Minutes" News Magazine program aired a TV show segment discussing the
laxed nature of EDA's programs in allowing many white businesses to use
minority paper corporations as fronts to make use of program funds meant
for real minority businesses. The irony of this situation is that many
legitimate minority businesses continue to be unsuccessful in getting
projects funded by EDA. Thus, the EDA case study is important because it
further establishes the fact that nothing much has changed in sensitizing
EDA (as representative of the larger bureaucracy on a whole) to respon-
sibly addressing the needs of disadvantaged populations for whom they
were created.
It is hoped that by shedding additional attention on the recalci-
trant behavior patterns of the EDA, in relation to minority needs, that a
stronger case can be built by others for its major overhaul. It is also
hoped that this work in conjunction with the past literature will help to
alert neophyte administrative officials, advocacy organization directors,
and community group leaders to the obstacles they might face in dealing
with the EDA or its sister agencies and aid them in developing effective
strategies for overcoming bureaucratic problems.
Most importantly, the GCG case is meaningful because of its
demonstration of how certain coordinative mechanisms are used to resolve
a cluster of the major issues usually associated with the bureaucracy
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problem. To paraphrase James Q. Wilson, there is not one bureaucracy
problem but several--a series of interrelated and interacting inadequa-
cies which retard public service delivery. One central issue the GCG case
study focuses on is accountability or control. That is how to use coor-
dinative mechanisms to get the bureaucracy to serve certain agreed upon
goals by: involving disadvantaged groups in the implementation process;
establishing a communications process that clearly broadcasts to everyone
(e.g., field officials, outside observers, etc.) what the goals and pri-
orities are; making it possible to pinpoint and hold responsible those
bureaucrats culpable of generating problems; and creating a forum for
groups to "voice" complaints about bureaucratic malfunctions and have
them corrected.
Another issue this case deals with is the problem of inadequate
resource allocation to individual programs. A common plea often heard
from public agencies is that they are woefully underfunded and under-
staffed to do all the things they are intended to do. All too often most
social problems are far too complex for any one agency to solve by itself,
given its individually limited resources (i.e., money, manpower, mate-
rials, etc.) and expertise (i.e., technical services).176 Disadvantaged
groups often suffer because they are told there are not enough resources
to meet their needs. Interagency coordination seeks to end any artificial
scarcity by getting agencies to pool their resources in a resource lever-
aging or sharing approach. Consequently, one end result sought by coor-
dination or the establishment of interorganizational relationships is the
attainment of goals that are unachieveable by organizations indepen-
dently.
Closely allied with this problem is the issue of fragmented and
disjointed program activity by various agencies seeking similar goals.
Various programs focus on similar problem areas and client groups -yet
there is an ever changing hodgepodge of conflicting rules, guidelines,
and qualification criteria that must be met by the public to access
services from these programs. The coordinative process reviewed in this
study is a direct reaction to the dysfunctional nature of the piecemeal or
"cafeteria shopping" approach to finding financial support for minority
ventures. Interagency coordination is viewed as one way to bring greater
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order and consistency to how projects are processed and approved by dif-
ferent agencies and at different agency levels. The coordinative process
is also considered a more effective and efficient way of establishing or
gaining up front support for target projects and groups.
A final issue to be considered in the GCG case study is respon-
siveness. That is the problem of inducing bureaucrats to prioritize and
meet "with alacrity and compassion, those cases which can never be brought
under a single national rule and which, by common human standards of
justice or benevolence, seem to require that an exception be made or a
rule stretched."1 7 7  This issue deals with the central problem of how to
get the bureaucracy to function effectively on the behalf of disadvan-
taged groups and not operate against them (i.e., assist groups to follow
correct procedures instead of willfully allowing them to violate certain
eligibility criteria or guidelines). Ultimately, this issue is related
to bringing greater equity into the service delivery process--that is
"getting bureaucrats to treat like cases alike and on the basis of clear
rules, known in advance." 17 8
Background
The Gary Communications Group Inc. (GCG) was founded by William
Douglas, Jr., Ph.D. (a steel plant metalurgical engineer) with seven
other prominent Gary businessmen on June 28, 1972, as the first black-
owned and controlled cable television business in a major TV market in the
United States. These businessmen had become interested in cable televi-
sion through exposure to a 1971 handbook published by the Urban Institute
entitled Cable Television in the Cities: Community Control, Public Access
and Minority Ownership, and their participation in a four-day workshop
(June 24-27, 1971) in Washington, D.C. sponsored by the Urban Institute,
the Urban Communications Group, and Black Efforts for Soul in Television
(BEST). During the workshop discussion, Charles Tate, special assistant
to the president of the Urban Institute, editor of the handbook Cable
Television in the Cities, and key organizer of the workshop, impressed
upon William Douglas and other businessmen present that significant op-
portunity for minority participation in the development, ownership, and
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operation of the communications systems of the future lay with cable
television.
Out of this vision sprang both the genesis for GCG and the need
for an organization like CRC to give technical assistance to community
groups seeking to develop cable TV businesses. Also critical to the start
of the GCG organization in 1971 was the fact that local black businessmen
felt that the "timing" was right to capitalize off of the change in the
city power structure which brought Mayor Richard Hatcher into office
along with a number of other black elected officials in the city council,
who held the power to grant cable TV franchises. Thus, with about 20
original black residents as stockholders, in a quickly formed corpora-
tion, GCG applied for and received a non-exclusive (non-exclusive meant
more than one company could hold a franchise in the city) franchise from
the city of Gary, Indiana. On September 6, 1973, they received a Certif-
icate of Compliance from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
authorizing service through March 31, 1977.
During the same time period, Lake County Cable TV, Inc., a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Teleprompter, Inc. (.TPT, a large multiple systems
operator), also had a non-exclusive franchise in Gary. This system ser-
viced about 650 subscribers over 40 miles of cable strung on telephone
poles throughout the community. Right after GCG received their fran-
chise, TPT began a construction policy that purposely "over-wired" the
same area that GCG planned to serve. In other words, Teleprompter began
to simultaneously develop a system in the same area of Gary as that in
which GCG was building its cable system. Since TPT had its own non-
exclusive franchise, this was legally permissible, but very disruptive to
GCG's attempts to construct its cable TV plant and get started. Basi-
cally, this move was an attempt to usurp GCG's possible business in that
area and run GCG out of business altogether. This was true because there
were not enough homes in the area to allow two rival cable TV systems to
operate simultaneously at a profit. Furthermore, since both companies
had to use the same telephone poles on which to place their cables, there
were constant confrontations and physical space interference problems
created when both GCG and TPT workmen attempted to put their cable equip-
ment up on the telephone poles first. Also, because GCG's cable equipment
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had to be placed close to TPT's equipment on the same poles, GCG's equip-
ment often became damaged or misaligned whenever TPT workmen had to climb
the poles to service a malfunction in their equipment. Despite these
hindrances, by November of 1973, GCG began operation of a 20-mile cable
system which served an 80-block area between 5th and 9th Avenues,
Washington and Harrison Streets. The GCG system had its head-end and
offices located downtown in the Hotel Gary.
For over six months, GCG and TPT directly competed for sub-
scribers. GCG utilized a number of slogans stressing the hometown black
ownership of GCG in trying to out-market its competitor. Then, Tele-
prompter, Inc. began to have numerous management problems. Basically,
one of TPT's top management officials in New York was arrested and sent to
jail for bribing city officials to get cable TV franchises. Just as soon
as this news began to break, trading of Teleprompter stock, the nation's
largest cable operator, was suspended from September 10-26, 1973. The
Securities and Exchange Commission's only official explanation was that
the suspension was ordered to:
. . explore fully the circumstances which gave rise to a release
issued by the company on September 4, concerning rumors circulating
about adverse corporate developments. Two weeks after the suspen-
sion, TPT announced its 1974 construction schedule would be reduced
from $75 million to $20 million, with about half that sum for sub-
scriber hookups. They also announced the firing of 20 percent of
their staff.1 7 9
These developments soon led the TPT operation in Gary to decide by
March of 1974 that local competition with GCG was too costly to fight and
as part of TPT's major corporate-wide retrenchment agreed to cease opera-
tions in Gary and sell its assets to GCG. The agreement provided for sale
of the existing plant with its 650 subscribers, an additional 60 miles of
cable without hardware, a 6-acre antenna site and antenna, head-end
building, warehouse, and other cable equipment. At first, GCG was to
provide a downpayment and the balance in a long-term promissory note.
Later, renegotiations with Teleprompter made it possible for GCG to pro-
ceed with the acquiring of their assets in Gary and their subscribers
without a downpayment. Because TPT wanted to close out its Gary operation
immediately and eliminate the operating expenses, TPT agreed to a settle-
ment that required no downpayment, and the acceptance of a promissory note
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with a 4-year principal moratorium and 6 percent interest. GCG's members
estimated that they would need about a $1.4 million package to refinance
their system and consummate their deal with TPT.1 8 0
Over a year past while GCG's members attempted to develop the
monies needed. By the time GCG's members had just about exhausted their
attempts to gain financing through both traditional lending institutions
(i.e., banks) and special cable financing sources, the National Rural
Cable TV Development Task Force was beginning to take shape. CRC's
director and staff, who had periodically provided technical assistance to
the Gary project from its inception, began to feel that Gary's only hope
for refinancing might come from leveraging money through some government
agency such as the ones on the Task Force.18 1
This was largely because news of Teleprompter's management set-
backs had caused many other multiple systems operators, private inves-
tors, banks, and specialized cable financing institutions to dramatically
cut back their investments of new venture capital into the startup of
cable TV projects. Also, because of the lagging economy at that time,
many banks felt it was too costly and too risky to finance any major cable
corporations in urban areas, let alone a new minority company with no
track record. Consequently, all of the financial institutions presented
with the GCG proposal, including the Gary National Bank and the Bank of
Indiana, had stated that given the state of the economy, they would not
participate in this proposal.1 8 2
EDA Discussions
The GCG-EDA case evolved very rapidly out of seemingly very suc-
cessful early discussions between CRC staff members (Charles Tate, Execu-
tive Director; Reginald Dunn, Market Development Director; and William
Polk, Market Analyst) and EDA top administrators (Jeff Cahill, William
Henkel, and Stephen Dunne) over their signing of the interagency agree-
ment and subsequent participation in the overall Task Force effort. Jeff
Cahill, during this time, was acting chief director of EDA although his
title was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Development. William
Henkel was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations and Stephen
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Dunne was the head of the Business Development Section.
The enthusiastic receptiveness of Jeff Cahill as a chief adminis-
trator of EDA to the Task Force concept, coupled with his expeditious
signing of the interagency agreement, led CRC's executive director to
focus on the EDA as the main choice for a funding source for GCG. The EDA,
although not a participant at the first Task Force meeting, signed the
agreement in less than a month after being approached with the idea. The
FmHA, on the other hand, was the last agency to sign the agreement in
spite of the fact that it was the first agency to agree to be on the Task
Force. The staff of CRC believed that EDA's general responsiveness, if
orchestrated correctly (i.e., given lots of publicity and public praise
for assisting minority economic development) could be developed into a
successful funding process for GCG.
Soon after the signing of the agreement, a general meeting was
held with Cahill and some of CRC's staff (Charles Tate, Reginald Dunn, and
William Polk) to inform him of the GCG project. During the meeting, Jeff
Cahill phoned EDA's Chicago office and instructed Ed Woleski (a loan
official) to meet with, and help CRC and its client GCG. Also, during the
meeting, Cahill summoned Stephen Dunne and requested that he assist CRC
staff in setting up meetings in Washington to discuss the GCG project and
help the application process get started.183 Within two weeks, CRC staff
members and GCG's President began meeting with the EDA loan officials in
Chicago and in Washington, D.C. to discuss the loan application process
and to explain to them the business package GCG intended to present.
Reginald Dunn informed EDA representatives that CRC would be assisting
GCG in submitting an application for a $398,000 direct loan, needed by GCG
to expand their subscriber service area. Reginald Dunn also indicated
that it was GCG's intent to purchase the fixed assets of another existing
cable TV operator (Teleprompter) in Gary and merge that system into its
existing system. It was explained to the EDA officials that GCG's busi-
ness plan called for raising significant equity and debt to: pay all the
then current accounts payable of about $140,000; acquire the assets of its
former competitor, Teleprompter for $480,000; combine the current GCG
system and its subscribers with current Teleprompter system and sub-
scribers into one system of approximately 1,000 initial subscribers and
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36 miles of plant with 5,400 potential subscribers; finish construction
of 64 miles of partially completed Teleprompter plant and provide service
to 9,400 more homes; and build an additional 35 miles of new plant to pass
5,250 homes.1 8 4
GCG's president projected that a total figure of $1,328,000 of
new financing would be required to achieve this plan. In order to carry
out this total financial package, GCG had entered into an agreement with
CATV Development Corporation (CDC) of New York City (a syndicator of
partnership financing) to form a Limited Partnership. GCG, CDC, and Cable
Communication Consultants of Washington (cable management experts) were
the general partners and CDC would arrange for $250,000 in equity invest-
ments by bringing on board about 20 limited partners. This equity was to
be used to meet immediate obligations and serve as working capital.1 8 5
A total of $878,000 was needed to purchase the existing fixed
assets of Teleprompter and finish the construction of a 135 mile cable
system. GCG had concluded an agreement with TPT to arrange for the
purchase of about 55 percent of TPT fixed assets (i.e., 36 miles of
operating plant, head-end, office, warehouse, tower, and partially con-
structed cable system of approximately 64 miles) for a purchase price of
$480,000 based on a long-term note. The remaining 45 percent of fixed
assets needed to complete the project or $498,000 would be sought from the
Economic Development Administration on terms of a direct loan. The re-
quest for $498,000 and the construction plans were developed to be phased
over 15 months to provide the necessary time to complete construction and
to provide time to raise capital needed from limited partners. 1 8 6
Advance Project Approval
In August of 1975, after Bill Douglas (President of GCG) and
Charles Tate had expressed to EDA loan officers an interest in procuring a
loan for the Gary project, it was suggested by loan representatives Ed
Woleski and Frank Moore in Chicago and Steve Dunne in Washington, D.C.
that a letter outlining the proposed application be submitted for advance
clearance. It was explained by the officials that a formal EDA applica-
tion involved a great deal of work and that the letter would provide a
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simple way of checking for any legal or policy reasons for loan ineligi-
bility.187 The letter outline requested by EDA seemed to be a positive
indication of their attempt to be responsive in helping GCG head off
future problems that might waste the group's limited resources. At this
point, it appeared that the existence of the agreement was stimulating
real responsiveness on the part of EDA to curtail fragmented and dis-
jointed program activity. The letter was sent, clearance was received,
and formal application invited. A formal EDA application for $498,000 of
direct loan financing, as part of a $1.4 million refinancing, was then
filed on September 11, 1975 with the Chicago regional and Washington,
D.C. National offices.
There then occurred a number of follow up meetings between Bill
Douglas (GCG) and EDA representatives in both the Chicago and
Washington, D.C. offices to discuss additional information requested
(e.g., updated financial statements, inventory of business supplies,
employment creation figures, etc.). These discussion sessions were
viewed by Bill Douglas and CRC staff as helpful in stimulating a positive
flow of information on how to improve the application package before
mistakes were made that could not be corrected. In effect, CRC staff and
Bill Douglas believed that such meetings, by putting them in constant
contact with EDA project review officers, would enable them to begin to
hold specific individuals accountable for their actions and thus ulti-
mately give them greater control or recourse in case of problems.1 8 8
One of the early goals of the coordinative process was to get
bureaucrats to be responsive in prioritizing cable TV projects brought
before them by lending special assistance to client groups in following
correct application procedures and by letting clients know in advance any
possible rules or policies that might jeopardize the eligibility of such
projects. This was to be done in order that appropriate and timely
actions could be taken by clients to rectify such situations before a
formal application was submitted to an agency.
Historically, it had not been part of EDA's standard operating
procedures to review in advance and give any type of general clearance to
proposed project ideas. In fact, EDA program literature and loan form
application instructions set forth no formal commitment to provide either
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preliminary clearance or general approvals of project eligibility before
full and complete project application forms are filled out in detail.
Thus, EDA's offer to provide a preliminary review of the GCG project
before a formal application was submitted represented a "special depar-
ture" from normal EDA project review procedures out of regard for the
objectives of the Task Force. This fact is consistent with information
established in an interview with George Burns, legal counsel for CRC, who
has indicated that he was informed during a pre-application conference in
Washington, D.C. (August 1975) by EDA Task Force representative Stephen
Dunne that "because of the special nature of the GCG project as a Task
Force initiative, it would be wise in order to reduce any potential
problems to have GCG submit a letter outlining their project for general
clearance purposes."1 8 9  This statement correlates with Stephen Dunne's
basic finding after reviewing the submitted letter outline that "no legal
obstacles were known to exist." This statement was also made to George
Burns verbally, but later chronicled in a November 20, 1975 memorandum
from John Topping (OMBE Chief Counsel) to Alex Armendaris (Director of
OMBE) dealing with developments in the GCG project.190 Collectively
these facts seem to indicate that EDA officials were demonstrating some
degree of responsiveness to Task Force objectives by showing up front
concern for the eligibility of the GCG project and by making "special
departures" in their review procedures to give GCG an early indication of
any legal problems.
It is also important to note that normally only one pre-applica-
tion conference is scheduled and that is usually with the regional office
representative. In the GCG case, however, several pre-application con-
ferences were held, not just with the regional or local office representa-
tives in Chicago, but with top-level EDA administrative officials in
Washington. In fact, early conferences over the GCG project were initi-
ated between CRC and EDA representatives in Washington, D.C. even before
regional EDA officials were talked to by GCG. This direct access to
Washington, D.C. EDA officials by CRC staff and Bill Douglas (GCG) was
facilitated by Jeff Cahill after he had signed the interagency agreement.
Jeff Cahill instructed Stephen Dunne (EDA's designated Task Force repre-
sentative) to meet with CRC and GCG representatives (Charles Tate,
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Reginald Dunn, and Bill Douglas) to discuss the project. Charles Tate and
Bill Douglas both felt that having Jeff Cahill, a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of EDA, to "open doors" and set up meetings for them with other
agency officials would be significant in stimulating greater responsive-
ness among various lower level officials to approve the GCG project. 91
The existence of the Task Force and the agreement created a supportive
environment and sanctioned opportunity for Bill Douglas to get to meet and
confer with various top-level Washington EDA officials about the GCG
project before submitting a formal application. Bill Douglas (GCG) and
CRC staff believed that by conferring with EDA's top-level officials in
Washington first, it would then be easier to trigger a positive
relationship with regional and field office officials. Especially, when
Bill Douglas (GCG) could demonstrate to field officials his knowledge-
ability about EDA programs and could indicate that he had already talked
to certain EDA top-level officials who were interested in expediting the
project. 192
CRC's Reginald Dunn and Bill Douglas (GCG President) were able to
convene and orchestrate a number of extraordinary meetings with EDA loan
officials in Washington and Chicago because of the existence of the Task
Force and the resulting "open door" policy generated by Jeff Cahill in his
demonstration of his support of the Task Force enterprise. No less than
five pre-application meetings were held before a formal application was
submitted to EDA by GCG.193 Reginald Dunn and Bill Douglas both viewed
the extra pre-application meetings with EDA Washington and Chicago offi-
cials as a helpful opportunity for surveying face-to-face EDA officials'
general disposition toward the project, winning over their support of the
GCG project and as a mechanism for allowing CRC and GCG to readily iden-
tify and hold specific officials accountable for any unresponsiveness. 1 94
The staff of CRC and Bill Douglas felt that by having increased opportun-
ity to get to know more intimately the key actors in the EDA project
review network, they would stand a better chance in isolating and placing
pressure on any bureaucrat presenting problems. After all, the creation
of the Task Force gave CRC a mandate for requesting agencies to expedite
cable TV projects, a legitimate rationale for attacking bureaucratic
resistance, and a credible forum for generating political pressure to
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resolve such problems. These were the views regularly discussed at weekly
in-house strategy sessions and staff meetings held by CRC on the GCG
project.
A prime indication of the increased responsiveness generated by
the existence of the Task Force among EDA officials can be evaluated, as
noted earlier, based on the "special departures" from standard operating
procedures taken by EDA officials to facilitate the GCG project. Basi-
cally, this meant getting EDA officials to do things that would assist the
processing of the GCG project even if such an action ran counter to usual
operating routines. The extra pre-application meetings held in
Washington between EDA and GCG over the proper development of the project
were certainly a departure from the standard single pre-application con-
ference normally held in the regional office as outlined in most EDA
program literature. The early review and clearance of a GCG project
outline for legal or policy problems was another departure from the stan-
dard EDA process of evaluating a completed package (i.e., a completed set
of loan forms) before giving any clearances. The fact that this early
review process was carried out simultaneously by both regional as well as
Washington EDA officials was another departure from normal project review
protocol.
According to EDA program literature and career officials, project
reviews are usually not carried out in any joint fashion by regional and
Washington officials. Most reviews are carried out in a independent
sequential fashion, moving from the field office or regional level to the
Washington headquarters level for final evaluation and approval. To
quote the EDA pamphlet Building Communities with Jobs, March 1977:
Prospective applicants should contact the nearest EDA Economic Devel-
opment Representative, who will explain the EDA program in more de-
tail. If the project is of an eligible type and appears to warrant
EDA financial consideration, a Pre-Application Conference will be
scheduled by the Regional Office. . . .Applicants are urged in all
instances to first contact the Economic Development Representative
for their area. . . .Potential borrowers should work closely with the
EDA field representative to assure that the application has a signif-
icant probability of acceptance by EDA.19 5
Historically, EDA national headquarter's officials did not get involved
in pre-application conferences or general project approvals.
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Bureaucratic Resistance
The key project review officer in charge of reviewing and pro-
cessing the GCG loan package in the Washington, D.C. office was David
Papermaster (as it would turn out later his name was quite apropos to the
endless complications and reams of paper generated by his various re-
quests for new, additional, or revised project information). It was
around him, according to CRC file documents, OMBE memorandums, GCG cor-
respondence with political officials, and GCG testimony, that a great
deal of the "red tape," delay, and unresponsiveness would be generated.
For example, after GCG's president had submitted updated financial state-
ments, Papermaster, according to CRC documents,. made numerous time con-
suming and often redundant telephone calls to GCG's partners, creditors,
TPT, TPT's bank, etc., to discuss the same financial information sub-
mitted in writing over and over again.196 This continuing activity of
over-verification served to slow the review process down immeasurably and
over taxed the patience of everyone involved. In fact, on November
19, 1975, Charles E. Tate (CRC) sent an executive summary letter on EDA's
involvement with GCG, which focused on this situation, to John Calhoun
(Director of Media Relations for the White House). In this communique,
the following situation was officially outlined for the public record:
The Gary loan proposal has been delayed considerably and endangered
by an EDA staff member named David Papermaster who has indicated he
does not support cable development. His strategy has been to make
numerous requests for additional information which serve only a de-
laying purpose. An example of this is his requesting a letter from a
private company confirming a contract of which he already has a copy.
Beyond that he had already confirmed the contract in a phone conver-
sation with the company's Vice President.19 7
No immediate resolution to the problem resulted from this letter per se,
but CRC staff felt it was significant to at least begin to start a written
record of problems they were facing with EDA officials. This was so that
CRC would have adequate documentation which could be used to support
requests for higher level intervention or investigation into the situa-
tion by the Department of Commerce officials, politicians, and the press
if Task Force inquiries proved insufficient.1 98
The general charges made in the letter to John Calhoun are consis-
tent with information provided in interviews with George Burns, CRC's
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legal counsel, and with information outlihed in a much later
(January 27, 1976) summary memo sent by GCG to Secretary Richardson.
Under the heading Unconscionable Treatment by EDA, this memorandum indi-
cated that "certain EDA employees have made every effort to kill the GCG
loan; by using delaying tactics; by making numerous, separate requests
for specious information; and by trying to create legal and policy obsta-
cles without foundation." 99 Informal conversations with certain in-
volved EDA officials have further substantiated the fact that the use of
"delaying tactics" in order to not make a formal decision on a project,
was an acknowledged practice often used by EDA employees against projects
they didn't want to fund.200 Thus, the conclusion that such practices were
used quite matter-of-factly to excess against the GCG project seems quite
legitimate.
It is important to note here that although great care and
consideration in forming the Task Force was given to the need to
indoctrinate field representatives with the need to prioritize the
processing and funding of cable TV projects, somehow, there seemed to be a
real gap in the communication of this spirit of responsiveness to
Washington, D.C. bureaucrats. In fact, except for EDA's Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Economic Development (Jeff Cahill) who signed the Task
Force Agreement, there seemed to be a lack of sensitivity to Task Force
projects by other Washington, D.C. EDA officials like Glen Waldron
(Acting Director of the Office of Business Development), Art Levine
(Staff Supervisor), and David Papermaster (Business Loan Officer). It
can be reasoned that because CRC failed to include many such career civil
servants in the original planning stages of their development of the Task
Force, that these individuals were not given a chance to develop a real
stake in the issue.
For example, Papermaster suggested during meetings between him-
self and CRC staff that "cable TV projects really did not fit in with the
type of business packages he was used to working on" and this project
meant he had to develop some "new routines and procedures for analyzing
the project." Which was something he let be known through his negative
words about cable and slow actions in processing the project was not
something that he relished doing.2 0 1
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The prevailing literature on organization theory support the ob-
servation that most public institutions and the individuals inside these
institutions tend to function according to certain patterns of routine
behavior. Furthermore, they tend to react negatively toward projects,
plans, or policies (i.e., implementation strategies) that tend to require
new learning, non-routine behavior, or defy established "short cut" tech-
niques of bureaucrats to keep things simple along lines of standard oper-
ating procedures. Hence, the GCG project tended to violate Papermaster's
and other EDA officials' "zone of indifference" as defined by Chester
Barnard.
Specifically, Chester Barnard has stated that if there are no
inducements that exceed the burdens and sacrifices to be made by a
bureaucrat in accepting certain new or different orders of action
that ultimately force him to alter his established standard operating
procedures or bureaucratic "routines," then his "zone of indiffer-
ence" over whether to follow such orders will be negatively violated.
Thus he will not feel compelled to perform duties or render services
above a bare minimum level of acceptable behavior. Furthermore, such
bureaucrats may either directly disobey or more usually evade any
orders perceived as utterly inconsistent with their own personal mo-
tives which are of course the basis for accepting any orders at
all.2 0 2
This appears to have been the nature of the dynamic at work behind the
major delays created by EDA Washington, D.C. officials in processing the
GCG project.
Conversations with various key actors in the EDA case experience
over time (i.e., before, during, and after its initiation) eventually
revealed that there was a strong undercurrent of personal motives at
conflict among certain top-level officials and career bureaucrats which
seemed to significantly influence the handling of the GCG project. For
example, Cahill, a Republican, who was supportive of the Task Force and
the expediting of the Gary project, had been serving as an interim head of
the EDA agency and had hopes of being given the opportunity to formally
become the head of the agency.203 Cahill's tenure as interim head of EDA
occurred during a time when the chief administrative position at EDA had
been vacated and Wilmer D. Mizell, as Assistant Secretary for Economic
Development, was considering leaving EDA to pursue a political career in
his home state. However, certain political forces who supported Wilmer D.
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Mizell for the chief position at EDA, if he decided to stay (which he did
after his political plans in his hometown fell through), were attempting
to ease Cahill out of EDA against his will so that Mizell would have no
problems in taking over control of the agency.204 Thus, in reality
Cahill's support of the Task Force and the Gary project tended to be both
a politically symbolic move to head off any potential political attacks
against him for not helping minorities which might have further
jeopardized his attempts to improve his position in EDA, and a token
gesture at foisting a project on a host of defiant career bureaucrats
(most were Democrats) who had been troublesome to him in the past.2 0 5
Also at work was the reality that when Papermaster first moved
into his position with EDA from another government agency, he had been
downgraded by Cahill in his civil service classification. This seemed to
have left an irrepressible residue of resentment on Papermaster's part
against Cahill. In fact, Papermaster had been waging his own subterranean
political struggle internally to be upgraded in his civil service rating.
It is quite reasonable to conclude that Papermaster's personal battle
tended to spill over into the struggle surrounding the Gary project, with
Papermaster seizing the opportunity to demonstrate his ability to compli-
cate and impede a project being supported by Cahill.2 0 6
Furthermore, by his own admission, Papermaster did not support
cable TV as a worthwhile venture for EDA to pursue nor did he feel the
city of Gary even needed cable TV. Papermaster made statements to this
effect during early meetings with Reginald Dunn and other CRC staff mem-
bers. This reality was later recorded in a November 16, 1976 Exeutive
Summary sent by CRC staff to Charles Stein. To quote the summary:
The Gary loan proposal has been delayed considerably and endangered
by an EDA staff member named David Papermaster who has indicated he
does not support cable development. His strategy has been to make
numerous requests for additional information which serve only a de-
laying purpose. 2 0 7
Papermaster attributed his major disenchantment with cable as stemming
from his belief that there existed certain First Amendment conflicts in
EDA funding a communications venture. (In reality such problems did not
exist as eventually verified by EDA's own legal counsel.) Also, by his own
admission, Papermaster did not know that much about cable TV as a business
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and had to make special efforts to learn about cable TV.208 Thus realis-
tically one can surmise that a great deal of Papermaster's reluctance to
view cable TV objectively as a viable EDA business venture stemmed from
his initial general lack of knowledge of its technical and financial
intracacies and his frustrations over having to make a special effort to
do so. Thus , against his will, Papermaster had to take time away from
his other projects to learn something new (cable) and had to expend extra
efforts in developing a financial format for evaluating this type of
project which departed from his standard operating procedures for more
traditional projects (i.e., manufacturing businesses).
Overall, there were no clear positive inducements to persuade
Papermaster into expediting this project in exchange for violating his
standard ope.rating procedures. Instead, there were many negative per-
sonal motives and incentives for Papermaster to impede or thwart the GCG
project, in order to serve his own goals or hidden agenda in striking back
at Cahill and in demonstrating his power to be dealt with, in vying for a
remedy to his grievances.
Glen Waldron, head of the Business Development Office within
which Papermaster served, also had a certain adversary relationship with
Jeff Cahill. This adversary relationship between Jeff Cahill and Glen
Waldron often led Waldron, according to inside sources at EDA, to verbally
agree to carry out Cahill's project plans or special assignments but then
later find some way to sabotage them.209 This reality tends to suggest
that it was perhaps no accident that Papermaster, who by his own acknowl-
edgment had a reputation as an independent maverick in his decision
making, inherited the GCG project and received no appreciable flak or
pressure from his immediate superior (i.e., Glen Waldron) on his handling
of the Gary project.210 In fact, it seems based on these various reali-
ties about the private motivations and hidden agendas of Waldron and
Papermaster that the stage was almost set for structured failure of the
GCG project from the point at which the decision was made to let
Papermaster handle the project.
Project Eligibility Challenged
The Task Force as a group was not convened on any regular basis
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nor was it summoned as a unit at every critical point when legal, policy,
or administrative roadblocks were placed in the path of the GCG project.
The first tactic usually employed, when trouble areas were confronted,
was to have the executive director of CRC informally contact the chief
official who had signed the Task Force agreement (Jeff Cahill) and solicit
his intervention into the matter based on his commitment to the Task Force
goals and the signed agreement. Hopefully, the official could be per-
suaded at such times to use the power of his position to forcefully
instruct his subordinates to follow through on the project, that is to
"coordinate their actions" more in line with the Task Force objective of
expediting the funding of cable TV projects. The threat of this clout or
the potential threat of such clout was a key motivating factor CRC staff
counted on as part of the "leverage process" created through the existence
of the Task Force. 21 1
Failing the successful operation of this effort, the next strat-
egy was to have Charles Stein, as Chairman of the Task Force and OMBE
representative, to mobilize his governmental resources (e.g., OMBE's
chief counsel, Department of Commerce officials, Interagency Council
representatives, politicians, White House staff, etc.) in concert with
CRC's contacts (e.g., FCC, Cable Trade Association, community groups, the
media, etc.) in raising inquiries into the mishandling of the GCG project.
For example (to jump ahead of the GCG history for a moment) , a January 28,
1976 Department of Commerce/OMBE internal memorandum sent by Charles
Stein to John Topping (OMBE Chief Counsel) requested Topping's help in
drafting a Commerce policy statement supporting the GCG project in its
struggle with EDA. This memo gives a prime illustration of the role
Charles Stein played as chairman of the Task Force in mobilizing other
officials and groups to focus pressure on EDA. To quote the memorandum
directly:
In keeping with our conversation of January 26, George Burns of CRC
will contact you to develop a Departmental policy statement for
Secretary Richardson's signature.
I have also discussed with Art Williams the desirability of
bringing to Under Secretary Baker's attention this violation (renega-
tion?) of the OMBE/SBA/EDA/FmHA agreement on Rural Cable Television.
It seems incongruous that an agency of Commerce - the Department
whose Under Secretary chairs the Interagency Council - can so
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blithely renege on an Interagency Agreement.
I am reasonably sure that the White House Office of Telecommuni-
cation Policy, the Commerce Office of Telecommunications, the Con-
gressional delegations from affected areas, and the National Cable
Television Assocation will all strongly support our position.2 1 2
By September 20, 1975, EDA represenatives in Chicago had held
numerous meetings and conversations with GCG's president, GCG partners,
and CRC staff over the project. Also, Papermaster had made numerous calls
to GCG partners, creditors, and consultants to discuss the same financial
statements of GCG over and over again. Growing tired of the delay that
this over-verification was causing, GCG's president and CRC's director
set up a meeting on October 15, 1975 with Cahill to present the project
application to him and to express a need for expediting the review pro-
cess. During the meeting, Bill Douglas showed and explained how all his
project's financial statements were all in order and indicated that only a
few calls were needed to verify their legitmacy. Instead, EDA representa-
tives like Papermaster had made numerous and repetitive calls to himself
and his partners about the same information.
Jeff Cahill reacted favorably to the information he was presented
with and promised that a letter of intent to approve the project would be
forthcoming from EDA within one week.
This situation prompted a prime example of bureaucratic resist-
ance which the Task Force process was developed to alleviate. When
Papermaster found out about Cahill's decision to have him issue a letter
of intent to approve the GCG project, he immediately sidestepped Cahill's
orders by sending a letter to GCG stating his office was not going to
accept an oral opinion given earlier by EDA counsel approving the cable
project as the final OK on the project's eligibility. Instead, he wanted
a legal opinion in writing and he informed the EDA regional office in
Chicago by letter that they should hold up approval and release of the
package. This was a clear illustration of a career bureaucrat evading
direct orders from a superior (Jeff Cahill) aimed at overcoming sluggish
bureaucratic responsiveness, that resulted in increased resistance.
Reginald Dunn (CRC) immediately contacted Papermaster to inform him that
GCG's cable TV system would not be doing any local origination and there-
fore should not be in violation of any EDA project eligibility
136
requirements that ban funding "broadcasting firms" (i.e., communication
system that broadcast live programming). 2 1 3
Certain EDA officials like Jim Marten (EDA Assistant General Counsel)
maintained that the elibility of cable TV systems for EDA funds turned
on the question of whether cable was considered a "broadcasting firm"
which originated live shows and exercised selective programming judg-
ment or was a passive conduit and did not act as a broadcaster. EDA
logic proceeded that broadcast firms were involved in the "opinion-
molding" process which might raise First Amendment concerns if EDA
were indirectly involved in the process by providing financing to
such systems. 2 1 4
Papermaster at this point told CRC that he had not read the application
package yet and could not comment on whether or not what was stated in the
application met elibility requirements of EDA. Charles Stein and CRC's
staff were dumbfounded by Papermaster's assertion that he had not read the
package, given the nature of his earlier requests for additional informa-
tion which seemingly could have only been based on his meticulous review
of the application.215
The major discussion over the eligibility of the GCG project
began to seesaw back and forth between EDA's office of business develop-
ment officials and OMBE-CRC-GCG representatives. Before long, the term
"demonstration" was tacked on to the GCG project by its CRC supporters and
its president as a way to try to give the project some added special
significance and importance so that it would be funded by EDA. Bill
Douglas (GCG) wanted to highlight that this would be the first minority
urban cable venture ever funded by a government program. Basically, Bill
Douglas and CRC staff hoped that the GCG project could become the focal
point for "demonstrating" the business development potential and impor-
tance of a cable TV system to an economically depressed community. CRC's
director also hoped that by adding the term "demonstration" other govern-
ment funds like CETA training monies could be piggy-backed to set up a
cable technician training program based in Gary that could train workers,
not just for jobs with the Gary system, but for other cable TV systems
across the country.216
After Bill Douglas convinced EDA officials that the GCG project
could become a nationally significant demonstration project, Papermaster
quickly suggested that a national impact demonstration statement be
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developed. This statement had to outline all the potential benefits that
might be spun off nationally through the EDA funding of the Gary system.
Specifically, he wanted GCG to spell out what types of economic develop-
ment gains such as new employment opportunities, job training programs
and spin off business benefits (e.g., construction jobs, vehicle sales,
etc.) would be stimulated by the GCG enterprise over the long term.
Bill Douglas and Rayfield Fisher (Vice President of GCG), during
November of 1975, made a special trip to Washington to meet with
Papermaster and other EDA officials to discuss the information they were
developing for the national impact demonstration statement requirement.
Douglas and Fisher wanted to make sure that they included everything in
the final statement that Papermaster and his colleagues wanted. The indi-
vidual meetings set up by Bill Douglas and CRC staff with various EDA
officials were to serve mainly as a dramatic gestures to "stroke" EDA
bureaucrats in an attempt to head off future nit-picking in reviewing the
application.217 This strategy at first appeared to have worked when at the
end of one of the meetings, Papermaster suggested that once the national
impact statement was completed the GCG application package would be
approved.218 However, much later (according to a historical record of the
GCG project compiled by CRC dated January 20, 1976 for submission to
Secretary Richardson's office) Papermaster would dispute that he ever
suggested that the national impact statement was the final condition that
GCG would have to meet to get their project approved.2 1 9
While Bill Douglas, with the help of CRC staff, developed a
detailed impact statement according to the strict specifications of
Papermaster, other things began to happen. On or about November 3, 1975,
Glen Waldron, as Acting Director of the EDA Office of Business Develop-
ment, filed a request with the Chief Counsel of EDA for an opinion as to
the appropriateness of EDA assistance to GCG's cable TV company under
number 41, chapter I of the Business Development Manual. This manual sets
forth the general guidelines for determining what projects were eligible
for funding by EDA. Specifically, the Business Development Manual stated
in part that: . . .in addition to the prohibitions stated in P.L.
89-136, the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, as amended,
the following types of projects are ineligible for business development
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assistance. . .6. Newspapers, publishing and broadcasting firms." 2 2 0
During this time period, SBA officials maintained the opinion
that any CATV system that originated live programs or exercised selective
programming judgment was acting as a broadcaster. Broadcast TV stations
were not eligible for government funds because they were viewed as being
involved in the "opinion molding" process. However, "passive conduit"
type cable TV systems, meaning those that only serve a signal retransmis-
sion service, were eligible for funds. The critical point which made
"active" cable systems ineligible, if viewed as broadcast stations, stem-
med from government agency paranoia over violating the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of speech and the press. Financing of media (e.g.,
newspaper, magazine, television broadcasting company, film production
company, book publishing company, etc.), it was theorized, could open
agencies to attacks over media control or influence into the "opinion
molding" process, especially if a venture went into default and fell
directly into the hands of a government agency.
In response to Glen Waldron's request, James Marten, then EDA's
Assistant Chief Counsel for Project Clearance and Title III matters,
issued on November 12, 1975, a memorandum to Glen Waldron that indicated
that the eligibility of CATV systems for EDA funds turned on the question
of whether CATV was a "broadcasting" firm. The EDA counsel felt that this
"broadcasting" issue was a policy question to be determined by whether
Gary CATV was a passive conduit or whether it originated live shows or
exercised selective programming judgment.2 2 1
OMBE's chief counsel responded to the EDA memo first orally then
in writing. OMBE's chief counsel became involved in this legal debate
over cable at the request of Charles Stein and Bill Douglas. It was a
very natural decision to have OMBE's chief counsel lead the legal fight
since EDA's legal attack against cable threatened not only the GCG project
but also OMBE's support of CRC as a technical assistance organization
mandated to help groups develop cable TV systems. Furthermore, it was
Charles Stein's duty as chairman of the Task Force to use his OMBE re-
sources (i.e., agency contacts) to troubleshoot and resolve just such
problems for cable TV groups who didn't have the clout, expertise, or
financial reserves to independently wage such battles on their own.
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Although OMBE's chief counsel took the lead in this battle, CRC's legal
and market development staff provided him with backup support and
information on cable TV.
In a November 26, 1.975 memorandum sent by John C. Topping, Jr. to
EDA, it was indicated that the U.S. Supreme Court had analyzed and con-
sidered the question of function as raised by EDA counsel and had deter-
mined that CATV systems were "passive" and did not act as broadcasters.
OMBE counsel further noted that it was "the policy of the Congress, the
Executive and federal agencies to facilitate with government funds the
development of cable."222  Topping, speaking for OMBE as the lead agency
and spokesman for the Task Force, also argued that the Gary project was a
worthy one and that the initial EDA clearance determination should be
affirmed. 223
In response to OMBE's position, a reply memo from EDA Assistant
Counsel argued back that the OMBE cited Supreme Court Case (Fortnightly)
was limited to copyright decisions and that the FCC was about to institute
a rule which would preclude the Gary CATV operation from maintaining a
"passive" role. That is to say require them to provide local origination
of programming. The EDA counsel also argued that much of the Congres-
sional, Executive, and Agency support focused on "rural" as opposed to
"urban" cable and cited the dicta in an SBA General Counsel's opinion
concerning "misgivings" about CATV loans from SBA. In the latter in-
stance, an SBA memo to all regional, district, and branch offices from the
General Counsel of SBA dated February 24, 1975, intimated that because of
the fuzziness of issues surrounding cable TV, that if they could, they
would not consider any cable TV system eligible for SBA funding. However,
the SBA conceded that at the present time "no legal objection to SBA
funding of passive conduit type cable TV system existed."2 2 4
OMBE Chief Counsel countered in another memorandum to EDA that no
legal or administrative authority had been cited by EDA counsel which
would officially bar federal funding of cable. OMBE counsel also indi-
cated that the holding of the Supreme Court in the Fortnightly Case
directly addressed the major issue raised by EDA counsel and officially
concluded that cable systems were "passive" systems and did not function
as "broadcasters." OMBE counsel finally asserted that this holding by the
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Supreme Court should be more persuasive than unsupported dicta by the
counsel of SBA. Furthermore, no FCC rule required a cable operator to act
as a broadcaster. 2 2 5
Legal Objections Resolved--Policy Issue Raised
Ultimately, the EDA Chief Counsel delivered a declaration to the
EDA Chicago office and CRC counsel that there were "no legal objections to
EDA funding cable TV projects. "226 However, Glen Waldron immediately
neutralized this major gain by attempting to delay the approval of the
loan by stating that there might be "policy" objections to EDA making
loans to cable. 2 2 7 This vague policy objection ruse was supposedly based
on the premise that EDA had never funded any type of communications
facility, or broadcast venture before. However, it would be discovered
later that EDA had indeed actually funded a TV project in the past and
that the project did not create as many jobs as the GCG was projected to
do. Thus, here again is another indication of EDA officials' attempt to
evade funding a project after certain officials had decided that it didn't
fit their model for a fundable venture. In spite of this "policy smoke
screen" raised by Waldron, the EDA Chicago office approved the GCG loan
application and forwarded it to D.C. for final approval.228
To quote one of the field officers during an interview: "We could
see a real battle was building over this project because of the existence
of the Task Force and we didn't want to be caught in the middle of a highly
politically charged situation."229 The field officers in Chicago had
already received more than the normal amount of inquiries from various
public officials and others interested in the status of the project. In
fact, the field officials indicated that they had knowledge of the fact
that EDA's assistant General Counsel had informally admitted that "in his
20 years of government service, he had never faced such intense political
pressure." 230 A statement which was repeated and recorded formally in a
CRC memo on a July 29, 1976 Task Force meeting. In a certain sense this
was an important indication that because of the Task Force and the high
visibility being given to all EDA officials reviewing the GCG package, at
least the field officials in Chicago did not want to be held accountable
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for turning down the package so they passed it onto their superiors in
Washington, D.C.
Political Intervention Mobilized
Meanwhile, the EDA Washington, D.C. officials continued to drag
their feet in issuing any decision on their contrived policy problem with
the GCG project. The term contrived policy problem is used here because,
bear in mind that during a preliminary review clearance of the project it
was indicated by EDA representatives both in Chicago (Ed Woleski) and
Washington (William Clinger, Chief Counsel) that no policy or legal eli-
gibility problems existed. Task Force chairman Charles Stein and CRC's
Reginald Dunn, working through behind the scenes contacts, stimulated
White House Director for Media Relations, John Calhoun, to call EDA's
legal counsel to express Administration policy which supported cable de-
velopment via the use of federal resources.
This call was made to try to convince EDA's legal counsel that
their policy attack against cable was not valid and should be dropped.
However, EDA legal counsel was unmoved by Calhoun's assertions that there
were no policy barriers to EDA's funding cable TV systems based on
Administration policy set forth in the 1974 Report to the President: The
Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications which clearly advocated the use
of federal agency resources to "foster significant minority ownership or
control of cable operations., 2 31 EDA's legal counsel made no commitment
to resolve the policy issue other than that he would take into considera-
tion Calhoun's comments in his review of the situation. No immediate
action to resolve the policy question was taken by EDA counsel.
Charles Stein, as Task Force Chairman, and Reginald Dunn were
able to gain Calhoun's involvement on GCG's behalf because there were
clear grounds for Calhoun to challenge EDA's policy position against
cable TV. Calhoun had been briefed on these grounds by Charles Stein and
Reginald Dunn to motivate his participation. For example, there were
certainly distinct and clear discrepancies between EDA's policy objection
to cable and actual Administration policy, not to mention EDA's reneging
on the signed interagency agreement commitment to support and assist
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cable TV groups in getting funds. In addition, the fact that there was a
Task Force in existence to specifically champion the cause of cable devel-
opment, of which EDA was a member, also signaled that this was a "just
cause" worthy of political intervention by officials like Calhoun.
During this same time, political calls promoted by CRC's execu-
tive director and GCG's Bill Douglas were made by Gary Congressman Ray J.
Madden to Assistant Secretary of EDA Mizell to find out the specific
reasons for EDA's delay in processing the GCG project. Congressman Madden
was told by Mizell's office that certain policy questions over EDA's
ability to fund cable TV systems were still being reviewed and that just
as soon as the policy issues could be settled then action would be taken
on the GCG project. The congressman asked that he be kept posted on the
status of the GCG project since the policy issue was still begin reviewed.
Congressman Madden was stimulated to contact EDA for most of the same
reasons used to motivate John Calhoun. The extra factor which helped to
stimulate his intervention on GCG's behalf was the fact that the GCG
project was a potential benefit to his home district constituency and
thus, he was politically obligated to make some attempt to come to the aid
of a group of his constituents. Not to do so would be to commit political
hara-kiri.
In early December of 1975, Bill Douglas traveled to EDA headquar-
ters in Washington, D.C. to meet with Waldron and Papermaster, to try to
expedite the application process but during the meeting, Waldron and
Papermaster maintained that they didn't think the project could be funded
because it was a communications venture and raised policy problems. The
EDA officials told Douglas that nothing could be done to speed the approv-
al of the GCG project until the policy issue was settled, but they would
continue to review the GCG package until such time arose.
GCG's cable consultants (Cable Communications Consultants of New
York City) began to meet with Papermaster to discuss financial projec-
tions and to alter them to suit EDA's (i.e., Papermaster's) guidelines. A
series of six or seven meetings were held between GCG, GCG's cable finan-
cial partners, GCG's consultants, and EDA's Papermaster to change, re-
hash, and change again financial projections to suit his interpretation
of EDA's needs.232 This went on throughout the whole month of December.
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Time after time, GCG and their consultants would make all the changes
requested by Papermaster, but he was never satisfied. Many very basic
financial questions were raised by Papermaster about the GCG package that
could have been asked and resolved much earlier.233 At one incredible
point during Papermaster's review of the GCG project, he contacted GCG
equity partner, Robert Liebauer, and offered to "kill" the deal if he
wanted to backout "gracefully." This fact, besides being noted in a
January 20, 1976 EDA-GCG chronology compiled by CRC's legal counsel, was
also generally recorded and outlined in a January 30, 1976 memorandum sent
by Charles Stein to Walter Lake Sorg, the Assistant Director for National
Programs within the Department of Commerce. The memo formally charged
that "individuals in EDA have contacted potential private investors and
creditors to point out to them the financial risks of this enterprise and
encouraging them to withdraw their support.2 3 4
When Robert Liebauer inquired very cautiously of Papermaster as
to why he was making this overture to him, Papermaster hedged and just
replied that it was going to take a long time to get this project in shape
before it could be funded and that the payoff might not really be worth
the effort being put into it.235 Papermaster, who had already expressed
to CRC staff a certain lack of interest in the GCG project, seemed to be
trying to size up how committed to the deal Liebauer was, and also giving
himself an opportunity to find an ally on the inside of the project to
help sabotage it. Robert Liebauer, of course, refused and immediately
contacted GCG and CRC to find out why an EDA loan official was trying to
"sabotage" the project.236
Bill Douglas and Reginald Dunn both informed Liebauer that
Papermaster, from the word "go," had taken a negative view of the GCG
project because in his words, "it didn't fit his idea of a good business
development project with significant job opportunities."237 More to the
point, CRC representatives told Liebauer that Papermaster resented the
extra work he had to go through (e.g., assemble special financial work-
sheets and forms) to analyze this project, because it didn't conform to
the standard forms, established review procedures, and general project
evaluation routines usually used by Papermaster and his co-workers. 2 3 8
For example, one shorthand technique Papermaster and his co-workers used
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to size up the feasibility of a project was to weigh how many jobs the
project would create against the amount of funds it needed. If a certain
project didn't create "X" number of jobs in proportion to the money it
needed, they were not interested in doing the project. The important
thing to realize is that there was no official formula or magic number to
be used in this technique, only the particular number that a worker
"thought" was plausible which left a wide margin for error or abuse. A
major precipitating factor for some of Papermaster's blatant attempts at
undermining the GCG project, besides his personal vendetta against
Cahill, had to be Cahill's lame duck status as an administrator.
During informal discussions between CRC staff, Papermaster, and
several other EDA officials on the impact of Cahill's lame duck status on
the outcome of the GCG project, it was generally conceded by most EDA
officials that there had existed certain philosophical differences be-
tween Cahill and some EDA career bureaucrats over Cahill's "administra-
tive leadership style" in advancing or supporting special projects. 2 3 9
Furthermore, this tension created a certain degree of resentment among
some officials when processing such projects violated their standard
operating procedures or established practices. Consequently, knowledge
of Cahill's lame duck status and impending purge from the agency tended to
precipitate and intensify resistant behavior on the part of some career
bureaucrats like Papermaster who were at odds with projects Cahill sup-
ported. This happened mainly because most of the career officials felt
Cahill had little or no power at his disposal to vent reprisals against
them. To quote Papermaster, "there was no speedy way, given the civil
service regulations at that time that Cahill could have moved around or
transferred to some remote outpost anyone in the agency once it was known
he (Cahill) was on his way out." 2 4 0
On December 12, 1975, Bill Douglas and Congressman Madden met
with top level EDA officials (Wilmer Mizell, William Henkel, Glen
Waldron) to get to the bottom of the delay over the policy issue. Charles
Stein and Charles Tate had worked hard to get the Gary congressman in-
volved in this meeting in hopes of creating some strong political pressure
to break though the bureaucratic resistance. It was reasoned that since
the demonstration of interest by political officials in the SBA case had
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been so successful in breaking through bureaucratic barriers, then per-
haps the same strategy might prove effective for GCG.
During the meeting, Waldron continuously maintained that FCC
regulations that required cable systems to do local programming would
prevent EDA from funding the GCG project. He emphasized that it was a
policy question not based on law. The key factor was the broadcasting or
media issue. Waldron, along with EDA's Assistant General Counsel, Jim
Marten, considered the FCC definition of broadcasting as being very broad
and that basically they took it to mean "media" including cable TV. The
formal rationale offered by some EDA officials for their stand against
cable was given during a Task Force meeting which was later recorded in a
July 29, 1976 CRC file memo on Task Force minutes. The memo quoted the
EDA spokesman, Jim Marten, as stating that:
The main reason why EDA couldn't loan money to television broad-
casters or cable TV systems was that they might broadcast something
against the Administration and that if, because of purely financial
reasons EDA needed to foreclose, the press and broadcasters would
raise a great uproar over censorship. Furthermore, they stated that
no administrator would subject himself or his successor to such an
uproar. 2 4 1
Bill Douglas raised the argument that cable companies did not
produce their own shows and had no control of content. Glen Waldron and
other EDA representatives said that this didn't matter because the real
issue was the possibility of having to foreclose on a cable system which
would raise an uproar.
Part of the real problem was that unbeknownst to both GCG and CRC,
Jeff Cahill was a lame duck administrator on his way out of the
agency. According to several EDA informants (unfortunately CRC did
not develop these inside contacts until well after the Task Force
agreement had been signed and the application process had bogged down
in problems) Jeff Cahill had incurred the wrath and disfavor of many
EDA bureaucrats by launching projects that his lower echelon offi-
cials didn't want to deal with and putting pressure on subordinates
who resisted his dictates. One special assistant to a chief adminis-
trator at EDA indicated "off the record" that Waldron, Papermaster,
and some others ended up being against the GCG project not because
they thought the project wouldn't really work but because they were
taking a stand against a project and a Task Force process that Cahill
was trying to "push" through before he left office, which they would
have to live with if any problems did develop. Furthermore, the fact
that the GCG project was a minority venture and as such did not
represent a direct benefit to EDA's perceived constituency, made many
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of EDA's permanent civil servants less eager to support and
expedite the processing of the GCG project. Consequently, the GCG
project presented certain EDA lower-level bureaucrats with an
opportunity to demonstrate their defiance and power to impede what
Cahill wanted to accomplish with reduced risk of retalization because
of his lame duck status.2
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Bill Douglas reminded EDA representatives that David Kinley,
Chief of the FCC's Cable Bureau had submitted a letter to EDA on GCG's
behalf stating formally that FCC regulations did not require local
programming by cable TV systems. EDA officials still maintained that
regardless of this fact, a foreclosure on a cable system might still be
turned into an adverse situation for the Administration by the press. The
problem at this point began to appear not to be cable but press
reaction.2 4 3
The EDA policy on cable it seemed was not apparently based on any
objective standard but only on avoiding political pressure and the fear of
future political repercussions from foreclosure on such a project. 'ere
was the perfect example of the basic defensive mentality of public bure au-
cratic organization--contrived policy was being used to not make a dec-
sion. In fact, several EDA officials have conceded that a classic defense
pattern used by EDA officials against projects they don't want to fun, is
to keep finding ways to delay making a final formal decision on ap.::oving
a project until an applicant gets tired of waiting and gives up. This
technique had worked so well in the past that the Gary project eventually
became one of the few if not the only project that was ever issued a
formal turn down letter by EDA.2 44
Basically, Chester Barnard has suggested that organization offi-
cials must know when not to make a decision. From a general administra-
tive point of view, this basic tenet may seem a valid tactic as practiced
strategically.245 However, when it becomes the common norm in handling
difficult situations, as it too often does in public agencies, then it
seems to represent a root cause of "red tape" and bureaucratic delay. One
could indeed postulate that the higher the degree of uncertainty which
surrounds an enterprise (i.e., in terms of it producing direct benefits or
direct harm) and who will shoulder the responsibility for negative conse-
quences, the greater the propensity for bureaucrats to avoid decision
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making by cluttering up the process with non-decision making maneuvers.
It must be remembered that formally, EDA officials voiced concern
that a public uproar might occur if GCG broadcast something against the
administration or if EDA had to foreclose on the project because of
financial problems. A greater concern of EDA Washington bureaucrats
however was over avoiding being saddled with an unwanted project by a lame
duck administrator who would not be around to share the responsibility for
any political problems or complications that might result. Also, the
project presented a chance for certain bureaucrats to demonstrate their
power to sabotage a project supported by Cahill in retaliation for their
past conflicts with him.2 4 6
The December 12, 1975 meeting between GCG and EDA ended with
nothing very much being resolved either way. EDA made clear it had a
basic leaning toward not funding cable projects as premised on its policy
interpretations, of what constitutes a broadcasting firm, but no formal-
final decision was made about the GCG project. The meeting tended mostly
to a political tug-of-war between GCG and EDA, with Congressman Ray J.
Madden being a sidelines spectator, referee, and at times, a devil's
advocate. For the most part, the Congressman only articulated a "deep
interest" in the GCG situation and expressed a "strong desire to see an
equitable solution worked out" without further delay, but he never
threatened to exert any real political pressure against EDA.2 4 7
Financial Plans Scrutinized
The policy issue raised by EDA over funding cable TV projects was
left up in the air for the next several weeks (from the middle of December
1975 through the early weeks of January 1976). During this time frame,
however, a series of meetings were called by Papermaster to discuss in
meticulous detail every minute facet and nuance of GCG's financial pro-
jections. Papermaster held several separate meetings in Washington, D.C.
discussing the same financial subject matter with GCG corporation mem-
bers, Robert Liebauer (President of CATV Development Corporation of New
York City--GCG's limited partner), and Martin R. Smith (President of
GCG's cable consultant firm).2 4 8
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Besides being very repetitive in focus, all the individual meet-
ings dealt with basic financial matters that could have been reviewed and
resolved months before. Despite the "nuisance nature" of the changes
called for in the project proposals, Bill Douglas together with his
partners and consultants, made every change requested. GCG, with the
support of Task Force members (i.e., OMBE and CRC) and other agencies like
the FCC appeared to be overcoming most of the bureaucratic barriers set in
its path just as fast as they materialized. Nevertheless, GCG was still
slowly, over time, mcving closer toward insolvency. A fact which both
fired GCG's initiative to work even faster to achieve its goals and
stimulated certain EDA bureaucrats to contrive new reasons to stall
activity, in hopes time for GCG would run out.
EDA Policy Bulletin Issued
On January 30, 1976, EDA formally issued a policy bulletin on the
eligibility of cable television system operators for EDA business devel-
opment assistance (see appendix J for copy of bulletin). The bulletin
maintained EDA's contenti on that since its business development manual
listed "broadcasting firas" as ineligible for assistance and because they
viewed cable systems <ith the potential for local organization as "broad-
casting firms," then cable systems would be considered ineligible for
funding. This finding was loosely based on the FCC rule that cable TV
systems with over 3,500 subscribers had to have the potential to do local
origination programs.
The bulletin charged that clear government policy guidance on
Federal support of cable TV development had been lacking. Specifically,
the bulletin stated:
Administration and Congressional positions expressed to date on
Federal support for the development of cable television systems do
not provide firm guidance for an EDA policy with respect to all cable
television system operators. The statements that have appeared indi-
cate general support for the development of such systems in rural
areas, particularly when minority operators are involved. EDA's
legal staff has found no statements favoring development of such
systems in urban areas. 2 4 9
This segment of the bulletin mainly attempted to falsely equate the
absence of any specific mention of urban cable systems in existing
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government communications policy statements as a declaration of non-
support of urban cable TV systems. EDA was mainly trying to establish a
"loophole" for saying there was no policy grounds for support of urban
cable systems by Federal agencies. In reality, at that time, there
existed a wide array of government programs supporting cable TV projects
in all types of settings (i.e., urban, exurbs, rural, new-towns, military
installations, etc.; see appendix A for a complete list of government
involvement in telecommunications projects) .
In fact, on January 10, 1976, Charles Stein had CRC's executive
director, acting in his capacity as recording secretary for the Task
Force, send to EDA officials a memorandum which summarized the extent of
Federal involvement in cable television at that time. The main emphasis
of the memorandum was on the fact that Federal policy statements, research
and development activities, demonstrations, and program mandates in sup-
port of telecommunications advancement and cable TV development had been
si'nificant and extensive. The following is a categorical synopsis of the
Feoral policy directives and government activities focused on cable TV
development and highlighted in this memo.
Prelicy Statements
o The Report to the President (1974), by the blue-ribbon Cabinet
Committee on Cable Communications, whose membership included
Elliot L. Richardson, has stipulated within its policy recommen-
dations the following:
Government authorities should assure that basic cable or
other broadband communications are available to residents of de-
pressed areas and to the poor. More specifically, recommen-
dation 12 states:
Participation by minority groups in cable system ownership,
operation and programming should be facilitated.
The development of cable represents a unique opportunity for
minority, racial and ethnic groups to become actively involved in
a new communications medium. Minority groups not only should
have employment opportunities, but also full opportunity to par-
ticipate in all aspects of cable ownership, operation and pro-
gramming.
The general policy for the structure and regulation of the
cable industry that we recommend would facilitate participation
by all segments of society in cable ownership or control of chan-
nel use. Moreover, the local franchising authority should ensure
opportunities for minority ownership and control in cable systems
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and programming. At the Federal level, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission should devote special attention to the
development of the cable industry to assure ample employment
opportunities for minority group members. We also recommend that
the Office of Minority Business Enterprise and the Small Business
Administration of the Department of Commerce be directed to give
high priority to cable and to propose any necessary special pro-
vision such as loan guarantees, to foster significant minority
ownership or control of cable operations.
o Inter-Federal Agency Cable Development Agreement-August, 1975
EDA, OMBE, SBA and FmHA made a signed commitment to make available
the collective resources of their agencies to provide all possi-
ble assistance to minority applicants seeking to develop or ex-
pand cable TV business.
o A Technical Draft Report entitled "Lowering Barriers to Telecom-
munications Growth" (dated October 31, 1975) and prepared by the
Science and Technology Task Force of U.S. Department of Commerce,
views telecommunications "as a vital national asset that is not
being fully exploited. Specifically, cable television in the
report, is pictured as particularly in need of governmental
intervention to help it achieve its full potential. They recom-
mended a $1 million development program within Commerce to accel-
erate the cable industry's growth."
Direct Funding of Cable Television Development
o The Federal Home Administration has made a $1.2 million loan to
develop a cable system in Trempealeau County Wisconsin;
o The Small Business Administration has made several direct loans
and loan guarantees to cable operators; and
o The Office of Minority Business Enterprise has for several years
funded a national cable development program coordinated by the
Cablecommunications Resource Center.
Research and Development Program Support of Cable TV Development
o HUD sponsored a 1971 study entitled Communications Technology for
Urban Improvement, which outlines a number of pilot projects
which might utilize telecommunications technology to solve urban
problems.
o HUD funded a $363,000 contract with Dr. Peter C. Goldmark for a
New Rural Society project in Connecticut.
o Department of Labor and local CETA programs have funded three
manpower training programs for cable TV technicians.
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o HEW has developed a two-way cable health service system in
Jonathan, Minnesota for $300,000.
o Department of Defense conducted examination of the feasibility of
providing modern cable services to Army bases (contracted through
Mitre Corporation) for several million dollars.
o National Science Foundation has funded $1,935,000 for three pro-
jects to test and evaluate public service uses of cable TV.
o U.S. Department of Commerce, EDA-funded preliminary investigation
of opportunities for rural cable development.
o Health Resources Administration has funded a $500,000 project to
demonstrate the use of opportunities for rural cable development.
Miscellaneous Support of Telecommunications Development
o Support of public Broadcasting through Corporation for Public
Broadcasting $80,000,000.
o HEW support of public radio and television facilities
$30,000,000.
o Appalachian Educational and Health Service Satellite Program
ATS-6 (sponsored jointly by NASA, NIE, and HEW).
o NASA--Satellite hardware cost $200 million
o NIE--Satellite programming $2.2 million
o HEW--Ground receiving equipment $45,000
A total of over $12,000,000 has been expended over the last three
years on general telecommunications research by a host of other
federal agencies ranging from the Department of Defense to the
FCC.2 5 0
Government Support of Telecommunications
Besides the existence of different cable TV projects, there had
been several broad statements of support of telecommunications develop-
ment issued by the then White House Office of Telecommunications Policy,
Federal agencies like HUD, and various Congressional representatives.
For example, in the August 1, 1975 Congressional Record Congressman,
Harely Staggers indicated he had sent a letter to the President which
asserted that the United States had not taken full advantage of the
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available telecommunications technology to increase productivity, new
kinds of communications options, provide new jobs, and new industry.
Congressman Staggers (a sponsor of several bills supporting cable TV)
further informed the President that telecommunications as a great
national resource had not been effectively developed and that "part of the
problem has been our fragmented and largely ineffecive, Federal effort in
the field of telecommunications technology utilization."251 Congressman
Staggers' statements not only illustrate that recorded congressional sup-
port for general telecommunications development by government policy
makers existed, but also acknowledges the harmfulness of the very type of
disjointed government behavior that EDA was displaying in its attempts to
"sidestep" funding the GCG project. Not to mention the fact that the very
existence of CRC as a program funded by OMBE under the Department of
Commerce clearly personified a government mandate to support cable TV
development by minorities in both urban and rural settings. Thus, the
real irony of the EDA bulletin was that it was attempting officially and
formally to overlook and bypass a program mandate, not of some distant or
unknown agency, but an agency (OMBE) within the same Department of Com-
merce.
The issue of divergent and disjointed policies existing within
the Department of Commerce was officially recognized eventually in a
major decision memorandum drafted by the Assistant Secretary for Policy
on August 10, 1976 and sent to the then Secretary of Commerce, Elliot
Richardson. Unfortunately, this official confirmation of what CRC's
staff already knew existed, would come too late to significantly help the
Gary project. The major emphasis in the memorandum was placed on the fact
that Secretary Elliot Richardson had served at one time on a Cabinet
Committee on Cable Communication which drafted a report that set policy
guidelines for federal agency support of cable TV. Specifically, the
memorandum stated the following:
Reference here is made to the report submitted to the President by a
select Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications completed in 1974.
As you know, members of the Committee were Clay T. Whitehead, Chair-
man, Robert A. Finch, Leonard Garment, Herbert G. Klein, Peter A.
Peterson, George Romney and yourself.
Notwithstanding the Broad recommendations of the aforementioned
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Report, divergent policies are still being pursued both within the
Department of Commerce (e.g., EDA/OMBE) and outside the Department
(e.g., FHA/SBA), pertaining to Federal financial assistance to cable
TV entrepreneurs. These problems concern First Amendment and regula-
tory aspects of cable TV. Also, current divergent executive policies
have resulted in sharp criticism of executive agency practices
(FCC/SBA) from congressional sub-committees. 2 5 2
Quite clearly, EDA officials were in effect seeking to misinter-
pret and exploit existing policies to meet their own goals and ends.
Francis E. Rourke and Robert L. Peabody ("Public Bureaucracies," Handbook
of Organization, 1965) have suggested that career civil servants must be
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constantly dealt with as political actors with goals of their own.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that professional bureaucrats are not
value free, unbiased deliverers of service to clients. Rather, they act
in predictable ways according to their modes of thought, definitions of
professional role, and individual needs for self actualization, security,
power, etc.254
For example, the prime commitments of civil servants are to
career, agency, and program in that order. Above all, they seek to come
to terms with the agency environment in ways that promote regularity,
stability, and if possible, expansion. Thus, civil servants usually
create an implementation process which is highly formalistic (i.e., there
is an exaggerated use and dependency on regulations, bureaucratic rou-
tines, established policies, etc.) to protect them from external
threats.2 5 5
In fact their bureaucratic credo usually suggests to them that
the key to survival is to search for the short-run advantage and the
entrenched position that protects against threatening forces.256 Which
certainly seems to describe the behavior of Papermaster and his immediate
superiors in stonewalling against the external pressures and attempts
made to expedite the GCG project. A basic understanding of this general
type of bureaucratic orientation also helps one to appreciate the dynamic
behind EDA's development of "instant policy" around the cable TV issue.
In its actual summary policy statement, the EDA bulletin stated:
It is EDA's position that cable television systems with 3,500 or more
subscribers (or the reasonable expectation of obtaining 3,500 or more
subscribers) constitute broadcasting firms, since they must have pro-
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duction capability and must permit production and presentation of
programs by local non-operators. Accordingly, it is the Agency's
policy that such systems are not eligible for EDA business develop-
ment assistance.257
The bulletin then went even further to erase any doubt that EDA might even
consider funding cable systems with less than 3,500 subscribers by
stating:
EDA does not feel it necessary at this time to adopt a specific policy
on assistance to cable television on systems with less than 3,500
subscribers (or reasonable expectation of having less than 3,500 sub-
scribers). Such cases will be decided on individual merits. However,
it is recognized that, in general, such systems lack sufficient eco-
nomic impact to warrant consideration for EDA assistance. They are
basically automated and provide little employment once service con-
struction is completed.2 5 8
The bulletin was signed by the then Assistant Secretary for Economic
Development, Wilmer D. Mizell.
When Charles Stein (OMBE), Bill Douglas (GCG), and Charles Tate
(CRC) received the bulletin, they were astonished that EDA would go so far
just to sidestep funding the GCG project. However, by this time, it was
obvious that the GCG project was a political "hot potato." Now that the
battle lines were drawn, Bill Douglas, with the support of CRC and Charles
Stein (OMBE) set about the task of taking the GCG case before the public
in an attempt to create enough adverse publicity for EDA that it would be
forced to reconsider its policy stance.
FCC Response to EDA Bulletin
First, several letters protesting the EDA bulletin and
challenging the EDA's misinterpretations of FCC rules were sent to EDA's
Wilmer D. Mizell by the FCC Cable TV Bureau Chief. The FCC Cable TV
Bureau responded to the EDA bulletin after CRC's director sent them a copy
to review and briefed David Kinley, Cable TV Bureau Chief, on the Task
Force and its agreement. CRC's executive director convinced David Kinley
of the contrived nature of the bulletin by virtue of the fact that pre-
viously a top-level administrator of the EDA had agreed that EDA would
serve on a Cable TV Task Force and had signed an interagency agreement
supporting rural cable TV development. Kinley was informed that certain
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EDA bureaucrats were trying to kill the GCG project by using "different
excuses and reasons at different times to delay the package.,,259 Now they
were even using a bastardized interpretation of FCC rules to avoid funding
the project.260 Reginald Dunn summed up the situation for Kinley as
follows:
EDA's refusal to allow the cable industry to use its resources will
have a serious, negative impact on the industry--primarily by setting
a negative precedent for other federal agencies, and possibly endan-
gering affirmative cable policies already set by them.
Of course, the cumulative effect will be the general hindering of
cable development, with a particularly harsh impact on minority
firms, small businesses, and cable demonstration projects. The pro-
cess has already begun, in the case of the Gary (Indiana) Communica-
tions Group.
We attempted to comply with the agency's requirements for the
submittal of the package. None of our alterations met with EDA's
constantly changing instructions. We were forced to conclude that
discrimination, both against the industry and against Gary, as the
first black group to apply for funds, was the primary reason.
I also find it interesting that this policy was issued after the
GCG submission, as if in respone to it. Before that, the policy of
EDA was that outlined in the Rural Interagency Agreement, to which
they were a signatory.2 6 1
The Cable TV Bureau Chief was acutely sensitive to the political
significance of GCG as the first black-owned cable TV system in a major TV
market. On several occasions, he had served as a key speaker on minority
cable TV issues before client seminars organized by CRC and helped
troubleshoot the FCC Certificate of Compliance (CAC--a license granted by
the FCC when a cable applicant demonstrates compliance with the FCC rules)
process for its clients. Also, the presence of Benjamin Hooks (the first
black Commissioner) at the FCC as an outspoken supporter of minority cable
TV ownership created an environment for supportive FCC action.
Commissioner Hooks, in commenting on the impact of his presence at the
FCC, has stated:
It was Dick Wylie (FCC Chairman) who proposed that minority owners'
conference we held. A couple of years ago he wouldn't even have
thought about it. I'm trying to say that we've tried to sensitize
people, and I plan to do a one-two thing--somebody here while I'm over
there. I think I've been a catalyst. I've been a sensitizer. I've
been an advocate. I've been a shrill voice crying. . .I've written on
a whole gamut of things, including common carrier, administrative
matters. . . .You name it and I've written on it. . . .Yet, some
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people try to claim that I was a one-issue (cable TV) commissioner. 2 6 2
Commissioner Hooks was extremely aware of the importance of the GCG pro-
ject to minorities. During the official "turn-on" ceremonies for GCG,
Commissioner Hooks made the presentation of the FCC-CAC to Bill Douglas in
Gary. Commissioner Hooks' high hopes for GCG were summarized in an
interview:
The entire country is looking to Gary as a harbinger of what can be in
cable television. . . .I think the Gary system has great potential;
it is one of the systems that will prove that cable can be successful.
They're going to have a lot of hard days, but with the type of men
they have leading it and the ideas they have, I think they can make a
go of it. 2 6 3
Commissioner Hooks stayed interested in the GCG system as it evolved and
was kept periodically abreast of its developments by CRC's executive
director.
In general, neither the Cable TV Bureau Chief nor the FCC at large
wanted, in one staff member's words, "to be made a party to the old
government dodge of one agency (EDA) shifting the blame for not doing its
job on to another agency (FCC)--especially in regards to minorities."2 6 4
Also the FCC Cable Bureau could ill afford other agencies encroaching on
its "administrative turf." As one special assistant to the cable TV
Bureau Chief put it, "we won't keep our shop open very long if we let
other agencies 'play around' (a more indelicate term was used) with our
authority to define policy affecting cable TV."265 Consequently, the FCC
cable TV bureau Chief and his staff were highly motivated and inclined to
challenge any misinterpretations of their rules which usurped their
authority, produced hardships for disadvantaged groups, and in the
process made the FCC appear culpable for EDA's ruling.
The FCC did not want to be used as a scapegoat or pawn in another
government agency's attempt to deny funds to a minority cable TV venture.
The FCC within the process of remaining militantly vigilant in not allow-
ing other agencies to misinterpret its rules became over time a very vocal
supporter of GCG in its policy battle with EDA. David Kinley, Chief of
the FCC's Cable Bureau, wrote in one of his letters to EDA the following:
The recent EDA Bulletin raises serious concerns regarding your clas-
sifications of all cable systems with 3,500 or more subscribers as
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"brcadcasting firms." Basing such a classification on our equipment
availability rule raises certain inconsistencies with the Commis-
sion's policies regarding the development of cable television.
Therefore, we request that this Bulletin be rescinded or the effec-
tive date deferred until such time as representatives from the Com-
mission and your staff can meet to discuss these matters in more
detail and resolve the apparent conflicts.2 6 6
Within two weeks after EDA received David Kinley's letter, a
special meeting was set up by William Clinger, EDA's Chief Counsel, to
discuss their cable policy in relation to the FCC's objections. Reginald
Dunn alerted all federal agency members of the Task Force to attend the
meeting, which they did. During the meeting, David Kinley (FCC), Charles
Stein (OMBE), and Charles Tate (CRC) made strong arguments against the
validity of the EDA bulletin based on the FCC letter. Generally, they
assertead that the EDA bulletin utilized faulty reasoning, misapplied
legal principles, ignored existing public policy, and completely breached
their signing of the interagency Task Force agreement.2 6 7
Specifically, Charles Stein maintained that EDA's breach of the
multi-agency agreement seriously impeded OMBE in its mandated efforts to
coordinate Federal programs which supported minority enterprise develop-
ment. David Kinley, representing the FCC (which has statutory jurisdic-
tion on-7-r the definition of cable and broadcasting entities), informed
EDA th:.t they had largely misinterpreted the FCC rules and had based their
misinterpretation upon an erroneous definition of a cable TV system being
the same as a "broadcast firm." The Cable TV Bureau Chief told EDA that
cable TV systems had no legal obligation to do any local programming and
thus EDA was raising a false issue. Finally, Charles Tate argued that the
EDA bulletin was incorrect when it stated that administration and con-
gressional positions did not provide firm guidance to EDA with respect to
cable. The executive director of CRC indicated that the 1974 Cabinet
Committee on Cable Communications Report to the President, which EDA
cited as evidence of lack of policy, clearly stated in recommendation 12,
"Participation by minority groups in cable system ownership, operation
and programming should be facilitated. . . .We also recommend that the
Office of Minority Business Enterprise and Small Business Administration
of the Department of Commerce be directed to give high priority to
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cable." 268
Despite various arguments that EDA had no firm ground upon which
to base its bulletin, EDA representatives continuously asserted that they
did. By and large, EDA's Assistant General Counsel, Jim Marten, kept
voicing concern over the potential threat of government intervention into
what was termed the "opinion-molding process" by funding a cable TV
system.269 The meeting ended with nothing much resolved, it was a stale-
mate.
In an effort to keep its clients informed of developments and to
make the public aware of the FCC's support in this matter, an interview
with David Kinley was published in CRC's newsletter/magazine Cablelines
(January/February issue, 1976). In the interview, Kinley capsulized the
situation as follows:
We've been in a bit of a fight with both the Economic Development
Administration and the Small Business Administration over this matter
of whether we are currently requiring cable systems to do original
programming. This interpretation has a substantial impact on whether
EDA and SBA funds are available, particularly in minority enter-
prises.
Both organizations have got regulations of some kind about not
funding programming enterprises. The kind of programming that our
rules are requiring cable systems to provide--That is, access pro-
gramming, not organization programming--is not the kind of program-
ming that SBA and EDA's regulations are designed to prevent. You
don't have the First Amendment problem because we've structured the
rules in such a way as to really foster First Amendment freedoms, not
prohibit them. That's the point we have to make clear.
I think, once they fully understand, they will see that they don't
have a problem. The concept of access programming is something that
we deal with everyday, and is so familiar to us that we know what the
rules are, what the protections are. We can understand that an
outsider coming in could look at that and say, "They've got to provide
certain programming, so we don't want to get into it." 2 7 0
Publicity Campaign Mounted
After the FCC meeting with EDA, CRC's director, during a follow up
in-house strategy session, theorized that perhaps EDA could be persuaded
to act in a more responsive manner if some outside "public support" for
the GCG project was developed. To build greater public awareness of the
GCG/EDA situation, CRC published an article titled "EDA Impedes Cable
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Growth" in its national newsletter/magazine which was widely distributed
to clients, Task Force members, political officials, minority business
organizations, and the media. The article gave an overview of the situa-
tion and included major quotes from the FCC letter that objected to the
bulletin. Besides this publicity approach aimed at the general public,
Bill Douglas had sent mailgrams to the President of the United States and
the White House staff, explaining the situation and seeking support.
Unfortunately, the White House never took a keen interest in the situa-
tion. Given the fact that a Presidential election was coming up, there
was a general reluctance among many political officials to become too
involved in anything really controversial.
On March 14, 1976, GCG and CRC staff's attempts to gain wider
publicity for the EDA situation finally paid off. After two months of
contacting media people and distributing CRC's article on the GCG situa-
tion, a major Indiana daily, the Post Tribune, picked up the GCG story and
printed a detailed article titled "GCG Loan Pleas Sparks Brouhaha In
Washington" (see appendix K for a copy of the article). The article,
besides giving a comprehensive history of the situation, recorded the
discriminatory nature of EDA's creation of "instant policy" just to
thwart an attempt by a minority group to get its project funded. Part of
the discriminatory nature of EDA's "instant policy," according to the
article, centered around the fact that EDA had singled out the cable TV
industry as the only business area to issue such a major temporary policy
statement on. The EDA bulletin was labeled anti-competitive in its dis-
crimination against cable TV businesses using EDA programs, contrary to
the thrust of federal policy-making bodies and agencies at that time to
free cable from unwarranted governmental and market place restraints.* 2 7 1
*A number of reports and documents at that time indicated that the
United States was not taking full advantage of available telecommunica-
tions technology to increase productivity, new kinds of communications
options, provide new jobs and new industry. Congressman Harley Staggers
sent a letter to the President during August of 1975 stating that telecom-
munications as a great national resource had not been effectively devel-
oped and that "part of the problem has been our fragmented and largely
ineffective Federal effort in the field of telecommunications technology
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utilization." The House Subcommittee on Communications published a 1976
report entitled "Cable Television: Promise versus Regulatory Authority"
which indicated that government restrictions, policies, and regulations
that hindered cable TV growth needed to be abandoned to promote more
"experimentation in the marketplace." 2 7 2  Most significantly, a 1975
technical report, "Lowering Barriers to Telecommunications Growth," pre-
pared by the Science and Technology Task Force of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, described telecommunications "as a vital national asset that is
not being fully exploited." The report depicted cable TV as particularly
in need of governmental intervention to help it achieve its full poten-
tial. Moreover, the in-house report recommended that the Department of
Commerce spearhead a major development program to "accelerate the cable
industry's growth." This proposed initiative stands out in startling
contrast to EDA's stance against cable. One would generally assume that
EDA, as a major program under the Department of Commerce, would at least
be in sync with Commerce's broad policy thrusts. Such stark conflicts
point out the ad hoc and contrived nature of EDA's policy stance against
cable.
Furthermore, the Post Tribune article recorded that when "asked
if the EDA cable TV policy regulation was a direct outgrowth of GCG's
application, one EDA official who requested anonymity, said his answer
would have to be an unqualified yes." 2 7 3  In other words, he was indicat-
ing that the bulletin was developed only for the purpose of "handling" or
avoiding the funding of the GCG project and not for any larger concern
about cable TV in and of itself.
An even stronger attack against the questionable nature of EDA's
policy actions would appear in a Gary community newspaper article titled
"GCG Accuses EDA of Racism" (dated March 25, 1976). This article points
out that on January 19, 1976, EDA issued a "temporary three-month policy
statement effective February 1, 1976, stating that they would not lend
money to the cable TV industry."274 The temporary nature of this policy,
according to the article, "indicates that the policy statement was
clearly a policy just for GCG; since according to available information,
GCG was the only cable TV company in loan request negotiations with
EDA. "275
The article asserted that EDA had not seen fit to issue any
special policy statements on any other industry except this cable pro-
ject. The implication to be drawn was that certain officials were willing
to develop a contrived policy statement against cable TV in general just
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to sabotage the GCG project.
Finally, the article, after indicating that one EDA representa-
tive had suggested that "EDA does not make loans to minorities; we make
loans to Americans" went on to state the following:
Gary Communications Group, Inc., which is supported in their efforts
by the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) now seeks the support of the commu-
nity. Those persons who are subscribers and potential subscribers
are urged to call or write their Senators and Representative,
requesting them to urge the EDA to reconsider favorably the proposal
of GCG.2 7 6
EDA's ad hoc bulletin stood in direct contradiction to EDA's
participation in a Task Force process and an interagency agreement, sup-
portive of cable TV developmnent, and the preliminary clearance and
assurances given earlier to GCG by different officials that no major
impediments to GCG project funding existed. This disjointed and contra-
dictive behavior on the part of different levels of EDA officials was the
exact type of behavior that the Task Force had hoped would be eliminated
during the various pre-application conferences held between GCG/CRC
representatives and EDA officials in the Chicago and Washington head-
quarters offices. In fact, to digress a bit further, one of the driving
rationales behind the creation of the Task Force was to create a deliber-
ate and effective communications process (e.g., via extensive pre-appli-
cation conferences) which would smooth the way for project funding by
getting agencies to: prioritize cable TV projects; communicate this pri-
ority among all levels of their agency hierarchy; and identify and resolve
up front any problems that might inhibit cable funding.
Bill Douglas mailed copies of the Post Tribune article to
Reginald Dunn. CRC's staff immediately made more copies of the article to
be mailed out to Task Force members, political officials, the FCC, general
project supporters, and the Washington, D.C. press. The staff of CRC
hoped that this article could be used to rally even greater public inter-
est and help to maintain pressure on EDA by keeping it in the spotlight of
public attention. The Post Tribune article, besides raising the question
publicly as to whether or not EDA was being fair and equitable in the way
it was handling the GCG project, also mentioned the fact that in contra-
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diction to its hard line against "broadcasting firms," EDA has at one time
actually funded just such a venture. 2 7 7
Reginald Dunn decided that if CRC staff could get some detailed
proof that EDA had actually funded some type of broadcasting venture in
the past, then this might help to demonstrate that EDA was being arbitrary
and capricious in dealing with GCG. It also might show that EDA had
funded a project which wouldn't create large scale employment opportuni-
ties, a side issue also being used by EDA to challenge the GCG project.
Proof of EDA Funded TV Station Uncovered
CRC staff contacted several of their "friends" inside the Depart-
ment of Commerce, OMBE, and EDA to find out where such information might
be located, but with no immediate success. Various members of CRC, during
the development of the GCG project, had cultivated "informants" (adminis-
trative assistants to certain agency officials) within the Department of
Commerce, OMBE, and EDA offices (all located in the same building on
common floors). From time to time they provided us with information on
certain developments at EDA. Eventually I contacted a student who worked
part-time in the EDA public information office. After a long search the
student discovered a progress report on an educational television station
in Watertown, New York funded by EDA in 1979 (see appendix L for copy of
report).
The information contained in the 1972 progress report clearly
contradicted statements made by EDA loan officials that they only funded
projects that created large scale employment opportunities and that they
did not fund communication ventures. The report indicated that on
December 18, 1969, EDA approved the establishment of an educational tele-
vision facility that would result in the initial employment of 11 part-
time and 4 full-time people. An evaluation of the project in 1972 showed
it had only 13 full-time employees working at the station and that besides
educational programming, the station was broadcasting a number of local
programs as well as picking up broadcasts from an ETV station in Syracuse.
The progress report also indicated ironically that many residents in the
target population area received such programming over a VHF station by
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virtue of cable TV service.2 7 8
A detailed report on the 1969 project was prepared by CRC staff
and submitted to Glenn Waldron (EDA's Director of Business Development)
along with an argument that it set a precedent for the funding of GCG
because it seriously weakened EDA's stance about not supporting "broad-
cast facilities."
The fact that EDA's funding of an educational TV station
seriously undermined their attack against GCG was echoed in a letter
(March 24, 1976) from Congressman Parren Mitchell to Wilmer D. Mizell.
Congressman Mitchell, a highly respected black politician, maintained a
significant interest in minority business development issues via various
Congressional committee memberships. He was very sensitive to the need
for government programs to be more responsive to minority groups. Conse-
quently it was easy for the director of CRC to gain his support of GCG by
informing him of the Task Force initiative and the problems with EDA.
Congressman Mitchell, in one of several letters sent to Mizell, indicated
the following:
I do not understand your response to my letter of 2/24/76.
You explain that EDA has an agreement with OMBE, SBA, and FHA to
stimulate the development of minority ownership in rural CATV systems
and explain that you are willing to extend various forms of assistance
in this program.
It is then indicated that EDA cannot make a business loan to GCG
because of First Amendment policy considerations in which you find
cable to be a "broadcasting" medium.
I am confused. First, I am informed that the FCC, which would
seem to have primary jurisdiction over "broadcasting" and "cable"
definitions and certainly has the requisite expertise, has informed
EDA that cable systems are not broadcast firms by letter and in a
metting with EDA. EDA's position seems to be in conflict with that of
the FCC. I might add that I am disappointed that I was not informed
by EDA of the FCC's concern in this matter.
Secondly, I do not understand why EDA's First Amendment concerns
apply to the business loan program. Especially since the Gary news-
papers have reported that EDA has financed an education broadcast
station in New York.
Lastly, the letter states that EDA was unable, in its judgment to
formulate a viable financing plan that would induce EDA to make a
finding that there is reasonable assurance of repayment of the
requested loan.
I do not understand why EDA is unable to make such a finding when
private financial sources, knowledgeable in cable industry financing
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are committing $985,000 to the Gary system. And, I am informed that
those funds would all be subordinated to the EDA loan. To me, this
convincingly attests not only to the safety of the EDA loan, but also
to the viability of the Gary system.
I recommend that EDA finance the loan of the Gary application for
the following reasons:
1. It would have a very favorable and substantial economic
development impact on the depressed Gary area which is the kind of
activity EDA is mandated to promote.
2. It would create 29 new jobs, and I am assured they are all
permanent.
3. The presence of private sector investment enables the
government to gain additional leverage on its funds.
4. EDA's participation can make this promising and viable pro-
ject possible. Without such assistance, it is extremely diffi-
cult for fledgling enterprises to raise investment funds in
today's capital markets.
5. The Gary project is a key test situation for minority par-
ticipation in the developing cable industry, which is being
closely watched by minority business groups across the nation.
Its success will be beneficial to the national minority
community.2 7 9
Despite the fact that there was clear evidence that EDA had funded
a "broadcast station" without any First Amendment complications in the
past, EDA's legal counsel, Jim Marten, in his response to CRC's report and
other inquiries refused to accept the notion that precedents could be set
inside government agencies by past actions of other administrations.
Glenn Waldron and other EDA officials also maintained that EDA
was not constrained by the past actions of the agency to follow along that
same course.280 EDA, despite its attempt to defend this major contradic-
tion in practice and policy, fully realized that this revelation did tend
to lessen the credibility of their policy stance against cable TV.
This analysis of the situation was fully supported by information
given CRC staff by several of its informants inside EDA and the Department
of Commerce. Specifically, Jim Edwards, a special assistant to a high
level EDA official, indicated that "EDA was taken completely off guard by
CRC's discovery of the background information on the TV project funded by
EDA." 28 Furthermore, Edwards, among several other informants, indicated
when interviewed that although certain EDA officials publicly denounced
the TV project discovery as insignificant, it directly triggered a flurry
of internal activity inside EDA to establish what one EDA bureaucrat
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termed "more stable and dependable grounds" for their stance against
cable.282 Further discussions with Department of Commerce officials in
close contact with EDA activities tended to confirm to the executive
director of CRC's satisfaction that EDA's policy stance was not holding up
as some EDA bureaucrats had aniticpated. Specifically, Mary Wooley, a
special assistant to a high official at OMBE, informed Reginald Dunn that
EDA's legal staff was in the process of doing a quiet in-house reappraisal
of their policy bulletin based on the complaints raised by the FCC and the
discovery of a communications venture previously funded by EDA.
FCC Reaffirms Objections to EDA Bulletin
Sensing that EDA's policy position against funding the GCG pro-
ject was weakening, Charles Tate and Reginald Dunn decided to encourage
the FCC to intensify its efforts in expressing its objections to EDA Cable
Policy.
J. Clay Smith, Jr. had become Acting Chief of the FCC Cable TV
Bureau after David Kinley left. J. Clay Smith, Jr., as the highest
ranking black staff official inside the FCC and Cable TV Bureau, was very
supportive of CRC and adamently opposed to the use of misinterpretations
of FCC policy to thwart minority cable TV development. CRC's directors
made it clear to Smith that EDA, through its bulletin, was reneging on a
prior Task Force agreement to support minority cable system development.
The existence of the Task Force and its agreement reinforced the suspi-
ciousness of the bulletin in Smith's mind. It signified the contrived
nature of the bulletin and reassured Smith that this was an important
issue and a just cause for him as a public official to pursue. Smith was
convinced that there was a need for "removing artificial barriers" that
hindered minority ownership of cable TV systems.284 He had, in the past,
supported CRC cable development activities and, in turn, had been sup-
ported by CRC staff in his activities at the FCC (e.g., given publicity
and interviews in Cablelines magazine).
The Acting Chief of the Cable Television Bureau, after conferring
with CRC's directors, decided to call a special meeting with representa-
tives of the Office of Policy Development and Coordination for the Depart-
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ment of Commerce. Reginald Dunn hoped that by having the FCC reiterate
the major problems (i.e., contradictions, disjointed actions, misinter-
pretation, etc.) embodied in the EDA bulletin to policy development
superiors inside the Department of Commerce, that some added pressure on
EDA to change its position would result.2 8 5
On April 15, 1976, a special meeting was held at the FCC chaired
by J. Clay Smith, Jr. with Andre L. Marcellin and Anthony Rodspieler. Mr.
Marcellin and Mr. Rodspieler were representatives of Robert S. Milligan,
the Director of the Office of Policy Development and Coordination at the
Department of Commerce. Also participating in the meeting was Laurence
Bloom, special assistant to J. Clay Smith. 2 8 6
The Cable Bureau Chief called the meeting to establish once and
for all that the EDA Bulletin incorrectly evaluated a cable system as a
broadcast entity and that in reality the bulletin had no basis in fact as
viewed against any existing FCC cable TV rules and regulations. During
the meeting, the Cable Bureau Chief reiterated the facts which estab-
lished that EDA's policy stance was inconsistent with existing FCC cable
policies. His major objections to the bulletin concerned its erroneous
assertion that cable TV systems with 3,500 or more subscribers consti-
tuted "broadcasting firms."
Specifically, J. Clay Smith, Jr. firmly and clearly maintained
that:
The analogy that a cable system is a broadcasting firm because it has
the capability of originating programming is the pitfall of compart-
mentalization that both the courts and the FCC have taken great pains
to avoid. Consequently, we reiterate that a cable system is not a
broadcasting firm. Furthermore, to date, both the courts and Con-
gress have deferred to the FCC's regulatory judgment on this
issue.287
The meeting ended with the Commerce representatives indicating that they
would take their notes on the information discussed back to their director
for his review and consideration.
Directly following the meeting, the FCC Bureau Chief sent his own
letter of further clarification of FCC objections and a summary of the
meeting held, to the Director of the Office of Policy Development and
Coordination at the Department of Commerce. The meeting was a major
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benchmark in the GCG-EDA struggle. The Department of Commerce, by sending
representatives to meet with FCC officials, were generally acknowledging
that there might be something amiss with the way EDA was handling the GCG
project. In effect, this meeting, as well as numerous other meetings held
between OMBE and EDA and other government agencies, were clear testimony
that the existence of the Task Force, the interagency agreement, and
OMBE/CRC political maneuvers were making a difference. Under normal cir-
cumstances, without such high visibility, outside agency interest, poli-
tical spectators, and general publicity, the GCG project would probably
have died a quick insignificant death behind closed doors.
Instead, career bureaucrats, department chieftans, and top-level
administrative officials alike were being summoned repeatedly to confer-
ences and meetings to be held accountable for their actions, non-actions
(i.e., lack of responsiveness or equity in handling the project), and dis-
jointed program activity. Furthermore, a public "stop watch" had been
placed on EDA's total responsiveness to the GCG situation by all the
outside attention generated by the existence of an interagency agreement
and Task Force to resolve just such problems.
EDA's misinterpretations of White House and FCC policy and dis-
jointed program activity were being scrutinized not just by offices and
agencies with the Department of Commerce (e.g., OMBE, Commerce's office
of Policy Development and Coordination, etc.), but by outside agencies,
independent commissions (i.e., FCC), political officials, and public
interest organizations. Also, the inconsistencies and contradictions
between EDA policy stances and actual past practice were being brought to
light in the public press and being made known to political officials at
all levels of government. It cannot be denied that the pressure for
responsiveness was significant. In fact, the original pressure for
responsiveness generated by the existence of the Task Force alone was
great enough to force EDA to risk coming up with contrived cable policy
that would prove to be inconsistent with their past record, in conflict
with FCC policy, and incongruent with the general trend of national policy
and agency support of cable.
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Policy Issue Relaxed
Slowly and very informally, EDA's hard line on policy regarding
the funding of cable TV projects began to ease after the meeting between
Commerce representatives and FCC officials. However, no formal statement
actually rescinding the bulletin was issued. Instead, by May of 1976, it
appeared that under the mounting pressure from political inquiries, wide-
spread publicity and FCC objections, EDA had begun to relax its policy
arguments against cable and its insistence that cable TV systems
constituted "broadcasting firms."
This fact is generally recorded in a July 12, 1976 letter from the
FCC Cable TV Bureau Chief to the Associate Administrator for Finance and
Investment of SBA. The Cable TV Bureau Chief states:
This Bureau has had a number of conversations with officials of the
SBA and the Economic Development Administration of the Department of
Commerce to assist in developing a uniform understanding of federal
regulation of cable television, particularly in the area of cable-
casting or program originations. As a result, it appears that the EDA
has permitted to lapse its Bulletin No. 3-76, which declared that
cable systems with 3,500 or more subscribers were ineligible for EDA
business development assistance because FCC rules required such sys-
tems to have the capability of originating prcgrams. The EDA no
longer regards cable systems as "broadcasting firms, an ineligible
loan class."'b
The existence of the Task Force provided the legitimatized con-
text needed to stimulate political inquiries, activate press interest,
and foster FCC intervention on behalf of GCG. In fact, the successful
mobilization by the Task Force of these indirect pressures on EDA ulti-
mately resulted in EDA's business development staft shifting their major
arguments against the GCG project to focus on the number of jobs created
by the project and the viability of GCG's financial arrangements for debt
deferral and an equity partnership. These arguments against the GCG
project had not been previously cited by EDA officials as being major
problem areas nor did they materialize as such until after the policy
objections against the project had been dropped. The validity of this
fact is born out by the reality that "the financial viability of the GCG
package had already been substantiated by two independent feasibility
studies, one by CRC and an outside cable consulting group, Cable Communi-
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cations Consultants."2 8 9 Furthermore, two private sector parties exper-
ienced in the cable industry had consented to invest $500,000 with no
guarantees. These basic points were made in a January 27, 1976 Summary
Memorandum on GCG funding problems with EDA which was sent to Secretary of
Commerce Elliot Richardson's office by the Task Force Secretary, Charles
Tate. The memorandum also charged that the weakness of EDA's attacks
against GCG on financial grounds is "illustrated by the fact that such
arguments were belatedly made after the other tactics employed to kill the
loan failed and by the fact that GCG has made every change in its loan
application requested by EDA."290
For example, on January 26, 1976, the president of GCG sent a
mailgram to then President Gerald Ford which outlined GCG's difficulties
in getting funding from EDA and asked for his assistance in seeing that
the project survived. For the record, Dr. William Douglas of GCG indi-
cated in the mailgram the following:
The EDA has formulated arbitrary and capricious policies in an
attempt to kill our initiative. . . .We have since August answered
all questions and submitted all information requested by EDA and each
time questions were answered or additional information was submitted
by GCG, EDA made additional demands. Recently EDA has been defining a
policy effective January 30, 1976 that excluded cable TV operators
from being eligible for EDA loans though admittedly they have no legal
basis for excluding cable TV operators from EDA business development
assistance. This negative position has been taken by EDA despite the
viability of GCG proposals being attested by GCG ability to attract
with no guarantee $500,000 in private sector capital as a part of our
proposals. We have Mr. President invested in America and in our
community. Our 40 shareholders have invested over $150,000 and made
additional personal loans to GCG of over $50,000. In addition, our
11 member board of directors have made personal guarantees far beyond
their ability to pay. We believe in GCG and its capability of acting
as a catalyst for developing our community and that our success can
become a symbol to others who have a concern for developing their
community. . .291
Copies of the mailgram were sent to: Secretary Elliott Richardson,
Senator Hartke, Senator Bayh, Senator Brooks, Congressman Madden,
Congressional Balck Caucus, Alex Armendaris (Director of OMBE), Mr. J.
Calhoun, Mayor Richard G. Hatcher, Governor Bowen, Mr. Don Wilkes, and
Barbara Williams.
Essentially, EDA loan officials began basing all their discus-
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sions against the GCG project on the grounds that it would create only a
limited number of jobs and that their financial arrangements with other
entities (e.g., equity partnership) were very tenuous and might fall
through.
Task Force Requests Intervention by Secretary of Commerce
During the last weeks of May of 1976, CRC staff, as recording
secretary for the Task Force, developed a detailed information package on
the history of the problems of trying to get EDA to fund the GCG project.
The package included: a copy of the Task Force agreement; an historical
overview; letters from the FCC to EDA; interagency memoranda exchanged
between OMBE and EDA; and a summary of the major inconsistencies and
contradictions embodied in EDA's disjointed program actions. The pack-
age, with a cover letter from Charles Stein as Task Force Chairman and
OMBE official, was delivered to the Secretary of Commerce, Elliot
Richardson. While the package was still under review by Secretary
Richardson's office, GCG's president persuaded the mayor, the City Coun-
cil president, Chamber of Commerce president, and several other local
public officials in Gary, Indiana to call Richardson's office to express
their support of the project and to inquire when the Secretary might be
finished reviewing it. This was another tactic to keep the pressure for
responsiveness on EDA, by demonstrating the range of outside observers
already aligned to hold EDA accountable for its actions.
The key leverage GCG's president used to gain the support of these
officials was the existence of a Task Force and an agreement whose found-
ing principles of support and assistance to cable TV groups were being
"maliciously and carelessly violated by Washington EDA bureaucrats."
2 9 2
The significance of GCG's battle with EDA was well known to these offi-
cials because of the major articles in the local press on the situation.
Furthermore, Dr. Douglas, a well respected Gary businessman, had provided
the mayor and other local officials with detailed briefing kits on the GCG
project which contained copies of these articles as well as an outline of
all the major problems GCG had confronted. The most compelling motivation
for their intervention and concern was the fact that the GCG project
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represented a major economic business development opportunity for Gary
and its people. The GCG project offered a chance for a major communica-
tions medium to be locally owned and controlled by minority businessmen
which could provide a needed community service, create jobs, and overall
improve Gary's tax base in the future.
By the first week of June, Secretary Richardson had come to a
decision. The Secretary of Commerce made a formal commitment to the
president of GCG, that a full re-evaluation of his project application,
taking into account the latest available information, would be undertaken
by EDA. GCG, OMBE, and CRC were all delighted that some new life had
finally been breathed into the GCG project.
Immediately, GCG's president and CRC's staff began to work fever-
ously to submit a revised application package. Mainly, GCG accountants
and CRC financial analysts had to develop updated financial projections
based on GCG's current operating status. During the second week of June
of 1976, GCG submitted to EDA a revised application package. From
June 15-June 22, 1976, EDA re-examined the GCG application as instructed
by Secretary Richardson's office. Then, on July 19, 1976, John W. Eden,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Development, forwarded a letter
to GCG revealing their findings.
Final Decision Rendered
Essentially, the EDA re-examination of the GCG project asserted
that GCG, as a company, was insolvent. The letter sent to GCG indicated
that basically EDA didn't have faith in GCG's ability to overcome its
financial liabilities with the help of an EDA loan. Primarily, EDA appli-
cation review officials had objections or reservations about GCG's over-
all financial plan; debt to equity ratio; future revenue estimates;
piggy-back financial contracts with other entities; and suggested debt
deferral arrangements with major creditors. Throughout the review of the
GCG package, EDA's John W. Eden (Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic
Development) always posed negative scenarios in predicting or hypothe-
sizing that if certain things went wrong (i.e., contracts or financial
arrangements with other entities fell through or creditors refused to
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accept deferral arrangements, etc.), then GCG would not be able to survive
as a business.2 9 3
In its analysis, EDA sidestepped the reality that their funding
approval to the GCG project was the main triggering mechanism which would
have basically guaranteed or assured that all other piggy-back financial
arrangements would go through. In summary, John W. Eden informed GCG:
I have no alternative but to conclude that a loan investment by the
Government in GCG would not only violate EDA's statutory require-
ments, but constitute a wholly imprudent use of taxpayer's dollars.
Secretary Richardson has been informed of this decision. Both of us
were highly aware of the hopes that you and your associates had placed
on this transaction and deeply regret that EDA cannot favorably re-
consider your loan request.2 9 4
It is ironic that the GCG deal was turned down mainly on financial
grounds (i.e., insolvency, tenuous or complex financial arrangements,
etc.), when it is realized that these financial conditions had been
exacerbated by the long battle to persuade certain EDA bureaucrats to
reconsider the project on its general merits, without reference to con-
trived First Amendment and cable policy objections. Quite obviously, as
the operating capacity and financial vitality of GCG's cable business
deteriorated with each funding delay, the overall attractiveness of the
original financial arrangements suffered. An earlier memorandum (January
27, 1976) from Task Force chairman Charles Stein to Commerce Secretary
Elliot Richardson chronicles the bureaucratic resistance that drained the
limited resources (e.g., funds, time, manpower, etc.) of GCG during their
efforts to secure EDA loan funds. Under the heading Unconscionable Treat-
ment by EDA, the memorandum indicated that:
Certain EDA employees had made every effort to kill the EDA loan; by
using delaying tactics; by making numerous separate requests for spe-
cious information; and by trying to create legal and policy obstacles
without foundation. These tactics have taken place in spite of the
fact: that it is the written policy according to a signed interagency
Task Force agreement to support cable projects; that EDA approved
GCG's cable loan eligibility in August in the preliminary loan appli-
cation process; and, that EDA authorized a letter of intent to make
the GCG loan in October. These tactics have caused GCG to make many
trips to Washington and required 9 trips by GCG representatives and
consultants to EDA offices both in Chicago and Gary, and over 400 GCG
man hours to be used in the loan application process.2 9 5
Under the heading Policy Problems, the memorandum indicated that the main
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attempt by EDA:
. . .to kill the Gary loan came in the form of a policy memorandum
stating, that EDA loans will not be made to cable systems, because of
certain FCC rule requirements. The FCC has informed EDA that EDA has
misinterpreted the FCC rules and has based the misinterpretation upon
an erroneous definition.2 9b
Finally, under the heading Financial Problems the memorandum recorded the
following:
EDA employees had made the contention that the loan may be financially
weak, in spite of the fact that two private sector parties experienced
in the cable industry, would be concurrently investing $500,000 with
no guarantees. The weakness of the financial attack against the GCG
project is illustrated by the fact that GCG has made every change in
its loan application requested by EDA. Furthermore, two independent
feasibility studies by outside investors and CRC have indicated that
the Gary package is viable.2 9 7
The outside investors' feasibility study was carried out by Martin Smith,
president of Cable Communications Consultants. Mr. Smith had previously
been a partner in a well known and highly respected cable consulting firm,
Malarkey, Taylor and Associates and had 15 years experience in the cable
industry.
Victories Achieved
Using the Task Force and its agreement, Bill Douglas (GCG),
Charles Stein (OMBE) , and Charles Tate (CRC) had won a host of small
battles over disjointed policy, fragmented program activities, and
bureaucratic resistance within agency field offices by giving high visi-
bility to these problems; challenging inequities publicly; marshalling
outside political and public agency interest; holding high administrative
officials, and career bureaucrats accountable for their actions; pres-
suring for alacrity in application review; and the right to know all rules
for evaluation clearly in advance.
Clear indications of some of the battles won in marshalling out-
side support (i.e., politicians' interest, FCC involvement, Secretary
Elliot Richardson's intervention, etc.) and wider public scrutiny (i.e.,
community group participation/observation, public awareness via newspaper
coverage, public interest group process evaluations, etc.) by virtue of
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the existence of the Task Force can be drawn from the high volume of
special meetings and memorandums of correspondence generated by Task
Force representatives and supporters to influence EDA officials. For
example, a strongly worded memorandum dated January 30, 1976, from
Charles Stein to Walter Sorg, Assistant Director for National programs
for the Department of Commerce, outlined some of EDA's "negative steps"
taken against the GCG project and charged that EDA had been actively
undermining and subverting OMBE efforts and general Administration policy
in support of cable TV in general and the GCG project in particular.
Specifically, the memo recorded the following:
With respect to policy, EDA Counsel, urged by OMBE Counsel, verbally
admitted that there is no legal bar to federal funding support.
Despite this finding it appears that EDA is attempting to push its
negative policy upon SBA and possibly other funding agencies.
Attached is a copy of the EDA policy bulletin together with a strong
letter from the FCC stating that the EDA policy is unsound and incon-
sistent with national policy and requesting rescission of the Bulle-
tin. In addition, Congressman Madden, Chairman of the House Rules
Committee, has interposed vigorous objections to the EDA policy.
These objections have been ignored or overruled by EDA.
With respect to the specific application for funding support of
the Gary Communications Group, which was submitted to EDA months
before the formulation of the new policy, EDA has raised, one after
another, a series of technical objections. One by one these have been
met through the efforts of the Cablecommunications Resource Center
(CRC). The policy bulletin was the last of the negative efforts.
During this lengthy, frustrating, and costly process, individuals in
EDA have contacted potential private investors and creditors to point
out to them the financial risks of this enterprise and have encouraged
them to withdraw their support.
OMBE General Counsel, working with CRC and me, is currently
drafting a proposed Departmental Policy Statement for Secretary
Richardson's signature which supports the national policy and under
which all Commerce Agencies are directed to support the minority
cable TV effort.
Whether this policy effort, desirable and necessary as it may be
will be accomplished in sufficient time to save the Gary Communica-
tions Group is doubtful. The private investors and creditors have
been very patient, but it is unlikely they can be put off much longer.
You will recall that Gary was the first of the OMBE-supported
systems to go on the air. We have publicized this system and held it
up as a shining example to both potential investors and potential new
cable towns and minority entrepreneurs. If it fails, through inade-
quate funding, it will unquestionably result in deleterious reaction
to further cable development, the OMBE program, and minority enter-
prise as a whole.
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I most urgently and sincerely solicit your active support and
that of the Director of OMBE to bring to bear whatever influence is
possible to ensure a speedy resolution of this most serious
problem.298
Most battles with EDA were won with the help of the "power base"
or leverage created by the existence of a Task Force formed to alleviate
bureaucratic problems and a signed interagency agreement, mandating agen-
cies to support cable TV development. However, the Task Force and its
companion agreement, in and of themselves, did not spawn automatic or
lasting forthright action by certain career bureaucrats to expedite pro-
jects under their review. Instead, the real leverage significance of the
Task Force and the agreement was embodied in the fact that they provided a
legitimatized opportunity and arena for disadvantaged groups like GCG and
their supporters (CRC) to have a "public voice" (as defined by Albert 0.
Hirschman in Exit, Voice and Loyalty) over bureaucratic snafus and conse-
quently a more substantive role in the implementation process.
Collectively, these two mechanisms provided a sanctioned forum or
environment in which public groups could air their grievances against
bureaucratic impediments, a formal platform or mandate upon which to base
arguments for greater responsiveness, and a legitimized context for mar-
shalling outside support (i.e., press coverage, political intervention,
etc.) when due process in ameliorating bureaucratic problems was not
forthcoming from the agencies. The Task Force approach to accessing
funding for GCG from EDA was innovative, energetic, and valiant, unfor-
tunately, the final outcome of the experience remains consistent with
much of EDA's past history (e.g., Implementation, Pressman and Wildowsky)
of being unresponsive to disadvantaged groups like minorities and the
real rural poor who are often not perceived as being part of "their" real
constituency. Such disadvantaged groups are often overlooked by agencies
when they are perceived to be "powerless"--i.e., they do not have
sufficient political clout to demand to be catered to as a constituent,
nor do they have the limitless time, funds, or expertise needed to
outmaneuver career bureaucrats, who for various reasons (i.e., either
personal or political) might set themselves against projects, as
demonstrated in the GCG case study.
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GCG/EDA Experience Postscript
The July 19, 1976 turndown letter sent to GCG was labeled a final
decision on the project, but Bill Douglas and his supporters (i.e.,
Charles Stein, Charles Tate, etc.) still mustered a number of follow-up
letters, calls, and meetings in an attempt to overturn EDA's final deci-
sion. But all these efforts were to no avail, the GCG project was dead.
The Task Force went on and attempted to proceed with its cable TV develop-
ment agenda using its experience with EDA to guide its subsequent attempts
to finance other projects more successfully. Mainly, CRC staff worked to
develop and cultivate more inside career bureaucrats as "friends" of
their developed processes before they applied for funds.
However, after the GCG/EDA project had fallen through and all the
political pushing and hauling had subsided, not much momentum was left to
the Task Force. The unsuccessful outcome of the GCG project had signifi-
cantly depleted CRC's stock of political capital and diminished its power
image along with the Task Force's reputation. Consequently, CRC's
leadership decided it needed time to recoup and rethink its future
strategies. During the "cooling off period" no major opportunity to
promote or save any particular projects materialized or was launched by
CRC. This was largely because most of CRC's other clients were still
embroiled in preliminary attempts at organizing local investors and win-
ning cable TV franchises. Then a major setback crippled Task Force
activity even more. Charles Stein, the coordinator of the Task Force and
CRC's strongest supporter retired from his job with OMBE. His retirement,
although not forced per se, appeared to be an after-result of a new
administration's changes in the organization of OMBE. Charles Stein's
retirement left the Task Force and CRC without a strong inside supporter
of cable TV among the Task Force agencies.
It was several months before a new official inside OMBE took over
the role of Task Force coordinator. By this time, most of the involvement
and interest among the participating Task Force agencies had been lost.
Simultaneously, CRC's staff was losing many of their political contacts
and friends inside various government agencies (e.g., FCC, SBA, FmHA,
OTP, etc.) because of changes being brought about by a new administraton.
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Attempts were made to reconstitute the Task Force with other new represen-
tatives along with the new OMBE coordinator, but it was like starting from
the beginning. It was hard to capture the attention and commitment of a
entirely different group of people.
CRC also began to experience during this time some cut backs in
their program funds. In the midst of this turmoil, CRC's staff became
reluctant to try to convince any new clients to risk sailing off to battle
the odds of getting funding from any government program until basic policy
grey areas over public funding of cable TV were cleared up. No other
major projects would be promoted through the Task Force process again.
For all practical purposes the Task Force as an operating mechanism was
defunct. The Task Force continued to exist, but in name only. No major
meetings concerning the funding of any specific projects would be held.
Instead, CRC's staff focused their efforts on working with the FCC, poli-
ticians, and White House telecommunications policy groups to change pub-
lic agencies' policies that inhibited the funding of cable TV or other
communication ventures. The staff of CRC also lobbied to have specific
capital pools or special programs within agencies set up just for funding
cable TV and other communication properties.
A major indication of the accumulated impact of CRC's numerous
behind-the-scenes policy and program struggles with various federal agen-
cies on the behalf of disadvantaged groups occurred in 1978. CRC's
significant Task Force efforts were rewarded when on January 31, 1978, the
Office of the White House Press Secretary announced that:
To ease initial financing problems, the SBA and the EDA have announced
rule changes to extend their loan and loan guarantee programs to
broadcast and cable facilities. The SBA program will extend direct
loans of up to $350,000 and guarantee loans up to $500,000 to dis-
advantaged persons (individuals or groups) wishing to buy cable and
broadcast properties. The EDA will extend its loan program to broad-
casting and cable consistent with its job-ratio requirement of creat-
ing one direct job for every $10,000 expended and/or where EDA has
invested considerable resources in a community's development. Both
agencies intend minorities to be the major beneficiaries of their
rule changes.29 9
This announcement seemed to indicate that some of the policy
barriers blocking future funding of cable TV projects were being removed
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and that the basic First Amendment confusion and bureaucratic resistance
over the acceptance of cable TV as a fundable venture by government
programs was resolved. Quite significantly, this major breakthrough
eliminated the ability of public agencies and malcontent career bureau-
crats to impede cable TV projects based on any contrived policy grounds or
misinterpretations of the First Amendment.
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This case study of the National Rural Cable Development Task
Force's operation points out just how inescapable and complex a problem
interagency coordination is within the public program implementation pro-
cess. This reality becomes especially clear when one observes within this
case study the continued disjointed, inconsistent and conflicting project
application review and approval processes carried out by career bureau-
crats at various levels (i.e., local, state, federal) of public agencies
involved in a coordinative process established to avoid such problems.
Furthermore, it illustrates that the "implementation problem" can be
understood in its most basic sense as a control problem. That is, how to
convince bureaucrats, their federal agencies, and component parts to act
in a desired manner at the right time, when achieving this purpose is
precisely what one cannot do under normal circumstances.
It is observable in this case study and in other instances (e.g.,
The Implementation Game by Bardach and Implementation by Pressman and
Wildavsky) that all parties in the implementation process are involved,
in some degree, both in trying to control others and in trying to avoid
being controlled by them.300 This is a reality which is clearly embodied
in Anthony Down's Law of Counter Control which states: "the greater the
effort made by a sovereign or top-level official to control the behavior
of subordinate officials, the greater the efforts made by those subordi-
nates to evade or counteract such control.,301 A corollary to this law
based on the Task Force experience just chronicled might be: the greater
the effort made by public advocacy organizations or external groups to
control the behavior of public officials, the greater the efforts made by
career bureaucrats to evade or counteract such control. The significance
of this corollary is born of the reality that the Task Force coordination
process in this case study was conceived and developed by the initiators
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(i.e., OMBE and CRC--a public advocacy/technical assistance organization)
basically as a leverage mechanism for achieving some degree of greater
control over the actions of bureaucrats and the services they disperse, to
assure the receipt of such benefits by disadvantaged groups. The theme of
coordination, although a real issue or need in and of itself, was in
actuality a means to an end in allowing disadvantaged groups to gain
greater control and power over the service delivery process.
The Task Force coordination process was seen as a way to deal more
comprehensively with several of the interrelated problem areas that often
retard public service delivery to disadvantaged groups. It has been noted
by James Q. Wilson and others that there is not one bureaucracy problem
but a series of interacting inadequacies which independently and collec-
tively inhibit public service delivery.302 Among the problem areas, the
Task Force attempted to confront and resolve were the major issues of:
accountability or control; inadequate resource allocation; fragmented and
disjointed program activity, and responsiveness.
The main overall problem that the Task Force attempted to come to
grips with was accountability or control. That is how to persuade or
convince the bureaucracy to serve certain agreed upon goals that would
benefit disadvantaged groups that traditionally lack the power to hold
agencies accountable for their actions. The Task Force mechanism at-
tempted to achieve greater accountability or control in several ways.
First of all it was felt that by allowing public or disadvantaged groups
to become more directly involved in the preliminary decision making and
implementation process of programs, through active participation and mem-
bership on an interagency Task Force, that some degree of greater respon-
siveness to addressing public needs would be developed by the agencies
involved. Some early gains were registered through public group partici-
pation at Task Force meetings, Federal agency representatives were im-
pressed with the degree and the caliber of public participation at Task
Force meetings. This happened mainly because most bureaucrats usually
only had to deal with such public groups in the abstract, as just faceless
names on project applications that they routinely shuffle back and forth
or as vague numbers on reporting forms indicating how many people will be
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served by a proposed project. Thus, the face-to-face contact and group
interaction established at the early Task Force meetings helped to de-
velop a greater degree of awareness, and respect by agency officials for
the needs of the public groups participating. The successful promotion of
awareness and appreciation among the public agencies for the collective
needs of the public groups laid the goundwork for the establishment of the
Task Force and the development of an interagency agreement.
Over time, however, the participation of community groups at ma-
jor Task Force meetings began to diminish. This was caused first by an
inability to call meetings on a regular enough basis so that public groups
could develop a real rapport with agency representatives, that would help
facilitate easier processing of project requests. Later, some groups
found it difficult to rearrange their schedules and to bear the travel
cost to attend the ad hoc meetings held to handle special problems. CRC's
staff had hoped to get the Task Force agencies to somehow provide commu-
nity groups with travel funds to attend meetings, but this never material-
ized because each agency maintained they had no special funds available to
meet this need.
CRC staff also discovered it was difficult to get agencies to send
on a continuing basis their top level officials to such meetings. Sar A.
Levitan has suggested in his writings on interagency coordination that
agencies often commit individuals to "Task Force" efforts more in terms of
their availability then their ability or power to assist in the process at
hand.303 At one point, CRC's directors reasoned that perhaps because it
was difficult to get major administrators to commit their time to the Task
Force effort that this indicated a lack of real commitment which ulti-
mately reduced the effectiveness of the overall process.304 In retro-
spect, perhaps what was really lacking was ongoing participation by some
of the critical lower level bureaucrats who actually had to review and
sign-off on projects submitted to the various government agencies. Much
of the literature dealing with public administration suggests that imple-
mentation processes often fail because career civil servants or low level
bureaucrats were not given a stake in the issue. But perhaps this general
analysis doesn't go far enough at least based on the GCG experience. It
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might be more precise to state that implementation processes often fail
because career civil servants or low level bureaucrats when not posi-
tively motivated to support a particular process are prone to activate
their own personal or political agendas that very often run counter to the
successful execution of the implementation process at hand.
Originally CRC leadership theorized that with the general approv-
al from agency chief administrators and the formal substance of a written
Task Force agreement, projects would be automatically bulldozed through
bureaucratic roadblocks. This automatic power to get things accomplished
based on the general approval of high level agency officials did not
materialize, however. Key agency project review officers tended to pay
only "lip service" to the Task Force mandated goal of expediting cable TV
projects while in reality they either directly contributed to or allowed
through benign neglect cable TV projects to become mired in First Amend-
ment disputes, bogged down in eligibility controversies, and submerged in
a confusion of policy conflicts. However, in both the SBA and EDA cases,
outside political pressure was able to be mobilized against these agen-
cies based on their reneging on the signed interagency agreement, and the
failure of agency officials to follow through on the Task Force mandate to
be responsive in expediting cable TV projects. Although the existence of
the Task Force and signed agreement did not automatically motivate the
total responsiveness desired, these mechanisms were instrumental in cre-
ating a "fish bowl effect" where agency transgressions in defiance of the
Task Force mandate and signed agreement became significant enough to be
publically scrutinized and denounced by outside political officials.
CRC's staff had also envisioned that by establishing a communica-
tions process from the top-down, which would let everyone who needed to be
involved in the implementation process know what the goals and priorities
were, field office bureaucrats would be less likely to respond negatively
to the projects submitted to them. In addition to interagency memorandums
on the Task Force, generated by the agencies themselves, CRC, on its own,
engineered various methods to asssure that information about the Task
Force and its goals was disseminated to the various participating
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federal, state, and local offices. For example, information kits on the
Rural Cable TV Development Program were sent to all major offices of the
participating agencies. Also, follow-up phone calls and discussion meet-
ings were held as soon as projects could be identified for consideration
by field office officials. Although these communication techniques were
effective in publicizing the existence and the significance of the pro-
gram to agency officials, this basic dissemination of information did not
in and of itself trigger the immediate responsiveness that had been antic-
ipated. Overall, neither the general approval of the cable program by
top-level agency officials nor the comprehensive communication of the
priority status of this program to lower level officials provided suffi-
cient impetus among these career bureaucrats to arrest bureaucratic
resistance or discourage bureaucratic snafus.
Nevertheless, in the SBA case, the existence of the Task Force and
a signed interagency agreement as formal mechanisms for intergovernmental
coordination was significant in confronting the bureaucratic problems
encountered. Largely the existence of these mechanisms stimulated and
improved the circumstances surrounding the favorable reconsideration of
the Eddie Pena application by: attaching a higher level of importance to
the project as being part of a larger program effort; establishing a
rationale and control mechanism (i.e., Task Force) for evaluating agency
performance; creating a greater need for the SBA field office to explain
its actions; stimulating outside attention by political officials and
agency higher-ups. Most specifically, these coordination mechanisms were
valuable in the SBA case in supplying Eddie Pena's group with firm ground
for involving outside political officials in reviewing SBA's misdeeds and
thereby indirectly pressuring SBA higher-ups to more closely scrutinize
the actions of their field office.
The interest shown by outside political officials helped to com-
municate to SBA officials that this was not any ordinary, obscure, or
insignificant community project that when turned down nobody would know,
care, or raise a fuss about. Hence, this outside political pressure
created an increased degree of accountability among SBA bureaucrats for
the disjointed behavior that they had displayed. Generally, the
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existence of the Task Force and the signed agreement provided an approved
context for identifying and publicizing bureaucratic snafus and a process
for revealing and giving names to the usually faceless, and nameless
career civil servants, who are too often allowed to cloak their actions
behind a veil of anonymity. The SBA/Eddie Pena case was successful in
demonstrating that some degree of control could be exerted over the arbi-
trary and capricious way bureaucrats often dealt with disadvantaged
groups.
Overall the Task Force was viewed by CRC's staff as creating a
tribunal or board of review to which it was ultimately possible for
publics to "voice" complaints about bureaucratic malfunctions, appeal for
assistance in rectifying unfair decisions, and generally attempt to amel-
iorate the bureaucratic problems confronting groups inside their respec-
tive agencies. It was hoped that through peer or group pressure, more
control could be exerted over bureaucratic actions and that the mere
presence of such a Task Force mandated to trouble shoot such problems
would tend to help to discourage some problem situations such as dis-
jointed policy action and resistant behavior by agency field officials
from even happening at all; especially if it was widely communicated that
agency administrators supported the program and that the Task Force would
immediately get involved in resolving problems whenever they material-
ized.
It was also assumed that OMBE as the lead agency would have been
able to exert some control or guiding influence over the other agencies
when problems arose by placing pressure on them to expeditiously solve the
issue at hand. Unfortunately, this turned out not to be the case. OMBE's
representative, (Charles Stein) had neither the control over the flow of
program resources to participating agencies nor the direct political
power necessary to operate the Task Force effectively through promising
rewards or threatening sanctions.
Quite to the point, an Advisory Commision on Intergovernmental
Relations' document titled State-Involvement In Federal-Local Grant Pro-
grams has captured the basic dilemma faced by OMBE, within a discussion of
major problems related to interagency coordination:
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. . .unclear lines of formal authority and responsibility, ineffec-
tive communication channels, a breakdown of informal organization,
disinterest on the part of program officials, and inadequate work
procedures often result in a fragmentation of intergovernmental
efforts to adjust to interagency relationships affecting federal,
state, and local activities in certain grant-aided program areas.
This situation often occurs when a lead agency among some interagency
group structure (i.e., task force, interagency council, etc.) has an
administrative supervisory but not direct financial control or impact
over other agencies program resources (e.g., funds, manpower, facili-
ties, etc.). In some instances, even where such formal mechanisms as
interdepartmental committees exist, the lead agency responsible for
the administation or supervision of a program lacks the leverage
necessary to coordinate effectively the efforts of other agencies.$Ut
Despite these realities, CRC was able to capitalize off of the
basic existence of the Task Force and the signed interagency agreement in
the SBA case as noted earlier. In the EDA/GCG case, however, the situa-
tion was much more complex and success much more elusive. There was a
great deal of outside political scrutiny, news publicity, and public
attention cast on the people, policies, and bureaucratic actions that
hindered and delayed the GCG project. Unfortunately, the major bureau-
cratic resistance encountered was not centered in a field office or on a
single issue as in the SBA case, but instead involved a number of higher-
up career civil servants (located in EDA's national bureau in Washington,
D.C.) challenging the GCG project on a number of different and constantly
changing issues. Many of the major problems in the GCG case stemmed from
the miscue that CRC's staff received from one of EDA's chief administra-
tors who signed the interagency agreement and voiced strong support of the
project. For unbeknownst to CRC and GCG, Jeff Cahill was a lame duck
administrator. A reality which did not reveal itself until after the GCG
project was already bogged down in confusion and controversy. Jeff Cahill
as a lame duck administrator had almost no real power at his disposal to
neutralize, penalize, or control the actions of lower level bureaucrats
inside his agency who were opposed to the GCG project. Without the threat
of any formal sanction or punitive action from above (e.g., such as being
shipped out to some remote outpost) the Washington EDA bureaucrats felt
politically insulated against any real outside political pressure. This
was not a small isolated field office resisting control, this was the top
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stratum of Washington based career civil servants flexing their bureau-
cratic muscles to show their disdain for a lame duck chief administrator
who they viewed as an adversary; and for the attempts being made to
influence and control their actions from outside the agency based on a
Task Force agreement that this same chief administrator had signed.
Much of the literature on the nature, formation, and maintenance
of relations within organizations suggests that organizations like indi-
viduals are not generally prone to coordinate for coordination's sake or
predisposed to abide by external controls without some resistance.
Instead, Alvin Gouldner ("Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory,"
Symposium on Sociological Theory, 1959), and others, have suggested that
there exists a dynamic tension within organizations and among bureaucrats
that tends to make them strain to maintain their autonomy and resist
coordination or any form of control.306 All agencies, and individuals as
well it seems, value their autonomy or capacity for choosing their own
course of action they desire to pursue. Andrew Van De Ven, in his work on
organizational behavior, has noted that from an agency's point of view, to
become involved in a coordination process implies:
. . .(a) that it loses some of its freedom to act independently, when
it would prefer to maintain control over its domain and affairs, and
(b) that it must invest scarce resources and energy to develop and
maintain relationships with other organizations, when the potential
returns on this investment are often unclear or intangible. 3 0 7
For these reasons career bureaucrats within public agencies often prefer
not to become involved in coordinating their activities or adjusting to
external directives (e.g., prioritizing projects) unless they are com-
pelled to do so.
The second main problem area that the Task Force effort sought to
deal with was the problem of inadequate resource allocation to individual
programs. The most frequent complaint heard from social program agencies
is that they are woefully underfunded and understaffed to do all the
things they are intended to do. The public often then suffers because
they are told there aren't enough resources to meet their needs. Further-
more, it has become increasingly clear that all too often most social
problems are far too complex for any one agency to solve by itself given
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its individually limited resources (i.e., money, physical facilities,
materials, etc.) and expertise (i.e., technical staff services, adminis-
trative knowhow in a given area, organizational contacts, etc.) .3 0 8
Thus, a major goal of the coordinative Task Force mechanism was to end
this artificial scarcity of resources by getting agencies to pool their
collective resources in a resource leveraging or sharing approach. It was
reasoned that through coordination or the establishment of interorganiza-
tional relationships, certain large scale program goals could be attained
that might be unachievable by organizations independently. The basic
concept of this idea worked very successfully. CRC as an organization
funded by OMBE, Department of Commerce, had the mandate and technical
expertise to organize and give business development assistance to groups
interested in cable TV, but had no ready funds at their disposal to help
groups finance the actual building of cable TV systems. On the other hand
various agencies like FmHA, SBA, and EDA had programs available to assist
economic development in new business areas, but had no aggressive out-
reach development program to organize and assist their client populations
in taking advantage of new cable TV market opportunities. Finally, there
were local community development organizations that had knowledge of
local businessmen in various "cable-ready" communities who could be
organized into cable development groups. These CDOs also had the estab-
lished local creditability needed to promote the general acceptance of
the cable TV development idea and "outside" technical assistance. Basi-
cally, the local organizations had the ability to finesse the entry of CRC
into the various communities selected as "cable-ready."
In general, the resource leveraging concept worked well as a
device for getting these various groups and agencies to mobilize
themselves toward using their individually unique resources (i.e.,
expertise, funds, contacts, etc.) to support cable TV projects. For
instance, in the SBA case, the Tele-Vu project was approved and funds
committed based on the cooperative efforts of CRC staff, the Task Force
chairman, SBA Task Force representatives, and SBA Washington administra-
tors in supporting the project and making inquiries into its handling. Of
course, in the EDA instance, there developed a lack of follow through by
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headquarters' officials.
The third main problem area that the Task Force effort sought to
deal with was the issue of fragmented and disjointed program activity by
various agencies seeking similar goals. The major motivaiton for the
federal agencies in participating in the Task Force was predicated on
their realization that they were a group of public programs that focused
on similar problem areas and client groups, yet there existed a hodgepodge
of conflicting rules, guidelines, and qualification criteria that had to
be met by the public to access services from their program. This was one
of the basic points of enlightenment that was established by CRC at the
early organizing meetings for the Task Force effort. The coordination
process aimed for by the Task Force was a direct reaction to the dysfunc-
tional nature of the piecemeal or "cafeteria shopping" approach to find-
ing financial support for minority ventures. CRC's staff discovered
through their early cable project development experience that "trial and
error" approaches to accessing public services for disadvantaged groups
were frought with endless and repetitive tasks. Basically, CRC realized
that the qualification of fundable ventures under different and conflict-
ing program guidelines, policies, and procedures on an individual basis
was time consuming and ineffective.
The coordinative Task Force effort was thought of as one way to
create a positive "group think" process on how best to achieve certain
common goals given a collective set of resources. Mainly it was hoped
that the special communication of the Rural Cable Development Program's
priority status from top-level administrators within federal agencies
down throughout the lower levels of their organizations (i.e., state and
field offices) would ameliorate much of the fragmented and disjointed
program activity usually associated with the implementation of public
programs. Unfortunately, basic communication by chief administrators of
their support of the Rural Cable Development Program through normal or-
ganizational channels (e.g., memorandums, Task Force agreement, press
releases, etc.) was not sufficient to reduce or eliminate fragmented and
disjointed program activity. In fact in both the SBA and EDA instances,
there was a continued tendency by career bureaucrats at various
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governmental levels to challenge and "short-circuit" the funding of cable
projects based on their often vague, conflicting, and untimely interpre-
tations of agency policy, guidelines, and qualification criteria.
By untimely interpretations I mean that in both the SBA and EDA
cases project review officers tended to make known certain last minute
objections to cable projects only at the most inappropriate and inoppor-
tune times. That is to say that these project review officials usually
voiced major objections to cable projects after not before or during the
special preliminary project review conferences developed and held with
agencies to iron out such potential problem areas before final project
evaluations. Thus, there was a classic trend observed in both cases where
early indications of project approval given by one set of agency officials
to project sponsors were later contradicted or negated by the same or
other a;ency officials during the final stages of the project review
process. in general most agency bureaucrats tended to present a basic
facade of cooperation and project acceptance during early project review
periods. This occurred at times when from the point of view of most
bureaucrats, the actual funding of a project given all the bureaucratic
paperwork, processing elapse time, and required qualifying procedures
seemed to mitigate against the successful funding of the project and
ability of the group to wait out all the delays.
To quote one EDA official interviewed:
we usually never have to formally turn down a project that we
don't want to support when we can keep finding reasons to delay the
processing of a project. The GCG project was one of the only projects
I remember that we had to issue a formal turn down letter on. Nor-
mally, an applicant will become tired and frustrated over the various
delays that develop and eventually leave us alone.
3 0 9
Thus, from the bureaucrats' perspective it was unnecessary to have to
flatly turn down a project when it was first submitted as long as they
could count on the probability that the exaggerated frustrations of deal-
ing with bureaucratic "red tape," eligibility complications, policy con-
flicts, and other inordinate delays would eventually use up or drain
project supporter's limited resources (i.e., time, money, energy, pa-
tience, etc.). Also, bureaucrats were smug in the knowledge that it was
going to be easier for them to contrive ways to subvert (if need be)
191
project implementation than it was going to be for project supporters to
reckon the proper means for making the implementation process succeed.
Consequently, as projects tended to survive or overcome various bureau-
cratic hurdles, the basic cooperative nature of agencies tended to deter-
iorate into traditional bureaucratic resistance, blatant delays, and out-
right disjointed behavior.
Closely linked with the problem of fragmented and disjointed pro-
gram activity is the issue of responsiveness. Responsiveness, the final
major issue considered in my case study of coordination, deals with the
problem of inducing bureaucrats to prioritize and meet "with alacrity and
compassion, those cases which can never be brought under a single national
rule and which, by common human standards for justice or benevolence, seem
to require that an exception be made or a rule stretched."310 Basically,
this area gets to the heart of the issue of how to get the bureaucracy to
function effectively in terms of generating positive activity that
assists client groups to follow correct procedures instead of willfully
creating situations of structured failure by allowing groups to igno-
rantly violate certain set criteria or guidelines and then only informing
them of their violation after it's too late to correct the mistake.
Ultimately, this issue is related to bringing greater equity into the
service delivery process--that is, "getting bureaucrats to treat like
cases alike and on the basis of clear rules, known in advance."3 1 1
The coordination Task Force and signed interagency agreement
served as the key triggering mechanisms used to leverage outside
political pressure against the SBA and its field office when the field
office officials arbitrarily and capriciously turned down the Tele-Vu
project after first indicating that it would be approved. Essentially,
the presence of the Task Force coordinative mechanisms established both
the legitimacy of the need to overcome certain bureaucratic problems that
impede public program implementation and the right of disadvantaged popu-
lations to voice their discontent and seek resolution to the inequities
that they have encountered in the service delivery process. Thus, the
existence of the Task Force played a central role in creating an environ-
ment conducive to SBA's responsiveness in rescinding their turn down of
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the Tele-Vu project and the project's final approval.
In the EDA instance, a certain level of token responsiveness was
evident in the number of pre-application meetings Bill Douglas was
granted in Chicago and Washington. Both the quantity of meetings held and
the fact that he was able to meet with Washington EDA officials repre-
sented "special departures" from their standard operating procedures.
Also, the preliminary clearance given the GCG project, based on a brief
letter proposal, was another "special departure" or concession made to
help the project. Finally, the EDA field office's approval of the GCG
project can also be viewed as responsiveness resulting from the existence
of the Task Force. Unfortunately, unforeseen complications, which ne-
gated this approval, developed among Washington-based career bureaucrats.
These officials, for various and sundry personal reasons had become
alienated by and antagonistic toward the chief administrator who had
signed the Task Force agreement and therefore set themselves against the
GCG project to serve their own personal motives. Basically, these bureau-
crats felt they were politically immune to hierarchical pressure owing to
the lame duck status of the chief EDA administrator who had originally
signed the Task Force agreement and pledged agency support. Beside these
internal tensions, which significantly undermined the use of the full
power and influence of the Task Force process and agreement to motivate
support for the GCG project, were a number of external factors which also
detracted from the level of responsiveness that perhaps could have real-
istically been expected from EDA career bureaucrats. The fact that the
Gary project was urban instead of rural increased the malcontent among
some EDA officials that the project was not truly serving their real
constituency as they defined it and thus was not really worthy of their
full support because tangible political benefits to them were not readily
evident. EDA counsel, in a 1976 memorandum to CRC's executive director,
challenged the obligation of EDA to fund GCG because it was an urban cable
TV system not rural. Furthermore, he interpreted most of the national
policy statements offered by CRC staff in support of the GCG project as
rural orientated and not applicable to urban systems.
The fact that a political election was coming up caused many
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political officials to be very conservative and reluctant to get too
involved in controversial issues such as the GCG case. This greatly
decreased the amount of significant outside political pressure that could
have been mobilized against EDA agency officials. Consequently, career
bureaucrats cognizant of this reality were really not intimidated by the
"token political interest" given by some political officials such as
Congressman Madden's investigations into the mishandling of the GCG pro-
ject.
Another major external factor which influenced the behavior of
many politicians as well as bureaucrats was the fact that the Television
Broadcasting Industry had exerted behind-the-scenes political pressure on
FmHA's top administrators and perhaps those of several other federal
agencies not to get involved in funding cable TV projects with public
programs. This reality was made known to CRC by a public information
official with the National Rural Electrical Cooperative Association who
had been privy to several meetings between the Secretary of Agriculture,
Earl Butz, and representatives of the TV Broadcast Industry. Knowledge of
Broadcasters' strong opposition to the National Rural Development Task
Force Program, especially just before a major presidential election year,
most certainly had to have some dramatic impact on increasing the ultra-
conservativeness of many outside political officials and top level agency
administrators when asked to intervene into the GCG controversy. To risk
negative media coverage by the Broadcast Industry or worse for politi-
cians, no coverage at all just before a major election was definitely
counter to the vested interest of most people in highly political and
visible positions.
Coordination Dynamics
The actual coordinative interaction observed between agencies
during the development and operation of the National Rural Cable Develop-
ment Task Force occurred in several forms. In general it appeared that
the Task Force coordination process, as it slowly evolved, went through a
series of progressive or developmental changes leading from one form of
coordination to another over time. The different forms of coordination
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observed largely corresponded to Charles E. Lindblom's formulations on:
mutual adjustment, cooperative discussion, central coordination, and
partisan mutual adjustment.
Basically during the first meeting of the selected agencies, the
interaction between them seemed to be exemplified by mutual adjustment
behavior where no central mind or decision maker exercised any particular
group coordinating responsibility, power, or control. Instead, the main
activities involved open collaboration and negotiation among independent
agencies on solutions or approaches to common problems of business
development.312 It was a general "feeling out process" where each agency
basically sought to discover where each other agency stood in terms of
operational problems experienced and the coordinative approach proposed.
The second meeting of the agencies had a more focused agenda in
terms of drafting an interagency agreement which would specify the nature
of agency commitment to the proposed Task Force effort. In general, the
activity displayed at this meeting seemed to reflect Lindblom's coopera-
tive discussion form of coordination. During this phase of coordination
development there occurred cooperative discussion or constructive dia-
logue among decision makers, and the group as a whole played the role as
the central regulator. Meaning that mainly there was a periodic shifting
of responsibility from one agency to another in attempting to reach con-
sensus on a general plan or program approach agreeable to all partici-
pants. Also, during this phase of coordination, the agency representa-
tives began to reach substantial agreement in supporting the program by
consenting to fulfill certain responsibilities (e.g., informing the other
levels of their agency's bureaucracy about the program and signing a Task
Force agreement). Overall the participating agencies cooperated rather
than bargained with each other in deciding about Task Force implementa-
tion details.3 1 3
Generally, the agency participants at the second meeting demon-
strated basic agreement on common values and purposes and a desire to
maintain that agreement over time. All of these observed behaviors are in
keeping with Lindblom's definition of behavior during cooperative
discussion.314 It has been noted earlier that cooperative discussion as a
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form of coordination is often typified by a "Task Force" approach to
coordination and this, of course, was exactly what was being aimed for in
the early meetings as personified by the name given to the interagency
effort-National Rural Cable Development Task Force.
During the development of the coordination effort between these
agencies, CRC's staff arranged for FmHA's Royce Jones to suggest that the
Task Force should have some sort of "coordinating secretary" or "lead
agency" to convene and preside over meetings. OMBE was designated to play
this role. OMBE's acceptance of this role represented CRC's attempt to
guide the Task Force into a central coordination form of operation where
individual decision makers would adapt to one another based on instruc-
tions from a central regulating authority or "lead agency."315 Central
coordination represented the general "ideal type" of coordination that
CRC's executive director and OMBE's Charles Stein hoped to create in terms
of effectively carrying out the National Rural Cable TV Development Pro-
gram in a controlled manner. One of the CRC's hidden agendas within the
Task Force process was to effect some degree of power or control over the
participating agencies in order to assure their complete support of cable
TV projects. However, over time it soon became clear that OMBE's Charles
Stein lacked any real power to influence other agencies significantly in
enforcing central coordination through either delivering tangible rewards
or executing formal sanctions against agencies. OMBE representative
Charles Stein was able to call and chair meetings as well as issue public
statements regarding OMBE's support or disapproval of actions taken by
other Task Force members, but beyond these perfunctory powers, Charles
Stein and CRC's staff could not muster any significant clout through OMBE
to influence other agencies (i.e., increase or cut back program resources
allocated to such agencies).
Consequently, despite the desire of CRC's staff and executive
director to have OMBE's Charles Stein orchestrate central coordination
among the participating agencies of the Task Force, the majority of agency
interaction seemed to be governed by partisan mutual adjustment. Basi-
cally, while each agency representative on the Task Force vocally sup-
ported Task Force goals and objectives, the lower echelon bureaucrats in
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each organization continued to make decisions on individual projects cal-
culated to serve their (i.e., career civil servants) own individually
conceptualized goals, which were often not the goals necessarily shared
by other interdependent decision makers of the Task Force or the agencies
themselves. Charles Lindblom suggests that individuals enmeshed in par-
tisan mutual adjustment behavior usually only make decisions counter to
their own goals only to the extent that they are in turn controlled by
other partisans or by central supervision.3 1 6
Despite the lack of a real power base by which to control Task
Force members, CRC's staff, in conjunction with OMBE's representative,
Charles Stein, attempted to orchestrate and perpetuate some semblance of
coordination among federal agencies through two general methods identi-
fied by March and Simon as the primary ways by which organizations can be
coordinated:
. . . (1) by programming and (2) by feedback. Coordination by pro-
gramming is exemplified by such integrating mechanisms as the use of
pre-established plans, schedules, forecasts, formalized rules, poli-
cies and procedures, and standardized information and communication
systems. The common element of each of these mechanisms is that a
codified blueprint of action is impersonally specified. Basically
human discretion does not enter into the determination of what,
where, when and how organizational roles are to be carried out to
accomplish a given set of tasks. Instead very precise guidelines for
organizational activity are prescribed in impersonal, standardized
blueprints or action programs. Furthermore, since such impersonal
mechanisms of coordination are codified, once implemented their use
usually requires minimal verbal communication between task
performers.317
Essentially, CRC attempted to activate formal coordination among
agencies via the programming approach by establishing a codified blueprint
of action vis-a-vis their interagency Task Force agreement. Mainly the Task
Force agreement represented an attempt to resolve many of the problems
caused in public program service delivery by confusing interpretations or
misinterpretations of program guidelines and the uneven enforcement of pro-
ject approval requirements by different levels of federal agencies. CRC's
staff and OMBE's legal counsel worked hard in trying to put real teeth into
the interagency agreement in precisely and categorically specifying the
tasks to be carried out by each agency.
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Unfortunately, the agencies worked equally as hard if not harder to
reduce, dilute, and weaken the strength of the document by committing them-
selves to only the most basic and mundane cooperative activities. It has
been noted by Sar A. Levitan in a review of federal programs in the sixties
that most formal interagency agreements tend to be as vulnerable as any
unenforceable two-party treaties but tend to survive because they are mutu-
ally convenient and relatively innocuous by nature. 3 1 8  Many tend to be
virtually innocuous because each agency essentially acts to protect its own
jurisdiction by not over-committing itself to any particular venture and as
with all treaties among equals, ad hoc interagency agreements are subject to
revocation by any of the participating parties.319
To try to bolster the weakness of the formal agreement to support
interagency coordination, CRC and OMBE's representatives also sought to
achieve coordination by feedback. James D. Thompson (Organization In
Action, 1967) has defined "coordination by feedback as mutual adjustments
based upon new information."320 The two operational feedback modes most
commonly used in:
. . developing plans and making mutual adjustments within organiza-
tions are the personal mode and the group mode. In the personal mode,
individual role occupants serve as the mechanism for making mutual task
adjustments through either vertical or horizontal channels of communi-
cation. On the other hand, in the group mode, the mechanism for mutual
adjustment is vested in a group of role occupants through scheduled or
unscheduled staff or committee meetings.M 1
CRC attempted to make use of both modes in achieving and maintaining
coordination between agencies. Through the personal mode, CRC's staff
attempted to use Task Force representatives and agency heads as basic chan-
nels of communication to inform, persuade, and impress other members of
their organizations with the significance and priority status of the Task
Force effort undertaken. It was anticipated that such communication would
take place both on a one-to-one basis in non-hierarchical as well as hier-
archical relationships. Also it would take place face-to-face as well as
through written communique. A significant degree of non-hierarchical coor-
dination was vested in OMBE's representative, Charles Stein, as a desig-
nated group coordinator and project expeditor who in actuality had no formal
authority over the other agencies whose activities required coordination.
198
Unfortunately as revealed in both case studies, simple communication of
Task Force goals and priorities from the top-down was not effective enough
to generate the total responsiveness desired. Channels of communications
between different echelons of bureaucrats became distorted by the interfer-
ence of bureaucrats' personal goals and hidden agendas which tended to
conflict with official Task Force directives.
The group mode of feedback was used periodically by CRC's executive
director and Charles Stein, to keep agencies abreast of project develop-
ments, and to discuss problems and their resolution. Task Force meetings
were also held to indicate program successes and to give agencies psycho-
logical pats on the back in private to reward their "good behavior." Task
Force agencies were also "politically stroked" in public through wide pub-
licity of their "good coordinative" behavior--copies of such press notices
were handed out during Task Force meeetings. Most Task Force meetings
occurred on an irregular basis, being convened largely at critical times
when it became important to motivate an agency or agencies to take some
desired course of action.
A few coordination meetings were also carried out at the local level
of each agency. Local coordination meetings were made up of what was called
a local development team. The team consisted of CRC market analyst, a cable
project leader, and a local official from each Task Force agency (i.e., SBA,
EDA, FmHA, and OMBE). The early meetings of these local development teams
were held to formally introduce the Task Force program to the participating
local agency officials and to get them to begin considering specific pro-
jects. Over time, the group interaction of the local development team
members tended to shadow the same type of partisan mutual adjustment be-
havior displayed by Task Force agency representatives in Washington. Most
local agency representatives followed through in making basic efforts to
inform perspective clients about their agency's program opportunities, but
collectively they never attempted to provide a strategic analysis of their
programs in cross comparison with others. In the final analysis the cli-
ents, in conjunction with CRC's staff, were still left to make intuitive or
"best judgment" decisions based on their own research of government pro-
grams. Furthermore, they were also forced ultimately in both cases to use
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outside publicity and political interVention or inquiries as the major
leverage required to combat bureaucratic resistance.
Different Approach
Given the peculiar set of externalities and circumstances surround-
ing the EDA-GCG case, it is not clear, looking back over what happened, if
any more skillful or adroit actions could have saved the GCG project. Two
significant circumstances support the probability of this reality. First
and foremost, the GCG case became over-burdened and saddled with a prolifer-
ation of bureaucratic antagonisms, conflicting hidden agendas, and below-
the-surface intrigues that obscured the potential merit of this particular
project, because these internal conflicts surfaced or were ventilated as
criticisms of the project's feasibility. Public advocacy organizations and
disadvantaged groups have an impossible time unraveling, proving, and chal-
lenging the complex intermix of seemingly valid criticisms raised against a
project versus criticisms raised for unobjective reasons just to sabotage
it. Furthermore, when such sub-surface organizational "games" are allowed
to direct most of the course of action or non-action taken by bureaucrats--
how are outsiders (i.e., disadvantaged groups) to a relatively foreign, if
not hostile system, supposed to accurately divine or decipher what these
games are, what power stakes are important (i.e., what types of bargaining
advantages, incentives, influence, etc.), and between what actors are con-
flicting games being played. Without reliable inside information or intel-
ligence from contacts within the government system to confirm, discover,
and translate the "public face" put on sub-surface actions and motives,
disadvantaged groups will be at a loss to decode what really needs to be
done to get what they want. Critically important is the fact that if career
bureaucrats don't perceive that disadvantaged groups are in a position to
address their political, organizational, and/or personal concerns, then
they will never even be given the opportunity to attempt to seriously enter
the political process by demonstrating whatever power or influence that
they might be able to muster on the career bureaucrats' behalf.
The companion circumstance which frustrated and undercut the devel-
opment of "right" moves or actions by GCG to immediately detect and
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counteract sub-surface conflicts, was their inability to easily penetrate
the public pretense or bureaucratic facades of compliance used by officials
to mask their hidden agendas and intentions. When public officials are
engaged in symbolic or token behavior where they only desire to give a false
illusion of their commitment to a process, they cannot be expected to
willingly divulge their true motives, intentions, action limitations, or
restraints to outsiders. Since to do so would make them vulnerable to
attacks. Thomas C. Schelling and others have noted that career bureaucrats
are most prone to use this tactic when they "suspect that top agency
officials are making a pretense at demanding performance but don't really
want their orders heeded."3 2 2
Marshall E. Dimock, in a Public Administration Review article
titled "Bureaucracy Self-Examined," has captured the realities of this sit-
uation quite succinctly from the perspective of the policy official:
The technique of feigned acquiescence is one of the indispensable
tools of the career official. If his advice is asked - and all too
frequently it is not - he tries to give what he considers an honest
reply which will be for the benefit of the long-range program and of the
policy official then in authority. If the advice of the "organization"
is not asked, then naturally there is an almost instantaneous and auto-
matic resistance to any program that is forced upon it in this manner.
Even when consultation does take place, if it is the opinion of the
career officials that the suggested reforms will have an injurious
effect upon the prestige and reputation of the service, they try, con-
sciously or unconsciously, to balk the program which to them seems to be
mistaken. They do this by giving outward acquiescence and cooperation
while actually slowing down the reform or killing it entirely. There
are several established ways of accomplishing this result. One -
perhaps the most common - is dilatory tactics. The career officials
promise to do what the policy official directs, but at each stage in the
hierarchy there is a progressively longer delay in actually taking the
necessary steps. When the policy official becomes exasperated because
of the delay, as he usually does, the career officials rely upon buck-
passing or upon a variety of excuses. One standard excuse is inadequacy
of personnel; another is the press of work which makes it necessary to
give attention to a large variety of factors, with the result that the
organization is unable to concentrate upon the one to which the policy
official is determined to give priority.
The baffling thing about institutional resistances is that they are
so subtle and elusive that it is next to impossible for the policy
officials to spot all the points at which the slowing-down process is
occurring. Permanent bureaucracy is amorphous. It is as though each
person has his finger pointed at the next person; the group as a whole
is responsible, and no one individual can be pinned down. Contrariwise,
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when the "organization" is very much in favor of a new program and sees
in it an opportunity to increase the prestige, influence, size, and
importance of the program with which its life and fortunes are identi-
fied, there is the same kind of ground swell which makes it difficult to
put one's finger on any one individual or on any one point in explaining
why the response is so instantaneous. It is this kind of institutional
behavior, sometimes manifesting itself in the form of resistance and
obstructiveness and sometimes in the form of whole-hearted response,
which leads one to speak of the inner life of bureaucratic organizations
as being a force which is greater than the sum total of the obviously
constituent elements. It is based upon long-established understanding,
nuances, ways of doing things; it is based upon an appreciation of what
constitutes the long-range interests of the career group..2 J
The implications of these realization are much more grave for
disadvantaged groups who unlike policy officials are outside looking in.
When public officials believe that they need only help to contri-
bute to an "agency-wide pretense" of support (i.e., since no significant
negative or positive incentives signal to do otherwise) then they will
continue to pay only "lip service" to what is expected of them by outside
groups. Without inside knowledge or information on what is really going on
inside public agencies, disadvantaged groups are at a loss to challenge this
insidious veil of bureaucratic resistance on any substantive grounds nor
properly focus and fix attention, influence, and/or blame. Only through
skill, stealth, and inside help can disadvantaged groups hope to monitor and
enforce bureaucratic commitments that are publicly voiced but privately
avoided.
The importance of dealing more effectively with these two dilemmas
guide the thought behind suggesting what different approaches might have
been taken to secure EDA funding of the GCG project. Primarily a more
intensive effort by CRC staff and GCG group members aimed at understanding
and influencing the key Washington actors (i.e., motivation systems, hidden
agendas, power limitations, power roles, etc.) that made up the project
application approval decision network was called for. Before the GCG pro-
ject was submitted to EDA, CRC staff and GCG group members should have made
more structured attempts to cultivate inside intelligence on agency offi-
cials from sources within or close to EDA.
Improved intelligence on the stability, hidden motives, and power
roles of Washington EDA officials could have led to more direct and
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effective use of the proper incentives (i.e., negative or positive) for
bargaining with the most important actors for their support of the GCG
project.
A basic formula that should have been followed by GCG and CRC
organization leaders in attempting to get business funds from EDA can be
borrowed from a line of reasoning offered by Martha Derthick on motivating
government officials. To papaphrase Martha Derthick, to achieve what they
want, disadvantaged groups must have enough knowledge of the internal poli-
tics of a given agency to perceive what incentives, (i.e., pressures or
rewards) are necessary; they must supply the incentives in sufficient
quantity; and they must direct the incentives to those key holders of
organizational power whose support is required to carry out the process
desired. 324
What is specifically implied in this field maxim for stimulating
government action is that adequate time must be spent in learning an
agency's culture in order to be able to: interpret bureaucrats' attitudes
and true intentions toward a proposed project based on its impact on their
political, organizational, and/or personal needs; and properly calculate
the necessary incentives (i.e., political payoffs, coercive threats, or
persuasive powers) needed to move key officials to take the actions desired.
If CRC and GCG representatives could have developed more accurate
up-front information on EDA's internal organizational politics (i.e., the
how, why, and who got things done--EDA's peculiar way of doing things) and
the true dispositions of key Washington officials toward the proposed pro-
ject, then perhaps they could have more effectively devised or arranged the
proper incentive system needed to influence the career bureaucrats needed
to process and approve the GCG project. An accurate ascertainment by CRC
and GCG of the political, organizational, and personal interests of the
critical actors involved in the Wasington project approval decision network
might have led them to the conclusion that they needed to consider, develop,
and execute a special range of internal organizational startegies designed
to "shepherd" or guide GCG's project toward successful funding. For exam-
ple, the need to operationalize the following types of alternatives might
have materialized from such an organizational evaluation:
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1. They needed to program EDA administrators to give the GCG project to
a more sympathetic "hand-picked" review officer rather than to a
bureaucrat known to have an "axe to grind" or grudge against the
agency.
A sympathetic official would have been one who was interested in the
Task Force's objectives and for whom clear incentives could be
identified, mustered, and exchanged for his support. Of course,
this strategy assumes the ability to persuade and bargain with
higher-ups to correctly program or reroute the flow path of an
application through the proper hands.
2. Lobby to have some special title, status, perks, or government
grade increases attached to the responsibility of reviewing cable
TV projects. The selection of the proper incentive of course would
be linked to what form of motivation the target bureaucrat would be
most responsive to, based on his discovered needs.
3. Direct pressure tactics could have been used to enforce restric-
tions that would have reduced the key project review officer's job
powers, prestige, ability to help his "friends," personal conven-
ience, and employment security. In effect, actions could have been
devised to make it more costly or less rewarding for him to block
cable TV projects than to process them judiciously and equitably.
For example his office powers over selecting certain secretaries to
do his work could have been cut, there could have been strict
policing of his office habits (e.g., expense reports, long distance
phone calls, time attendence, etc.) by his superiors and/or crea-
tion of extra rules that restricted his personal convenience (e.g.,
moving him to a small office space) and jeopardized his job security
(e.g., threatened job demotions or firing, pay increase hold-ups,
banishment to an undesirable job post in another city, etc.).
This "hard line" strategy assumes of course that no complicity
exists among the central project review officer and his superiors
or his fellow career bureaucrats. For if indeed there is a secret
or unspoken covenant between and among bureaucrats to feigned
acquiescence to even direct pressure techniques, again only token
actions may result. However, if a major threat of getting politi-
cians to cut back funds to EDA could have been carried out by CRC
and GCG then perhaps this could have provided the proper impetus to
systematically motivate EDA career officials all down the line to
act more favorably toward the GCG project.
4. The need for the development of a "bail-out" or "wait and see"
strategy might have presented itself, if the intricacies of EDA's
internal organizational politics appeared or proved to be (after
some trial analysis) too formidable to overcome because the proper
incentives or influence needed to operationalize support was
lacking. Thus, the decision could have been made to try another
agency or to wait until EDA's internal politics settled down and
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became stable enough to deal with effectively. To reach either of
these decisions, some trial balloons or "gaming situation" could
have been used to get early feedback from key Washington project
review bureaucrats on what type of projects would be the simplest
for them to process through this program. CRC and GCG organization
members could have thus tested to see who was interested in the Task
Force process, its proposed projects, and attempted to identify
what they (CRC and GCG) might have to offer or threaten bureaucrats
with in terms of their needs. Such a process might have very well
revealed that certain individuals could not be bargained with suf-
ficiently to promote future projects. Meaning neither rewards nor
direct pressure (i.e., the use of threats, such as approve this
application or we will get you shipped off to Cleveland!) appeared
to be able to evoke the responsiveness desired, without the process
becoming overly complicated, time consuming, and politically
costly.
These examples are only illustrative, not exhaustive, of all the
possible alternatives that might have been pursued by CRC and GCG represen-
tatives based on a more accurate understanding of the internal organiza-
tional politics, culture, and interests of the EDA Washington officials at
the time GCG made its request. In the final analysis, no one approach can
or should automatically be assumed to be the key to the successful funding
of projects like GCG. Realistically, what has to be fully anticipated and
planned for when dealing with bureaucratic institutions is that a series or
continuous sequence of bargained responses or power moves have to be made to
promote any process, project, or goal. This reality holds true even when
dealing with only one individual inside a government agency. This is
because man's needs in general are essentially unstable and constantly
changing, but are especially volatile within public organizations or
bureaucratic settings where there exists a much broader range of opportu-
nity for "quid pro quo" interaction and hence a greater potential for a
bureaucrat's miscellaneous needs (i.e., personal, organizational, politi-
cal, etc.) to be satisfied as they become invisibly intertwined with organi-
zational tasks and responsibilities. The best one can hope for is that
armed with accurate knowledge and understanding of men and motives in
bureaucratic organizations, the proper means can be found to move them to
take the desired course of action.
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of the information gathered, there does appear to be
a positive correlation as originally hypothesized between the presence of
coordinative mechanisms established by public advocacy organizations and
the ability of minorities to increase their influence over the distribu-
tion of resources in the public sector to meet their needs. My conclu-
sions and findings are presented below. The general research questions
posed at the outset of this study serve as topic headings; illustrative
examples, and findings are arranged accordingly.
Question: What leverage can be employed by disadvantaged groups to
improve their chances of receiving a "fair share" of the
benefits from public programs?
1. Disadvantaged groups can improve their chances by establishing
and co-opting for their own use certain regularized government action
channels (e.g., interagency task forces, interagency coordination agree-
ments, etc.).
These action channels act as a surrogate for the informal persua-
sion or influence exercised over public programs by more politically
powerful groups.
Example: In the Tele-Vu and GCG cases the interagency agreement and
task force process worked on behalf of disadvantaged
groups, enabling them to establish "inside contacts"
willing to support projects and to provide technical
assistance and advice when projects became enmeshed in the
bureaucracy. These mechanisms also provided the moral
underpinning for disadvantaged groups to recruit outside
support (e.g., politicians, other agencies, the media,
etc.) to help remedy bureaucratic snafus.
There is complementary support for this conclusion from the
SBA/Tele-Vu and EDA/GCG cases, although the ultimate outcomes are uneven.
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Both the SBA/Tele-Vu case and the EDA/GCG case illustrate instances in
which action channels were used to help disadvantaged groups leverage
support for particular projects. In the SBA/Tele-Vu case, CRC staff, the
Task Force chairman, SBA Task Force representatives and SBA's Washington
administrators provided support after a project application submitted to
the SBA was indiscriminantly turned down. The project's sponsor was able,
through the Task Force, to win the support of key actors. New Mexican
politicians sent letters to SBA officials and the Task Force chairman
asking for an investigation into the Tele-Vu situation. The Task Force
chairman, SBA Task Force representatives, and SBA Washington headquarters
administrators requested information from SBA's field office on their
"mishandling" of the Tele-Vu project based on the mandate to support cable
TV applicants as outlined in the Interagency Task Force Agreement. The
many inquiries and investigations made into the SBA/Tele-Vu matter by
these outside observers triggered the projects' re-evaluation and ap-
proval.
In the EDA/GCG case, support was sought during pre-application
meetings, before the project was officially submitted and after the pro-
ject application became bogged down in bureaucratic conflicts over eligi-
bility. The original attempts by GCG's president to lobby the key EDA
business loan officials in the Chicago field office and in Washington
seemed to be successful; he was able to participate in several pre-
application meetings instead of the standard one; he was able to arrange
meetings, not just with local field office staff, but also with loan
officials in EDA's National office in Washington even though EDA's pro-
gram literature says such pre-application meetings take place only with
field office officials; and he was able to submit a special proposal and
receive a preliminary clearance that indicated there were no legal prob-
lems affecting its eligibility. All these special departures from normal
EDA operating procedures were the result of an "open door" policy
implemented by the Acting Chief EDA Administrator, Jeff Cahill, who after
enthusiastically signing the Task Force Agreement, instructed EDA busi-
ness loan officials in Chicago and Washington to assist CRC staff and
GCG's president with their project application.
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These actions were quite significant and help to illustrate the
difference that the existence of the Task Force made.
When the project became mired in legal objections, GCG's presi-
dent, through the Task Force and its interagency agreement, was able to
marshall support from Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeff Cahill, CRC legal
and market development staff, the Task Force chairman, and most impor-
tantly, OMBE's Chief Counsel. OMBE's Chief Counsel disputed all the legal
challenges raised by EDA Counsel. CRC's legal counsel and market analysts
provided OMBE's Chief Counsel with backup information that he used to
defend the GCG project. The Acting EDA Chief Administrator and the Task
Force chairman provided moral support and convened meetings to try to
resolve the issue in GCG's favor. The involvement and support of these
various individuals at key points in the legal disput-e over GCG's eligi-
bility culminated in EDA's Chief Counsel capitulatingi. EDA's Chicago
field office officials then approved the GCG loan application and for-
warded the package to D.C. for final approval.
When the GCG project later became enmeshed in a policy dispute
raised by Washington EDA officials, GCG's president, through his Task
Force connections, was able to muster another roster of allies willing and
able to ward off policy attacks; investigate delays; mobilize public
awareness; and provide technical assistance in making application changes
or additions. John Calhoun (White House Director of Media Relations)
after being contacted by one of CRC's directors, defended the GCG project.
CRC's executive director persuaded Gary Congressman, Ray J. Madden, to
call EDA's administrator and to participate in a meeting to block further
delays. During this same period, CRC market and financial analysts pro-
vided periodic technical assistance, helping to revise GCG's project ap-
plication to meet EDA officials' requests.
In the midst of the policy dispute, a major Indiana daily, the
Post Tribune, picked up the GCG story and printed a detailed article
titled "GCG Loan Plea Sparks Brouhaha in Washington." Another article on
GCG's struggle to get funds from EDA appeared in a local Gary community
newspaper. Both materialized after CRC staff printed a "seed article"
titled "EDA Impedes Cable Growth" in their own newsletter/magazine. This
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"seed article" was then widely distributed among the media in hopes of
creating greater public awareness and interest.
When EDA issued a policy bulletin on cable TV, David Kinley and
J. Clay Smith (FCC Cable TV Bureau Chiefs) sent letters to EDA Chief
Counsels and held meetings with EDA administrators and Department of
Commerce officials to protest EDA's decision not to fund cable TV and to
convince EDA to rescind its misinterpretations of FCC rules.
Charles Stein (Task Force chairman) sent a comprehensive memoran-
dum to Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson which detailed all the
problems GCG had encountered with EDA. He requested a re-evaluation of
the project. Simultaneously, the Mayor of Gary was contacted by GCG's
president and CRC's executive director and informed of GCG's plight. The
Mayor called Secretary Richardson to voice support. These efforts gained
the project a "special review" or re-evaluation. Although the final
outcome left much to be desired, the assistance provided by the Task Force
and the informal network of supporters generated through the interagency
agreement was effective in fostering increased accountability and respon-
siveness among the field office bureaucrats and among some Washington EDA
officials.
Question: What bureaucratic dynamics precipitate and sustain inequi-
ties (i.e., the consistent exclusion of certain groups
from the benefits of government programs) even when re-
forms are initiated?
2. The failure to anticipate the impact of reforms on existing bu-
reaucratic incentives (i.e., political, organizational, and/or personal)
often results in increased bureaucratic resistance.
Example: Papermaster was more susceptible to scuttling the GCG pro-
ject than supporting it because: no substantive external
political pressure induced him to support it; no direct
internal organizational pressure motivated him to approve
it; evaluating the project violated his established "work
routines" and "short-hand" review techniques and his per-
sonal antagonisms toward the "lame-duck" administrator who
supported it, mitigated against his ability to view the
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project objectively.
The EDA/GCG experience provides evidence in support of this con-
clusion. CRC's original intension of creating a support mechanism that
would forestall bureaucratic field office snafus for its clients, over-
looked the inclination and misjudged the ability of Washington career
bureaucrats to resist reforms and sidestep censure. There was a naive
mispresumption about and overreliance by CRC leadership on the ability of
the top-down priority commitments expressed by EDA's acting Chief
Administrator to stimulate the responsiveness among subordinates needed
to resolve problems. Thus, instead of responsiveness, certain Washington
career bureaucrats in collaboration with some higher-up EDA program offi-
cials, resorted to the creation of "instant policies," unwarranted legal
objections, and the use of very narrow interpretations of existing public
policies in order to avoid funding cable TV ventures.
For example, after an October 15, 1975 meeting between GCG's
president, CRC's executive director, and EDA's Acting Chief Administra-
tor, it was indicated by the EDA Administrator that a letter of intent to
approve the project would be forthcoming from EDA within one week. When
Papermaster found out about this decision, he sidestepped Cahill's order
by sending a letter to GCG stating his office was not going to accept an
oral opinion given earlier by EDA counsel approving the cable project as
the final OK on the project's eligibility. He wanted a legal opinion in
writing and he informed the EDA office in Chicago to hold up approval.
This eligibility dispute materialized in spite of the fact that the GCG
project was given preliminary clearance, which indicated there were no
legal barriers to its eligibility, during a pre-application review.
After a protracted debate between OMBE Chief Counsel and EDA Chief Counsel
over this issue, it was established that no legal barriers existed and
this dispute against the project was dropped.
Papermaster's predisposition against expediting the GCG project
was clearly demonstrated by his refusal to issue a letter of intent and
his launching of a challenge against the EDA project on unwarranted legal
grounds. For Papermaster, not expediting the GCG project was an oppor-
tunity to retaliate against a lame-duck administrator who had demoted
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him. This project also represented extra work (e.g., development of a new
financial format for evaluating cable TV) and learning new information
that he was not interested in. Working on the GCG project meant
Papermaster had less time to work on other projects he was involved with
an more committed to. Finally, the GCG project, according to Papermaster,
violated his "short-hand" rule for deciding if a project was worth working
on or approving. If a project, in his estimation, created only a small
number of jobs in relation to other projects, it was not worth his time.
Papermaster's basic inclination toward not funding the GCG pro-
ject was illustrated in his declaration that EDA, as a rule, did not fund
media ventures or businesses that did not create high numbers of jobs.
The validity of this declaration was challenged when it was uncovered by
CRC staff that EDA had actually funded an educational television station
in 1969 that created only a few jobs.
Following the legal attack on the GCG project, the director of the
Washington EDA business loan office indicated that there might be some
"policy objections" to EDA funding cable TV systems. The loan office
director also held certain antagonisms against the Chief Administrator
who supported the cable TV Task Force. Thus, he was inclined not to
expedite the GCG project in retaliating against the Chief Administrator.
This policy dispute slowed down the project's processing once again. A
formal EDA policy bulletin was issued which disqualified cable TV from EDA
funding. The bulletin was challenged by the FCC Cable TV Bureau as being
a complete misinterpretation of their policy and eventually the policy
attack against cable TV and GCG was dropped.
To quote one Washington EDA official, several years after the GCG
experience, on the subject of bureaucratic resistance:
We usually never have to formally turn down a project that we don't
want to support, when we can keep finding reasons to delay the pro-
cessing of a project. The GCG project was one of the only projects I
remember that we had to issue a formal turn down letter on. Normally
an applicant will become tired and frustrated over the various delays
that develop and eventually leave us along. 3 2 5
Career bureaucrats inside both SBA and EDA atempted to sabotage
projects through the use of similar techniques. One technique involved
project review officers not communicating important barriers to a pro-
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ject's eligibility to project sponsors until after a project was submit-
ted for final review, instead of during pre-application conferences.
Informal pre-application conferences were held supposedly to
identify, discuss, and iron out any problems affecting a project's eligi-
bility. The other technique involved the delayed communication of key
approval criteria by project review officers to project sponsors, also
until after a project was formally submitted for final review and not
during pre-application meetings.
The problems suffered in attempting to get projects funded by SBA
and EDA emanated from career civil servants, inadequately motivated to
support cable TV projects because they lacked a real stake in the projects
and had personal agendas and/or established working routines that miti-
gated against their automatic support in expediting such projects.
Question: Under what circumstances can coordinative strategies work
to overcome the bureaucratic resistance that consistently
excludes certain groups from the benefits of public pro-
grams?
3. Public groups and disadvantaged populations are more apt to se-
cure what they want from field office bureaucrats when prior agreements
from Washington headquarters send clear signals and obligatory directives
to field office bureaucrats.
Example: SBA's field office bureaucrats at first turned down Pena's
project but later renegotiated and approved the project
under the pressure generated by the discrepancies between
SBA's handling of the review of the project and the clear
mandate of support and assistance embodied in the Task
Force agreement.
The evidence in support of this conclusion is mixed. In the SBA
case, the existence of a formal Task Force agreement provided a clear
mandate and context for Eddie Pena to recruit political officials as well
as Task Force members in investigating the mishandling of his loan re-
quest. The presence of a Task Force and an interagency agreement were
visible indications and acknowledgments to field offices and outside ob-
servers that cable TV applicants were entitled to special assistance and
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support in facilitating their enterprises. The Task Force and inter-
agency agreement symbolized agency accord on providing assistance and
support to cable groups. Their existence served to magnify the gravity of
any glaring discrepancy between agency words (i.e., the agreement) and
actual deeds. It also intensified the amount of attention that could be
focused on any problems. After all, the obvious raison d'etre for most
such coordination mechanisms was to diminish bureaucratic snafus, not
create them.
The inescapable visibility of these realities, or signals, given
off by the Task Force and its agreement placed a burden on SBA field
officials to explain why Mr. Pena should be penalized for their error or
indiscretion in not providing early notice on a funding prerequisite
(i.e., no origination of local programming) before his proposal submis-
sion and not after the review process had been completed? This inconsis-
tency between the SBA's word and field office action prompted investiga-
tions and inquiries into the situation by the Task Force chairman,
National SBA Office administrators, SBA Task Force representatives, and
New Mexican political officials. The Task Force chairman, by letter,
informed SBA officials in Washington and New Mexico that the field
office's "handling" of the Tele-Vu project was not in general accord with
the basic spirit and intent of the interagency agreement.directives that
instructed all signatory agencies to "provide all possible national and
local assistance to minority businessmen and user-groups qualified to
participate in the cable TV program." Nor was it in accord with the
directive indicating that signatory agencies were responsible for "noti-
fying regional, district, county, and/or local representatives of the
signatory agencies of the terms and intent of this agreement, and to
encourage active support and assistance by such representatives in
carrying out the local aspects of the program."
Within two months after inquiries were made by Task Force members
and political officials into the SBA field office mishandling of the Tele-
Vu project, funds were relinquished to Eddie Pena.
In sum, the Task Force agreement, set a general standard for
support that provided a yardstick by which CRC, Task Force members, out-
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side observers, and disadvantaged groups could measure the actual state
of bureaucratic behavior in rendering assistance and support to target
groups.
In the EDA/GCG case, the mounting pressure and attention focused
on any EDA attempts to renege on their written commitment of support was
enough to trigger the Chicago field office's approval of the GCG project.
This happened after EDA Chief Counsel became obliged, under challenges
from Task Force representatives, to acquiesce in their legal dispute and
to inform its field office there were "no legal barriers" to funding GCG.
To quote one EDA field officer: "We could see a real battle was building
over this project because of the existence of the Task Force and we didn't
want to be caught in the middle of a highly politically charged situa-
tion. ,326 The officials in Chicago had received more than the normal
amount of inquiries from various public officials and other outside ob-
servers interested in the status of the project. The field officials were
also aware that EDA's Assistant General Counsel had informally admitted
that "in his twenty years of government service, he had never faced such
intense political pressure." 3 2 7 The Task Force attention focused on the
handling of the GCG package was significant enough to stimulate the EDA
field officials to not want to be held accountable for turning down the
project (i.e., become a scapegoat) so they approved it, and passed it on
to their superiors in Washington, D.C.
The existence of the interagency agreement and Task Force pro-
vided the leverage for GCG's president, the Task Force chairman, and CRC's
executive director to mobilize substantial support from a wide array of
actors that might not have been motivated to come to the defense of the
project otherwise. This is to say GCG on its own, without the resources
of a Task Force behind it, might not have survived as long as it did, nor
attracted the level of political attention and support that it did. The
existence of an established Task Force and interagency agreement were
useful tools for "communicating" and convincing outside observers that
GCG's plight was a just cause, worthy of closer scrutiny and support.
Thus, when GCG's president, the Task Force chairman, and CRC's executive
director went shopping for extra support in challenging the mishandling
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of the GCG project, they were able to recruit the intervention of various
political officials (e.g., Congressman Madden), other agencies (e.g.,
FCC), and the media (e.g., newspaper articles).
But, in reality, the agreement in and of itself did not fulfill
its manifest function of spawning an automatic and lasting responsiveness
by agency officials for expediting cable TV projects as hoped for. The
basic existence of the agreement did not diminish, or halt bureaucratic
resistance generated by EDA career bureaucrats in Washington. Instead,
its latent functional utility was as a tangible record of an agency's
commitment to support and assist cable TV development groups. This record
of support was used to challenge bureaucratic snafus and to create the
impetus for attracting and recruiting extra support (e.g., political of-
ficials, FCC, the media, etc.). Perhaps Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall
Kaplan's book, The Politics of Neglect, most eloquently and cogently sums
up the classic realities of interagency agreements, when commenting on a
HUD experience: ". . .the agreement provided HUD with the language, the
moral underpinning as it were, to go shopping for interagency support.
However, it clearly did not generate the necessary support to make it
work." 328
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Coordination should not be conceived as any panacea for all in-
tergovernmental malaise and it certainly, as demonstrated by my case
study, is not immune to bureaucratic sabotage, unforeseen events, or
faulty preplanning. Yet, it does at least present an alternative approach
for disadvantaged groups seeking to gain greater influence in public
program decision making and implementation. I have attempted to describe
and illuminate a task force coordination process, as one strategy for
offsetting some of the common bureaucratic problems that consistently
hinder disadvantaged groups' chances of receiving a fair share of bene-
fits from public programs.
One important general observation for future investigations is
that the interagency coordination process, if it is to be structured
correctly, must help public groups and advocacy organizations to identify
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and anticipate what adjustments need to be made to allow a project to
withstand the stresses and strains (i.e., "pulling and hauling," muta-
tion, conflicting agendas, etc.) that take place during implementation
between project supporters and agency bureaucrats. This means that
ideally a task force coordination process should be able to serve as an
early warning and conflict resolution system. It should provide a "test
arena" for coordination initiators to observe behavior and identify what
particular bureaucrats, agency policies, or program practices may not be
responsive to their needs, so that appropriate plans can be initiated to
steer program implementation around those impediments that cannot be re-
moved or neutralized through collective negotiation or bargaining.
When putting together complex action systems, coordination initi-
ators must carefully assess the culture (e.g., motivation systems, "short
hand" decision techniques, internal politics, etc.) of each participating
agency. There must be an acute appreciation and awareness of an agency's
peculiar ways of doing things, especially those bureaucratic routines
agency bureaucrats may be professional or psychologically tied to, that
might have to be violated or altered by the coordination process proposed.
Adequate time must be spent by reform initiators in learning an agency's
culture, in order to be able to correctly interpret bureaucrats' atti-
tudes and true intentions toward a proposed enterprise based on its impact
on their political, organizational, and/or personal needs. This knowl-
edge will allow them to properly calculate the necessary incentives,
i.e., pay offs, coercive threats, or persuasive power needed to move these
key holders of organizational power to take the action desired.
It is clear that the total resources and expertise needed to cope
with many complex problems are often contained within a wide array of
public agencies and organizations. However, it is not so certain that the
present bureaucratic structure of government is properly adapted or pre-
disposed to solving complex problems that cut across departmental juris-
dictions through joint action systems (e.g., coordinative task force)
particularly in terms of various government agencies and department being
automatically inclined to follow the leadership of some central regu-
lating authority or coordinator. This is especially true if the desig-
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nated lead agency or "coordinator" of a task force has no direct and
immediate ability to control other organizations' behavior by dispensing
rewards or levying sanctions. Under such circumstances, no significant
changes in the way things are done will take place.
To get things accomplished, there has to be some extraordinary
pressure placed on agencies or some compensation of key organizational
power holders for foresaking their "standard operating procedures."
Extraordinary pressure can come from political officials or other actors
who have direct influence over the flow of program resources to government
agencies. However, this study and most literature on human motivation/
organizational behavior would tend to support the assertion that a "spe-
cial compensation" approach might work better with agencies and bureau-
crats so traditionally resistant to pressure mounted by disadvantaged
groups. The interagency task force was an effective vehicle for getting
disadvantaged groups to the government bargaining table. But, to bargain
successfully, in the quid pro quo system of government, disadvantaged
groups are better off if they have something positive (e.g., favors) or
tangible to exchange for the bureaucratic responsiveness they desire.
For example, it would be interesting to see what changes in the outcome of
the GCG experience would have resulted, if the upgrading of Papermaster's
civil service status had been linked to his expeditious handling of cable
TV projects. In fact, if CRC and OMBE's staff could have properly
orchestrated the delivery of certain "special compensations" or govern-
ment perks to key project review officers, perhaps the development and
outcome of the total task force experience might have been different.
This study is handicapped to some degree by the limited instances
of the coordinative Task Force's operation available for examination.
Nevertheless, the basic information generated by this dissertation in
conjunction with other contemporary studies cited previously does outline
the general utility of coordinative mechanisms, the enduring problems
confronted in the coordinative approach, and the kinds of external fac-
tors which tend to exacerbate the shortcomings of this implementation
strategy.
Interagency task force coordination certainly is not infallible,
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but it does appear to be a useful process for increasing the bargaining
advantages available to disadvantaged groups, which they can employ in
vying for a more equitable share of public program benefits. The informa-
tion developed on the unique benefits of the coordinative approach indi-
cates that coordinative mechanisms can be a desirable supplement to the
activities of public advocacy organizations seeking to insure disadvan-
taged groups greater influence in public program implementation. Based
on the significance of these benefits is the assertion that coordinative
approaches devised by advocacy organizations or other groups outside the
federal system are deserving of greater attention and government support.
The trials and tribulations of the task force in this study
present substantial evidence of the continuing and dire need to reform the
federal delivery system. Likewise, there is a corresponding demand for
greater exploration and exploitation of innovative reform approaches such
as this one. The need for greater attention and government support of
such coordinative reform approaches undergirds the major thesis of this
study. The major thesis of this study is that special coordination
mechanisms can serve to help increase the chances of disadvantaged groups
or disenfranchised populations in lessening many of the typical
bureaucratic roadblocks (e.g., "red tape," unresponsiveness, disjointed
program activity, etc.) encountered in public program implementation.
The existence of coordinative mechanisms (e.g., an interagency
task force and/or an interagency agreement) can create increased leverage
for disadvantaged groups seeking services from bureaucratic agencies.
For disadvantaged groups, increased leverage within government means the
ability to exert greater influence upon the administrative functioning of
public service delivery, under circumstances where normally disadvantaged
populations occupy a passive role, with little participation in decision
making and with little or no access to redress mechanisms to control for
service delivery inequities.
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NOTES TOWARD A THEORY OF COORDINATION
It would be unrealistic to assume one could solve all the problems
involved in the immensely complex process of public program implementa-
tion via coordination mechanisms or any other similar types of reform
strategies. It is not too ambitious, however, to assume that public
groups and advocacy organizations can at least form some basic safe-
guards, defense strategies, and conflict resolution mechanisms for avoid-
ing structured failure* as stimulated by the classic bureaucratic prob-
lems that traditionally confront public program implementation. A basic
framework of variables that affect how well institutional coordination
works in the implementation process could improve the design of initial
program strategies and enhance the successful administrative operation of
programs.
The basic question that emerges from such an assumption is: What
kinds of knowledge are required to be able to predict the consequences of
organizing the delivery of a social program in one way rather than an-
other? There is a great deal of public administration research on insti-
tutions (i.e., "bureaucratic behavior," program politics, civil servant
performance, citizen-government relations, etc.) as periodically alluded
to in this study that can be used to help explain and anticipate the
complexities of coordination. However, the various pieces of the theo-
retical perspectives in these different areas have not been adequately
joined together to form a basic theory of coordination dynamics.
Building a theory of coordination can take many forms: a list of
significant questions to be raised before actions are taken; a roster of
the enduring problems to be circumnavigated; the suggestion of
*Structured failure is a concept that embraces the notion that
the neglect to pay heed to the existence of certain enduring bureaucratic
problems or the need to pre-plan and evaluate the feasibility of alterna-
tive strategies for achieving planned goals by avoiding such problems is
to increase the likelihood of process failure.
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significant insights, revelations, or learned lessons from past experi-
ence (i.e., case study approach); the categorization of different types
or levels of coordination that can be pursued and/or the isolation of a
special cluster of variables that influence the process.*
All of these approaches have been observed in the literature. I
have tried to generally review and highlight some of these approaches
through example in this research. However, a review of the substance of
these different approaches seems to suggest that there are certain broad
themes to be played upon in the coordination process. The knowledge areas
that seem to suggest themselves as useful tools for understanding the
coordination process are:
o The politics of program coordination,
o The functioning of organizations,
o The performance of professionals, and
o The citizen/government relationship.
These knowledge areas are adaptations of similar broad areas iso-
lated by Erwin C. Hardgrove in his work The Missing Link: The Study of the
Implementation of Social Policy.
By no means should these areas be considered as being all inclu-
sive or as representative of the entire universe of what could be. Rather
these focus areas appear to be a convenient way to order the conventional
wisdom that relates to the coordination process and helps to explain its
*Donald S. Van Meter, Carl E. Van Horn, and Randall Ripley of the
Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, have been study-
ing the need for an implementation framework. Van Meter and Van Horn have
developed a seven-variable model of the implementation process as a theo-
retical framework for research. the direct carryover of this model to the
coordination process as a method of implementation is clear as one reviews
the variables listed. The seven clusters of variables that affect policy
impact and service delivery are: program standards and objectives; re-
sources; interorganizational communication; interorganization enforce-
ment and follow-up; characteristics of the implementing agencies; eco-
nomic, social, and political conditions within the implementing jurisdic-
tion; and the dispositions of implementors. Overall the developers of
this model suggest that process and program performance will vary depend-
ing upon the amount of change involved and will vary depending upon the
amount of change involved and the extent to which there is consensus upon
goals among relevant actors. 3 2 9
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dynamic flux. There is obvious "spill over" and overlap of information
between these broad areas but each area maintains a unique focus integrity
of its own. For example, the politics of coordination focuses on the
relationships and interaction between interested parties as they try to
shape programs to fit their vested interests, needs, priorities, official
mandates, or demands.330 The chief participants are politicians, admin-
istrators, interest groups, and officials at all levels of government.
The broad area on organizations focuses on how organization theory might
help to explain the behavior of institutions in the coordination process.
The specific emphasis in this area is on the internal functioning of
organizations as it affects their external behavior. The organizations
to be analyzed are not just bureaucracies but include legislatures, pat-
terns of executive decision, and especially the workings of any organized
group that activates a coordination process which impinges upon or influ-
.331
ences public program operation.
The topic of professionals zeros in on the reality that the dif-
ferent behavioral motivation of professionals (i.e., status quo orien-
tated civil servants versus social advocates' change orientations) in-
volved in the delivery or planning of public services affects organiza-
tional outcomes. In other words, the motivation of professionals influ-
ences their performance in regard to carrying out work commitments which
include their predisposition to change as possibly represented by a coor-
dination process. Furthermore, the different functional actions of pro-
fessionals in the public bureaucracy as opposed to those found in quasi
public/special interest groups, or even in academic settings may be ex-
plained by their selection of a work setting supportive of their internal
value system. This is to say that career civil servants as a group tend
to select public service settings (either consciously or subconsciously)
because of its known characteristics of indulging or even rewarding con-
servativeness, the maintenance of the status quo, and tolerating varying
levels of administrative sovereignty. In fact, James Q. Wilson and other
students of government have suggested that "the career civil service is
not ordinarily attractive to people with a taste for risk taking."3 3 2
Furthermore, true bureaucrats by Anthony Downs' definition are "con-
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servers" who seek to minimize risk, maximize their own security and con-
venience, and preserve the general conservative nature of organizations
in which they serve.333
While on the other hand, professionals who tend to embrace or
desire to promote change or innovation are more likely to be found in
quasi public, special interest groups, academic arenas, or other settings
"outside the system" which are supportive of their goal behavior.
All of the explained categories above focus on the implementors
of public policy. There has always been an express need to also analyze
coordination from the perspective of citizen impact upon governmental
decisions, which has been part of the unique focus of this research. The
dynamic relationships between citizens and the government is a category
of interest which seeks to reveal the consequences, significance, and
outcome of citizen involvement in the coordination process.
Under the broad theme areas just outlined, I will now highlight
(based on my empirical experiences, case study material and the available
literature) some of the significant insights and learned lessons that
should be considered by either neophyte administrative officers or public
groups in planning and/or participating in public program coordination
processes.
The Politics of Program Coordination
This area represents the basic dynamic which fuels the coordina-
tion process. The essence of which is embodied in the interaction in
which individuals and groups vie for control of or defense against pro-
grams.
o The dynamics of program politics, virtually guarantees that
federal policymakers will promise more than they can deliver.
o The failure of program development or coordination is often pre-
cipitated by the rhetoric of exaggerated public promises and the
failure to estimate implementation problems in advance by policy
officials at various agency levels (federal, state, local).
o The matching of disparate interests of agreement on programs is
the basic ingredient of the policy adoption process and the first
stage of coordination.
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o The "complexity of joint action" should not be underestimated--it
should not be assumed too cuickly and easily that the differing
incentives of the several participants can be joined.
o The coordination planner must attempt to project the number of
steps involved in the process and the number of critical decision
points at which agreement would be necessary. He might find it
necessary to go so far as to plot on a chart the critical path of
decision making to be pursued in taking different options.
o The complexity of the coordination process can be judged by the
number of participants required and the effect of resources upon
program form as the key variables to be analyzed.
o If the existence of many participants sets up numerous veto
points, participation will inhibit effective coordination.
o Participation must be structured to promote the coordination pro-
cess not retard it.
o A good coordination estimate might lead to a conclusion to reduce
the number of decision points.
o It must be realized that coordination participants might agree on
the end to be achieved but disagree about the specific means to
that end because their institutional objectives and personal mo-
tivations are different.
o Domestic policy problems are often so difficult and complex that
there is very little political credit to be gained by taking on
new social strategies that reflect redirected efforts at solving
all encompassing problems like economic development, poverty,
poor housing, and discrimination. Hence, there is a temptation
on the part of public officials to perform the symbolic or dra-
matic action which lacks substantive impact, because it is often
difficult for publics to tell the difference between symbolic and
effective actions and the former are easier to carry off. 3 3 4
The Functioning of Organizations
o An agency must have strong goal consensus among its officials in
order to achieve both good coordination and extensive decentrali-
zation of authority.
o The coordination process and program performance will vary
depending upon the amount of change involved and the extent to
which there is consensus upon goals among the relevant actors.
o The larger any organization becomes, the poorer is the coordina-
tion among its actions. 3 3 5
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o The greater the hierarchical distance between low level officials
and the points where final approval of their decisions can be
obtained, the more difficult and time consuming it is for them to
carry out their functions.
o Make sure the organizational capability which supports or
launches the program is maintained for its execution.
o Organizations prefer to suffice or optimize rather than maximize
and to rely upon existing work patterns and routines to meet new
problems rather than to learn anew about reality and adapt inter-
nally in each case. 3 3 6
o Agencies as political units seek external alliances with legis-
lators or constituent groups which will give it leverage and
autonomy vis-a-vis the demands for compliance from hierarchical
authority.
o Federal agencies often assert that they are not geared to plan for
the coordination of new program thrust because of the press of
current business and lack of staff resources for special assign-
ments. The result is that new ideas are processed through old and
inappropriate mechanisms of evaluation and operation.
o Secretaries, under secretaries and assistant secretaries come to
government for a short time, often no more than two years. They
seldom have familiarity with their departments and the programs
under their jurisdictions before they arrive. Often they lack
administrative experience, having been lawyers, or, if business-
men, they know little of government administration, which differs
greatly from the private sector. By the time they have learned
their way about Washington governmental politics and know some-
thing of their departments and programs, they are gone and a new
set of novices has replaced them. 3 3 7  Consequently, the real
power to get things done constantly remains in the hands of the
permanent civil servants.
The Performance of Professionals
o The prime commitments of permanent civil servants are to career,
agency, and program. The marks of success are autonomy for
bureaus and expansion of budgets. Above all, they seek to come to
terms with the agency environment in ways that promote regular-
ity, stability, and, if possible, expansion.3 3 8
o Civil servants are far more concerned with legal and administra-
tive processes than with program substance or purpose or with the
substantive problems of program coordination.
o The organizational mission of an agency as its career civil ser-
vants understand it may dictate more how an agency functions than
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its official mandate.
o Professionals are not value free, unbiased deliveries of service
to clients. Rather they act in predictable ways accordinq to
their modes of thought and definitions of professional role.339
o The difficulty of getting responsiveness from department career
civil servants in regard to changes in program coordination or
implementation are so great that policy administrators often pay
only lip service to work involvements; which results in civil
servants being allowed to use a variety of delaying tactics
(i.e., strict interpretations of program guidelines and legisla-
tive mandates; slow and overly meticulous processing of program
applications, issuing of ad hoc policy stances at variance with
new coordination initiatives, and holding of unnecessary meetings
on minor application details) to thwart program coordination at-
tempts and specific project development.
o Policy coordinators must be aware of the tensions between hier-
archy and professionalism, the conflict between those with formal
authority and those with the actual skills required to do th"Ie
work. Barriers to successful coordination are set up when pro-
gram administrators commit agencies to tasks that uninvolved per-
manent civil servants must carry out.
o Project managers or project review officers are seldom brought on
board when an innovation is being planned and therefore lack a
stake in it.
o Accommodations must be made to resolve tension and conflict with-
in the coordination process by briefing technicians as well as
managers on new program directions. Furthermore, these techni-
cians and people in the field must be made to believe they have a
real stake and investment in the successful outcome of the pro-
gram.
o Policy coordination must face the realities of confronting stra-
tegies of organizational survival and token participation as used
by career civil servants.
o Policy coordinators who serve as change agents in bureaucracies
must realize that such a role requires respect, tolerance,
patience, and an understanding of the culture of the organization
and the incentives and perspectives that move people.3 4 0
The Citizen/Government Relationship
o Government bureaucracy is often preoccupied with its own internal
processes to the exclusion of clients.
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o Intimacy between the government and the governed is not possible
with centralized control in Washington.
o The government in attempting to handle innumerable minute things,
becomes mechanical and the more mechanical a government becomes,
the less able it is to deal directly with the people and the more
danger there is of its becoming entangled in a mesh of "red
tape. "341
o Governmental functions have become so numerous that personal
supervision is hopeless, and in their efforts to forestall wrong
decisions or mistakes, administrators often utilize complicated
procedures that make prompt and direct action impossible. Hence,
coordination schemes are often called for to relieve such prob-
lems.
o Channels for communication between program producers and program
consumers are often very weak, because of remoteness between a
producer bureaucracy and consumers, the limited organization of
consumer group, and the absence of a market mechanism for regis-
tering immediate discontent with producers' action (consumers'
options are limited to withdrawing from the service or
voting) .342
o Agency administrators look to appropriations officials for their
resources, not to consumers. Consequently, they often try to
maintain themselves by meeting what they perceive to be their own
needs and priorities and not those of client groups.
o Obstacles to effective coordination stem not only from the natu-
ral tendency of officials to guard their respective jurisdic-
tions, but also from outside groups with special interests in the
activities of various departments and bureaus. Even at the
intradepartmental level, private and public lobbies provide inde-
pendent power bases for some bureaus which make them nearly in-
vulnerable to controls by their own agency heads.3 4 3
Critical Variables
Besides considering a framework of conventional wisdom drawn from
past experience, it is also appropriate to examine what key variables seem
to influence the coordination process. There are a number of important
areas that appear to significantly affect in some manner the level and
degree of coordination to be achieved within the implementation process.
Some of these critical variable are: the type of coordination strived for;
the complexity and scope of the enterprise (How ambitious is it?); the
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number of essential decision points or consensus nodes needed to carry out
the process; the socio-political arena(s) where negotiations and bargain-
ing are to be carried out (on whose turf are deals struck or propositions
made); duration of the process over which coordination is to be main-
tained; level of perceived "common ground" existing among participants;
type and substance of commitment vehicles used to formalize mission con-
trol (i.e., task force structures, written agreements, etc.); level of
participation and briefing of agency technicians who must carry out ad-
ministrative details andc processing procedures; the extent of "power"
available to chief coordinator to reward or sanction participants behav-
ior and the amount of conflict between new coordination goals and estab-
lished goals of participating agencies. Overall, three basic proposi-
tions can be added as guidelines in investigating these areas: coordina-
tion problems will be most severe when the implementation process
involves major changes; coordination strategies will be hardest to imple-
ment when there exists little or no goal and process consensus, and
communication problems can undermine a coordination process no matter
what the stage of change or degree of consensus.
Summary
In summary it can be said that the most effective coordination
efforts at the federal level have been ad hoc arrangements between what
one subcabinet officer has called the "loyal underground of civil ser-
vants." The least effective have been those at the cabinet level where
"Congress has affixed conflicting grants of interagency supremacy and
where the search for personal preminence is added to jurisdictional
defenses and administrative rigidities."344 In between are a number of
formal interagency agreements which are as vulnerable as any unenforce-
able two-party treaties but which tend to survive because they are mutu-
ally convenient and grossly innocuous by nature. Overall, it seems that
progress has most often been made through the delegation of specific
responsibilities by one agency or another rather than through simple
mutual coordination. In such instances, there is usually some threat of
"power" (e.g., outside intervention, congressional criticism, media scru-
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tiny, etc.) that activates the process with congressional influence, per-
sonal agressiveness, or the ownership of effective delivery capability,
enhancing the bargaining power of one contender vis-a-vis others. 3 4 5
In view of these realities, one can say that the first requirement
for effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination is some no-
tion of a policy framework. Furthermore, such a policy framework by
definition must promote or help to create a general consensus for achiev-
ing a common goal. Whether this goal be the promotion of economic growth
and business development, the comprehensive delivery of health services
or the stimulation of a broader range of housing opportunities, some broad
focus area must be identified. Essentially the policy framework must
embody some unifying concept or precept that cuts across the individual
programmatic goals, personal agendas, and objectives of all perspective
participants. Above all else it must link the agencies' goals with the
needs of the public group. Thus, the process of policy coordination can
be greatly enhanced and accelerated when clearly pervasive, contemporar-
ily significant, and distinctive reference points around which federal
agency action can be organized are identified. Such a framework, however,
must not just articulate a need for collective action, but must point out
the official and executive mandates supportive of the course of action to
be taken. It should also historically set in perspective the necessity
and the signficiance of the reform process or program to be implemented.
Most importantly to be effective coordination or any similar type
of government reform strategy must take into account the peculiar politi-
cal and human motivational realities of the organizational environments
in which changes must take place. To be specific there must be an
appreciation for and careful analysis of the political intrigues, indi-
vidual drives, value systems, human interactive patterns, established
work routines, and other organizational behavior motivating determinants
that might be violated or have to be compromised to accommodate the reform
process desired. Without such foresight and pre-planning intelligence,
coordination reforms are doomed to head-on confrontations with the organ-
iztaional defense mechanisms of career civil servants, possibly alienated
and threatened by such new initiatives. When such confrontations do occur
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the result is often increased bureaucratic resistance. Not until reform
strategies are successfully devised to simultaneously cater to the proper
incentives that drive career civil servants while linking bureaucratic
goals (i.e., public program mandates) with disadvantaged group needs will
the full benefits of more effective service delivery be reaped by disad-
vantaged populations. This premise is based on the reality that some
degree of mutation of program plans to adjust to the needs of civil
servants is inevitable if any type of implementation process is to suc-
ceed. Thus, anticipatory adjustment of project plans or of the coordina-
tion process itself to allow for certain concessions to be made to the
designs of career civil servants should be planned for.
The second requirement is a clear delegation of specific respon-
sibilities (i.e., administrative expediting of project review procedures,
creation of special capital pools for project funding, etc.) among par-
ticipants and identification of the "power" (i.e., control over either
positive incentives such as funding rewards or negative sanctions such as
budget cutbacks and the removal of uncooperative bureaucrats) to encour-
age cooperation and immediate follow through on commitments. Third,
there must be some type of institutionalized process which: formalizes
the commitment and responsibilities of participants and creates an on-
going free flow of communication among the significant parties involved.
A key purpose of coordination is to harmonize bureaucatic
relations, activities, and objectives within and between governmental
units to improve the performance of the government in the delivery of
services. Consequently, effective coordination requires some formal
procedure (e.g., task force structure) for putting people who need to be
talking together in a position of having to talk to one another.
Furthermore, they must be obliged to recognize their areas of
mutual interest and conflict. Emphasis on the coordinative function Of
the task force process should produce a plan for integrating common inter-
ests and objectives, and a procedure for negotiating differences. Such a
plan should strongly reflect the fact that a crucial factor in the success
of the coordination process is the attitude of both the agency administra-
tors and the key career civil servants who must carry out the new
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directives at federal, state, and local levels. They must all share a
commitment to implementing the reforms or new approach. Also the chief
administrator or some centralized power authority (e.g., task force
leader) must have at their disposal the power to ensure that the projects
submitted are given a fair review. Most especially the administrators
must make it clear to key staff (i.e., project review officers) that they
must give priority support to the coordinative process and the projects
submitted. Any entities (agencies or individuals) that will not accept
such requirements should be bypassed in some way in setting up the initial
coordinative process and project approval systems. Interagency
coordination mechanisms, if developed and used effectively, can provide
disadvantaged groups with the basic power equalizing tools for combatting
and overcoming bureaucratic inertia, structural fragmentation, and the
administrative limits placed on the full utilization of federal programs
to solve contemporary problems. 3 4 6 But, it must be remembered that it is
the "power" and human motivation marshalled behind the process which
Ciotates how automatically and successfully the implementors (i.e.,
career civil servants) of coordination reforms will translate plans and
pol icy into action.
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LIST OF CABLE-READY AREAS
APPENDIX B
INITIAL PLACES IDENTIFIED AS CABLE-READY
LO'JISIAA
Excellent
1. Homer
2. Grambling
3. Lake Providence
4. Cooper Road
5. Scotlandville
6. Jeanerette
7. Tallulah
Good
1. St. Martinril le
2. Minden
3. Donaldville
4. Winnsboro
5. Covington
MISSISSIPPI
Excellent
1. W. Gulfport
2. Charleston
3. Hazelhurst
4. Canton
Good
1. Hol.ly Springs
NORTH CAROLINA
Excellent
1. Tanabora
2. Edenton
M'I CjI GAN
1. Highland Park
2. Benton Central
3. Muskegan Heights
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SOUIII CAROLINA
1. Laurcns
2. Camden
3. Chester
4. CIinton
5. Shannontown
6. alterboro
OHIO
1. East Cleveland
2. Lincoln Heights
ILLINOIS
1. West End
MISSOURI
1. Kinlock
GEORGIA
1. Covington
ARKANSAS
1. Marianna
2. Warren
3. W. Memphis
TEXAS
1. Marshall
2. Terrell
3. Hitchcock
4. Prairie View
TENNESSEE
1. Covington
2. Humboldt
3. Franklin
VIRGINIA
1. South Boston
2. Franklin
ALABAMA
1. Lafayette
2. Roanoke
3. Union Springs
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FLORIDA
1. Gif ford
2. Dlray Beach
3. Mmhis
4. Palmetto
5. Browcrdale
6. Goulds
7. Florida City
8. Richmond Heights
9. Bunche Park
10. Browns Village
11. Perrire
12. Dania
TEXAS
1. Robstown
2. San Marcos
COLORAO
1. Thornton
2. Greeley
ARI ZONA
1. Glendale
2. Cosa Grande
CALIFORNIA
1. Alum Rock
2. Corona
3. Qhino
4. Colton
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WWCC LOAN APPLICATION
PROJECT INFORMATION CARD StatoiIWisconsin
County(s):
Trempealeau
0
-
.0
S0
S0
-4
Li
I
1eJscrpton o ac ty an se 169 a
This loan will be used to construct a cable t.v. system to serve residents in
B communities; 8 public schools and arochial schools.
Special benefits or comment: The schools will use the system
to transmit special educational programs between one
or more of the schools. This is the first phase of a
county wide system which is being planned and will even
Previous FHA loans & grants for project offer services to rural
(amount, year): residents as well.
J.
~'UA~m.
(Signatura - Official Forwardin
Date Rec'd at IF 1
News release drafted:
Date: I/e/7 $C By:
-,ually
Release to Liaison:
Date: 0i /7 By:p
USDA-FHA
Form FHA 071-1 (Rev. 12-21-73)
Date to IF Staff: Date 440.1 or 449-14 to be Sent: Type of Facility:
September 25, 1974 October 4, 1974 Cable t.v. system
Name of Association or Organization: 1 roft
Western Wisconsin Communications Cooperative M Non-profit 0 Pubbe
Name or Governing Body Head: Title:
Mr., Gerhard Nilsestuen President
Mailing Address of Governing Body Head:
625 West Main Street, Arcadia, Wisconsin 54612
Amount of FHA Loan $ 11238,000 .Repayment Period 15 Years
Amount of FHA Grant S Interest Rate 5 Percent
i~ ivu fv~i .. fli... d. i
4S
No. users (or Rental Housing :U sp -v
-)
a-
.41
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APPENDIX D
LIST OF TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS
APPENDIX D-1
NATIONAL RURAL CABLE TASR FORCE
FEDERAL AGENCIES
Agency
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Louis F. Laun
Deputy Administrator
Small business Administration
1441 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20416
(202) 382-3021
Mr. Connie Mack Higgins
Associate Administrator for
Minority Enterprise
Small Business Administration
1441 L Street, N.W., Room 1010
Washington, D.C. 20416
(202) 382-3021
Mr. Warren Boyd
Small Business Administration
1441 L Street, N.W.
Room 1010
Washington, D.C. 20416
(202) 382-4907
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Frank B. Elliot
Administrator
Farmers Home Administration
Room 5433
14th & Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D. C. 420250
(202) 447-7967
Mr. Judd Hanson
Community Facilities Loan Division
Farmers Home Administration
Dept. of Agriculture, Room 5427
South Building
Washington, D.C. 20250
(202) 447-7667
OFFICE 0? :INORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
I". Alex Armendaris
Director
Office of Minority Business Enterprise
Department of Commerce
14th & E Streets, N.W., Room 5053
Washington, D.C. 20230
(202) 967-2654
Mr. Charles Stein
National Coordinator for Business Development
Office of Minority Business Enterprise
14th & E Streets, N.W., Room 5717
Washington, D.C. 20230
(202) 967-3936
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Jeff Cahill
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Devel.
Department of Commerce
14th & E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230
(202) 967-4067
Mr. William Henkel, Jr.
Deputy Assistance Secretary for Operations
Economic Development Administration
Departent of Commerce
14th & E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230
(202) 967-3081
Mr. Stephen Dunne
Business Development Section
Economic Development Administration
Depar=ent of Commerce
14th & E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230
(202) 967-2607
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Federal Agencies
Page 2
OFFICE OF MINORITY BUSINESS - REGIONAL OFFICES
Atlanta
Mr. Charles McMillan
Regional Director
Office of Minority Business Enterprise
Suite 505
1371 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
(404) 526-5091
Mr. Bill Brewster
Construction Specialist
Office of Minority Business Enterprise
Suite 505
1371 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
(404) 526-5091
Dallas
Mr. Henry Zuniga
Regional Director
Office of Minority Business Enterprise
1412 Maine Street
Suite 1702
Dallas, Texas 75202
(214) 749-7581
I
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APPENDIX D-2
NATIONAL RURAL CABLE TASK FORCE
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
ORGANIZATIONAL HEADS
Mr. John G. Gloster
President
Opportunity Funding Corporation
2021 K Street, N.W., Suite 701
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 833-9580
Mr. John Brown, Jr.
Director
SEASHA
P.O. Drawer 1080
Tuskegee Institute
Tuskegee, Alabama 36088
(205) 727-2340
REPRESENTATIVE
Mr. Edward Hayes
Consultant
Opportunity Funding Corporation
2021 K Street, N.W., Suite 701
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 833-9580
Mr. David Vinson
SEASHA
P.O. Drawer 1080
Tuskegee Institute
Tuskegee, Alabama
(205) 727-2340 -
36088
Mr. Charles 0. Prejean
Executive Director
Federation of Southern Cooperatives
P.O. Box 95
Epes, Alabama 35460
(205) 652-9676
Mr. Charles Bannerman
Chairman of the Board
Delta Foundation, Inc.
P.O. Box 588
Greenville, Mississippi
(601) 335-5291
38701
Rev. A.J. McKnight
President
Southern Cooperative Development Fund
1006 Surrey Street
P.O. Box 3885
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(318) 232-9206
Mr. Edward Infante
Vice President of Marketing
National Economic Development Association
3807 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800
Los Angeles, California 90010
(213) 388-1131
Mr. Ramon Tyson
Federation of Southern
Cooperatives
P.O. Box 95
Epes, Alabama 35460
(205) 652-9676
Ms. Sandra Rosenblith
(representing Delta Foundation)
Responsive Management Group
Suite 914-A
1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-4533
Mr. Howard Boutte
Southern Cooperative Dev. Fund
1006 Surrey Street
P.O. Box 3885
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(318) 232-9206
Mr. Nick Aguirre
National Economic Dev. Association
3807 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800
Los Angeles, Calfiornia 90010
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ORGANIZATIONAL HEAD
Mr. Raul Yzaguirre
National Council of La Raza
1025 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 659-1251
Mr. Juan Gutierrez
Director
Interstate Research Associates
2001 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 333-4900
Mr. M. I. Foster
Director
Division of Navigation Development
and Regional Studies
Tennessee Valley Authority
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902
(615) 637-0101
REPRESENTATIVE
Mr. Raul Yzaguirre
Mr. Juan Gutierrez
Mr. Avon Rollins
Minority Economic Development
Economic Research Staff
Division of Navigation Development
and Regional Studies
Tennessee Valley Authority
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902
(615) 637-0101
Mr. Joseph F. Brooks Mr. Joseph F. Brooks
Executive Director
Emergency Land Fund
799 Fair Street, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30314
(404) 758-5506
Mr. John Duncan, Director
Mid-West Piedmont Area
Business Development Organization, Inc.
Plaza South, 623 Waughtam Street
Winston-Salem, N.C. 27107
(919) 784-7970
Mr. John Duncan
APPENDIX E
CONGRESSIONAL RURAL CAUCUS
Congrtsgs of tbe EAniteb btateg
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
JOH BERGLAND (D--inn) *otg of R FRANK 0. TSUTRASJOHN BRECKIN RIDGE (O-Ky) ~ ~~DRCO
ED JONES (D-Tenn) DIRECTOR
GILLIS LONG (D-Lat 309 MOUSE ANNEX BUILDINGGUNN McKAY (-Utah) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 CAROL J. FORGESCHARLIE ROSE (0-NC)LEACONL
DON YOUNG (R-Alaska) AREA CODE 202 225-500 LEGAL COUNSEL
SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL RURAL CAUCUS 41575-53
The CONGRESSIONAL RURAL CAUCUS was formally organized during July 1973
to insure the orderly growth and development of rural/nonmetropolitan are.s and the
plans for bringing together the maximum Federal, State, Local, and Non-Governmental
resources available to such areas.
As a Bipartisan Congressional voice for Rural Develop-ment and Agriculture,
the CRC became immediately, and actively, involved in many subjects which resulted
in a total reevaluation to identify specific priorities.
M1ajor priorities for the 94th Congress include (1) Agririture, (2)
Implementation of the CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROT. ACT, (3) Public
Works, (4) Full implementation of the RURAL DEVELOr!ENT ACT (5) Rural Education,
6 ) Rural Health, (7) Rural Housing, (8) Rural Manpower, (93 Rural Transportation,
and (10) Rural Water and Sewer.
The CRC coordinates weekl7 discussions of the Rural Development Grcup
which is comprised of Uembers of the House and the Senate, their top staff members,
Non-Federal, and Non-Governmental representatives with national communications and
contacts reaching millions of people who are concerned with Rural Development and
Agriculture.
CRC policies are formulated by an elected Executive Committee. A full time
Director manages the administration and operations. Legal Counsel assumes legal
matters. Financial support is provided by CRC members. Voluntary staff assistance is
utilized on a selected basis. CRC staff reports to members and coordinating groups
and provides action recommendations in selected issue areas.
Many Federal, State, Local, and Non-Governmental representatives inquire
of the CPC for comments, suggestions, and advisory opinions related to Rural
Development and Agriculture. CRC also seeks such response from the excellent sources
available in Washington and throughout the Nation.
Such coordination and communication is absolutely essential so that
Legislative and Executive decisions result in beneficial and positive actions for
Rural America
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WORKING FOR RURAL AMERICA
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TASK FORCE AGREEMENT
APPENDIX F
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AND
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AND
OFFICE OF MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Whereas, rural cable television has potential to advance the economic and
social well being of rural Americans while simultaneonsly providing business
opportunities to rural residents; and
Whereas, minority Americans 'deserve an opportunity to participate equitably
in the development of viable business opportunities in the rural cable area;
Now, therefore, the signatories to this agreement covenant with each other
as follows:
1. To cooperate with each other in the design, active develop-
ment and implementation of a national minority Rural Cable
Television Program.
2. Within the restrictions of law and regulation under which
they each operate, and within the limitations of the resources
available to each, to provide all possible national and local
assistance to minority businessmen and user-groups qualified
to participate in the Program.
3. To notify regional, district, county, and/or local
representatives of the signatory agencies of the terms and
intent of this agreement, and to encourage active support
and assistance by such representatives in carrying out the
local aspects of the program.
To facilitate carrying out of this agreement, the signatories further agree:
1. To participate in and designace representatives to a National
Task Force, under the Chairmanship of a designated representative
of the Office of Minority Ecsincss Enterprise, for the purpoc
of planning, implementing and onitoring progress of the Program.
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2. To arrange representation on local development teams as
established by the National Task Force.
3. To encourage their representatives to cooperate fully with
the Cablecommunications Resource Center, an OMBE-funded
contractor, to the extent consistent with the demonstrated
views and needs of the affected local people.
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as in any way modifying the
legal or administrative authorities of the signatories or as amending any
scope of work of any contractor or grantee organization funded in whole or
in part by any of the signatories.
For the purposes of this agreement, the definition of minority business
is that provided in Executive Order #11625.
Frank B. Elliott
Administrator
Farmers Home Administration
Department of Agriculture
Cuis F. Laun
Deputy Administrator
Small Business Administration
Jeff Cah 1
Deputy A sistant Secretary for
Economic Development
Department of Commerce
Alex Ar/nendaris
Director
Office of Minority Business Enterprise
Department of Commerce
Date
Date
Date
Date
A
APPENDIX G
TASK FORCE ACHIEV10ENTS
APPENDIX G
SLMMA.RY OF MAJOR ACIE7VEEN-TS
Rural Strategy: A New Development Approach
+ Identified and researched collected data on 105 cable ready areas in
small town communities out of a pool of some 500 cities
+ Identified the FA as a key federal agency that list cable TV as a
fundable enterprise under its loan and grant programs
+ Collected and analyzed data on Cooperatives as a optimal model for
rural cable development
+ Developed and devised a large scale rural cable strategy. and planning
guide
+ Developed a special array of visual information stimuli (i.e. charts,
information packets, 3D model of a cable system, samples of trunks,
feeder and drop cable, etc.) as an educational package to enhance
community and organizational presentations on rural cable strategy
Held a National Rural cable development planning session between a
number of regional community economic development organizations and
federal agencies
+ Established a working relationship with regional comunity economic
development organization to help organize local comunities. These
groups include FSC, SEASHA, NEDA, DF, ELF, NUL, OFC and La Federacion
De Organizacion Del Valle
+ Worked with 0MBE to organize and form a National Rural Cable Development
Task Force made up of regional com munty economic development organizations
and federal agencies.
+ Made on-site visits to 42 "cable ready" rural communities to
substantiate and expand upon in-house collected data as well as to meet
with community leaders to begin c:able development process
+ Assisted organized cable ventures in identified. "cable ready" communities;
won 6 franchises - Espanola, Tuskegee, Grambling, Muskegan Heights,
Tallulah and Pine Ridge.
+ Made special presentation on rural cable strategy and task force TV:
a National Conference of NEDA officials meeting in ;Miami, a meeting
of the Southern Conference of Black Mayors in Louisiana, a National
Conference on Rural America in Washington before a group of Indians
+ Worked with OMBE to establish a first of its kind inter-agency agreement
between OME, EDA, SBA and FrA to support rural cable development
Initiated the dialogue between EDA and CRC which lead to EDA's decision
to contract CRC to perforn a preliminary investigation of telecormnunications
demonstration projects which holds some significance for rural develop:ent
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PRESS RELEASE
APPENDIX H 
___________
LN!TED STATES DEPARTMENT OFCOMMERCEOFFICE OFCI CMINORITY BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230
FOR RELEASE WEDNESDAY,
SEPTEMBER 24, 1975 MINORITIES SEEK OWNERSHIP
202/967-3024 MB 75-114 OF RURAL CABLE TV SYSTEMS
Potential cable television markets in rural communities in the South and
Southwest are being developed as part of a Government drive to assist minority
communities to secure ownership and operation of new cable TV systems.
Led by the Department of Commerce's Office of Minority Business Enterprise
(OMBE), the effort involves a just completed agreement among four Federal agencies.
The other three are the Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home Administration,
the Small Business Administration and the Commerce Department's Economic
Development Administration.
Technical assistance is being provided by the Cablecommunications Resources
Center of Washington, D.C. under a contract from OMBE. CRC conducts market
studies to identify "cable-ready" areas and locates minority community groups
interested in getting into the cable TV industry in these areas. CRC assists
the community groups to organize local investors, secure city franchises and
financing, and plan construction and system operations.
According to OMBE Director Alex Armendaris, CRC is currently working with
about 100 minority cable groups, mostly in urban areas. Twenty-eight of these
venture groups have obtained franchises and are now completing financing,
construction and system operation plans with CRC assistance.
Armandaris views the move into rural markets as an opportunity to further
develop minority business ownership while providing a much-needed community
service.
"There is a real need for cable TV in many small communities particularly
in the South and Southwest," Armendaris said. "Not only does this program
offer the potential for profitable minority business operations, but it can
also help to fill a community need by providing facilities for entertainment
and educational programming."
CRC researchers have already studied the cable market in some 500 rural
communities, identifying 75 of them as target market areas. Other CRC staffers are
in the process of working with city councils and other local officials to determine
the feasibility of setting up cable systems.
- more -
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According to Charles Stein, who manages national industry development
programs for OMBE, target areas are chosen on the basis of the need for
cable in terms of other broadcast services available and the economy of
a cable operation based on the density of housing and the potential number
of subscribers. Other considerations include a significant minority population
and minority influence in local governments, which have the final say in the
award of cable franchises.
A. typical minority-owned cable franchise is Televu, Inc. of Grants and
nearby Milan, New Mexico. With the help of CRC, owner Eddie L. Pena recently
secured a $100,000 loan from the Small Business Administration to expand
his cable service to meet increased customer demand. Pena has been operating
the system since 1973. He provides the 17,000 residents of these predominantly
Spanish-speaking mining communities with clear quality reception on the
four television stations from Albuquerque (75 miles away) and an additional
four channels from Los Angeles.
CRC Executive Director Charles Tate believes Eddie Pena's cable operation
shows the real opportunities for minorities in cable television. "He has
used local financing and hard work to provide his community with a needed
product and now is showing a handsome return for his effort."
Tate expects rural franchises which have recently gone to minorities
in three other states to do as well.
Oyate Vision of Pine Ridge, South Dakota, will provide this predominantly
Indian community of 3,700 with clear reception on four television channels in
addition to local affairs and news programming. Currently Pine Ridge residents
receive only one commercial television station clearly.
Headed by Fred Brewer, an Oglala Sioux, Oyate Vision becomes the second
Indian-owned cable franchise (the other is in Port Orchard, Washington).
Brewer has arranged for partial financing for his company through the Interior
Department's Indian Business Development Program and CRC projections indicate
that the firm will be profitable in its second year of operation.
Similar success is forcast for Tallulahvision, Inc. of Tallulah,
Louisiana, which according to CRC should be grossing some $86,000 in its
second year. Local citizens formed the company which will offer the pre-
dominantly black community of 9,500 reception of seven television channels and
a package of services including news and weather reports,and community announcements.
Residents of the town of Roosevelt City, Alabama, are also becoming involved
in a local cable franchise through the offer of stock shares in the Southeast
Alabama Self Help Association's (SEASHA) Community Cablevision Company. The
involvement of local residents in the ownership of the cable system is an
extension of the SEASHA organization's program of economic and community develonment
for rural residents in a twelve-county area of Alabama. The company has begun
to arrange for financial support from the Farmers Home Administration.
The Office of Minority Business Enterprise was established in the Department
of Commerce in 1969 to serve as the coordinating agency in the Federal Government
for minority business affairs and to work with the private sector in developing
minority-owned business enterprise.
- -
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-ABJI.ECOMMUNICATIONS RESOURCE CENThi
1900 L St.. N.W. suite 205 * Washinjgton, D.C. 20036
(202) 29-580
February 24, 1976
Mr. Eddie Pena
Tele-Vu, Inc.
P. 0. Box 757
Grants, N.M. 87020
Dear Eddie,
Enclosed, are two letters about the SBA loan. The first is to the
SBA office and is short and sweet - just saying you will comply. If they
raise further questions you can reply in more detail but I don't think you
.should go into more detail that might open up new areas of inquiry.
Enclosed, is a copy of the current SBA policy for your information.
You can comply with it with little problem. However, we are actively seeking
at the top levels an improvement of this policy; but we do not know when this
will be made.
Secondly, it is important to note several points if SBA raises the
3500 subscriber issue to have local origination. 1) The FCC has rescinded
its requirement that cable operators do L.O. 2) Operators with 3500 subs-
cribers need only have equipment available for others to do programming and
3) Under FCC definition it seems extremely unlikely that you will have 3500
subscribers, because the Grants and Milan systems are considered seperate
systems by the FCC and therefore the Grants system alone would need 3500
subscribers.
Also, enclosed is a draf t of a letter to your Senators and Congressman.
I suggest you communicate with them and get them involved.
If we can provide additional help on this loan, please let us know.
Sincerely,
Gncme
Enclosures
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Draft
February 24, 1976
SBA
Albuquerque
Dear
Confirming our phone conversation of February 1976, Tele-Vu,
Inc., will comply with the SBA origination restrictions as a condition of
receiving final approval of the SBA direct loan.
Sincerely,
Eddie L. ?ena
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February 23, 1976
Dear Senator:
I would like to bring you up to date with the difficulties and por-
treatment my company is receiving at the hands of the Small Business Admini:rno
As we discussed in our recent meeting, my cable television system is seeking
$100,000 loan from SBA to expand cable service to the many new residents of Crant:
and Milan.
The package was submitted in June ? , 1975 to the Albuquerque office.
I was informed it was accepted on (date) by M4r. (name)
and (title) . He said that as soon as funds were allocaced to the
Albuquerque office, my loan would be dispeised. He assured ma and representari-.res
from your office that no problems existed with the loan and as soon as money
was available, I would received the loan.
However, on February , 1976, 1 received a call from !r.
(name) (title) , who informed me my company does not Cualif-Y 0or
an SBA loan.
My first reaction was why didn't th.e SBA office tell me anytime
within the last nine months. His response was that he believed that funds would
never be alloczted and therefore it was not necessary to evaluate the packaga!
Now that funds are available he examined the package. As a businessman, e
need new funds to expand my successful business. I have relied on SSA' s promineo
and statements in my planning. At least, had I had an honest 1ppraisal I would
have made alternat.ive plrns. This cavalier attitude cxpressed by the SBA haz
seriously jeopozdized my plans.
Mr (name) , informed me the reasons that SBA can not
loan money to a cable system :hat has local crigination or even a time and
channel. I informed him that we are not now and do not plan to do any progrnmmin1g.
The time and weather channel serves a valuable community function and provides
local announcements that many people rely on. I receive no revcnue from this
channel and wish to provide it as a community service. However, if required, :.he
company will cease operating it. I have stated this to SBA in the attached letter.
Senator (Congressmen) I will appreciate your assistance in assuring
that my company receives fair treatment with the SZA office and my loan application
can be processeu promptly. Futhermora, I would apprecinta your investigatica
into SBA's policy that discriminates against the cable celevision industry and
deprives my customers in Grants and Milan wth a valuable community service.
Thank you for your consideratiori.
Sincerely,
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EDA POLICY BULLETIN ON CABLE TV
APPENDIX J
c T EEconomic Devele;-~ ,anuMmmstration D recuires System
Sr rNo. 3-76
-r ~ ~ I a U > ective Data: 1/30/76
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE '4 Es Da 4
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AOMWNISTRAION Dsroy Date: 4 / 30/76
ELIGIBILITY OF CAB TELEVISION SYSTEM --
OPERATORS FOR EDA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
EDA's Business Development Manual states that:
In addition to the prohibitions stated in
P.L. 89-136, the Public Works and Economic
Development Act of 1965, as amended, the
following types of projects'are ineligible for
business development assistance: .
Newspapers, Publishing and Broadcasting firms .1/
This policy, which is also a policy of the Small Business
Administration, is based on the premise that it is not consistent
with the First Amendment for the U.S. Government to finance or
financially assist any private business enterprise that- entails
the propagation of opinion-moldin; ideas, regardless of the
nature of the ideas or the form in which they may be propagated.
In determining EDA's policy on assistance to cable television
operators, the question to be resolved is whether or not cable
television companies are broadcasting firms. SBA's 'Office of
Finance in its Opinion Digest No. 96 2/ concludes that if a
. cable television system has the capability of originating "live-
shows, even if they are only time and weather features, or if the
sys'tem's operators exercise selective judgment for programs
transmitted over its cables, then the system is a broadcastinc
firm and inelicible for SBA assis:ance.
Be ginning January 1 , 1976, the F;.eral Communications Commission
will require that operators of cale television systems with
3,500 or more subscribers have ec-.:pment available for local
production and presentation cf cablecast.programs. Furthermore,
l/ "IBusiness Development Manual, No. 41 - Chapter I,
January 19, 1974 (SN-223).
2/ "Opinion Digest," No. 96, parraphs 101 and 103,
February 24, 1975
B
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the FCC will require that such operators permit local non-
operator production and presentation of such programs.3/
Clearly, such systems will (and must) have the capabilT:.y o
originating live shows and thus would be ineligible for
assistance from SBA. -.-
Administration and Congressional positions expressed to date
on Federal support for the d~velopment of cable television
systems do not provide firm guidance for an EDA policy with
respect to all cable television system--operators. The state-
ments that have appeared 4/ indicate general support for tie
development of such systems in rural areas, particularly when
minority operators are involved. EDA's legal staff has found
no statements favoring development of such systems in urban
areas. . - - -.
Policv Statement: It is EDA' s positioh that cable television
systems with 3,500 or more subscribers (or the reasonable
expectation of. obtaining 3,500 or more subscribers) constitute
broadcasting firms, since they must have production capability
and must permit production and presentation of programs by
local non-operators. Accordingly, it is the Agency's policy
that such systems are not eligible for EDA business development
assistance.
EDA does not feel it necessary at this time to adopt a specific
policy on assistance to cable television systems with less
than 3,500 subscribers (or the reasonable expectation of having
less than 3,,500 subscribers).- Such cases will be decided on
individual merits. However, it is recognized that, in general,
such systems lack sufficient economic impact to warrant con-.
sideration for EDA assistance. They are basically automated
and provide little employment once service construction is
completed. - - -.- -
Ass:istant Secretart-
for Economic Development
3/ 47 CFR 76.253
4/ Guide to the Rural Development Act of 1972, Senate Subcommittee -
on rural Development, 93rd Congress, December 10, 1973, p.21;
agreement between EDA, FHA, and OIS3, August 1975-.; and Reoort
to the President, Cabinet Co'mittee on Cable Communicati.ons,
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GCG locn a
paksbrouhaha Z
- - ,in Wshi~io
By ED ZUCKERMAN
Post-Tribune Capital Bureau
and TOM STUNDZA
'P-T Business Editor
When the directors of Gary
Communications Group filed
last August for a $400,000 fed-
eral loan, they had no idea
the nation's first black-
owned cable television firm
would become the center of i
bureaucratic brouhaha in
Washington.
But GCG inadvertantly has
touched off an intensive
struggle between two agen-
cies within the U.S. Depart-
nient of Commerce:
V The Economic Devel-
opment Administration
(EDA), which dispenses fed-
eral funds to help create per-
manent jobs in economically
depressed areas.
V The Office of Minority
Business Enterprise
(OMBE), which assists
members of minority groups
enter business ventures.
GCG apparently has
stepped into a "gray zone"
between the two agencies be-
cause the firm is minority-
owned and Gary is on EDAS
list of areas eligible for as-
sistance.
Officially, the loan has
been denied by EDA on
grounds that the cable televi-
sion firm's proposals don't
create a suff icient number of
permanent jobs to justify
federal assistance. -
More importantly, in deny.
ing the loan. Wilmer D. Miz.
eli, Commerce's assistant
secretary for economic de-
velopment - thus, the EDA
chief - issued a regulation
which views cable television
operations as "broadcasting
facilities" and are automati-
cally ineligible for federal
funds bec;use the govern-
ment doesn't provide assist-
ance for newspaper, publish-
ing and media ventures.
But the EDA regulation
isn't just being protested by
OMBE. It also has been at-
tacked by the Federal Com-
munications Commission,
which says it, not the EDA,
determines what is and what
isn't a "broadcasting facih-
/YAnd, as the Small Business
Administration (SBA) and
the Farmers Home Adminis-
tration (FmHA) also are in-
volved in the development of
small and medium-sized ca-
ble television systems, they
are watching the dispute:
It now is believed that
Commerce Secretary Elliot
Richardson - who once
voiced support for programs
to promote minority owner-
ship of cable systems when
he was U.S. Department of
Health, Education and '%el-
fare secretary - will be re-
quired to settle the EDA-
OMBE dispute.
And, if he fails, because of
the other a-encies involved.
the matter iiltimately could
involve the White House Do-
mestic Council.
GCG openea for business
on Oct. 5, 1972, with S25A.k0/
in private inestment and a
$245,00 S' A 1:un throu~h
Gary Nationaank. Coin-
peting witn a 'eiveromnpT'er
Corp. suh.(Ii ary in operation
in Gary v 1'71), GC;
plaofid n u1ta m \il of ca-
bl;e in the .- y'., %dtown and
Ve S n'! re .,,I
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Continued fron Page 1
Due to what GCC Presi-
dent A. William Douglas
terms "capital-intensive
start-up and construction
costs." combined with com-
p e t i t i o n f r o m
TelePrompTer, the firm has,
operated for four fiscal years
"in the red." With the origi-
nal investment funds almost
gone, Douglas says GCG
needs $4S0.00) to buy out the
TeleProipTer operation -
and its 1,000 customers and
37 miles of East Side cable -
plus $430,000 to wipe out cor-.
porate debt - primarily to
area utilities Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. and Northern
Indiana Public Service Co. -
and insure operation in fiscal
1976 and 1977.
With $500,000 pledged by
CATV Development Corp. of
New York City, an invest-
ment brokerage house led by
Robert Liebauer, and several
of Liebauer's clients. GCG
officials applied for an EDA
loan to cover the remaining
$400,000. The loan was filed
in August of 1975 with nego -
tiations aided by Martin
Smith, president of Cable
Communications Consultants
of New York City.
But after months of nego-
tiations between GCG offi-
cers and EDA division chief.
tans, EDA chief Wilmer
"Vinegar Bend" Mizell is-
sued a regulation on Jan. 19,
effective Jan. 30, that effec-
tively denied the loan appl.i-
cation by stating:
"It is EDA's position that
cable television systems with
3,500 or more subcri-
bers...constitute broadcast-
ing firms (and) are not eligi-
ble for EDA business devel-
. opment assistance...Cable
television systems with less
than 3.500 subscribers...lack
sufficient economic impact
to warrant consideration for
EDA assistance."
Mizell, a former Republi-
can congressman better
known from his earlier ca-
reer as a professional base-
ball pitcher, acknowledges
his regulation means that ca-
bie systems are ineligible for
EDA loans no matter what
size they were.
The keystone of Mizells
ruling is his interpretation of
cable systems as "broadcast.
ing facilities." basing that
interpretation in a murky
collection of bureaucratic
regulations.
Recently, the FCC pro-
posed :. regulation requirng
cable !;ystems with more
than 3,300 rubscribers to rri-
ginale "live" pro~tramning
for their customers, even in
only time and w-:ather fea-
tures. The SBA, in turn. is-
sued a polcv contending tnat
cable systems irainidinting
equinment for "live'' ro-
cr1 'hr m iing 'econsid-
erd 'oroadcasun 'au' es
and therefor- i
cntsting facilities for u.se by
pubbec groups.
Speaking about Mizell's
decision to use the FCC regu.1
lation to stop EDA aid to ca. I
ble television firms, David
D. Kinsey. the FCC's chief.
cable television hureao,
says: "Basing such a 'brodi-
casting firm' classaficatinn
on our 'equipment :ivailabili-
ty rule' raises certain incon.
sistencies with FCC's poli.
cies regarding development
of cable television."
Kinsey adds he has 're.
quested" the EDA to "drop"
Mizell's regulation, but the
EDA has failed to compy.
Asked if the regulation was
a direct outgrowth of GCG's
application, an EDA of ficial.
who requests anonrymity.
says his answer would have
to be "an unqualified yes.
GCG's Douglas contends the
rejection of the loan is "a
racist act solely directed at '
GCG.
The EDA never has provid-
ed funds for media ventures
with the exception of a $708,-
000 loan in 1969 to an educa- -
tional television statior in
upstate New York for job
training opportunities.
But, the agency ;ast Au.
gust signed a written agree-
ment with the FmRA, an
agency of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agricultum, piedg-
ing financial assistance ior '
development of rural cable
systems.
"Mizeil's regulation co-
pletely negated that ag-te-
ment," says a knowicdge.
able source, who adds th:at
"EDA was not troubiea by
the ban on providirg ,ovtn-
ment assistance to broad-
casting facilities when it a
proved the agreement to ap-
prove loans for rural sys-
tems. I would -assume,
thereiore, there is no first
amendment difference b-
tween rural- and urban
areas."
. The federal agencies pro-
testing Mizell's reguation
contend there is a basic afi-
,erence between cable sys-
tems and broadcasting facth-
ties,
So does GCG's Douglas.
who says, "Broadcasting fa-
cilities operate over the puo-
lic airwaves to the at-lrge
public. But. cable systems
are not public. They do not
transmit through the public
airwaves. Rather, they are
closed systems transmit:ng
through telephone lines to
paying customers. That's a
big difference."
ft. 'oritnties that "20 w
Jobs for an innertty, minor.
ity-o%,ed 11m'n may not s-mrn
like iiuch to Mizell, but the
tmoortance of continuing o-
cr3tions of GCG is tied in
With helping soark an nsera]I
economic renewai for smail
and red:iurm-s'zed b.iness-
es in Gary.".
Dougias contends that
FVs r'!ctIon cf t oni l
.oca c.ons O''a a.r::rr
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APPENDIX L
EDA REPORT ON WATERTONN TV STATION PROJECT
APPENDIX L --
Satus 'R.port on the St. La renceVai e ucational Tclevision,i.'. C- a
EDA Project No. 01013CO'C
George T. Ka:rras, Direcr
Office of Public Works
On January 17 - 19 the followin -pcople were interviewed fcor
this report:
Richard Jones, General knager, Station TNE-1:N'I
Carmen Bocciolatt , Director, Ccmunity Action Planning
Council of Jefferson County, Tnc. (and staff)
Elwood Forrester, Superintendent, Second School District,
Jefferson County
James Higgins, General Manag.r, Watertown Daily Times
,and W-VNY (radio and TV station), former member of
the Board of T-ustcee of the St. Lawrence Valley
Educ ational Television
Irying Atlas, EdVcationi V Coordinator for the Bo'rds
of Cooperative Educatioa- Servi.ces of Jefferson,
Lewis and St. La-.7rence Courties
Arthur Mengel, ecutive Director, Black River-St. Lawrenca
Economic Developmnt Co=m-ission
Joseph Rcmola,'resident, Black River-St. Lawrcnce ccncmic
Developrent Commission
Thomas Guihan, Assistant District School Superintenden ,
St . Lawrcnce Countv
Francis Ahmsteed, Member Boerd of Trustees, St. Lawrence
Valle Educationl Telvision
Following is a status repc-c: on the Station, its operations,
programs and effec on ~..c -Pc -iver-St. Lawrence Economic
Development District.
A. The Station'S Ccerr.:io
1. F cilitie 1 s
Statin - ?E--:: began ooverating in July 1971, several
ce av occurred -:y .---- :~ --- - t- -- - -
of the tran-.~it:-r t-a'x was blown over. All the
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facilities, including two transmitter towers an-d
buildings and stC io and trn-mission ec*uipment are
Io cMClete. Th Saion is presently leasing office
and studio spacc cro. a. commSrca1 station.
2. Range of Service
With its two transmitter toWCrs the Staticn's broadcast
range covers the four counties in the Black River-St.
Lawrence Economic Development District, using two UHF
channels. The Station has been running a campai.gn to
explain to area residcnts how to tune in the appropriat
UHF channel, since this is the first UHF channel in the
area. The County Ez:tension Service also has been
advertising these instructions. in addition almost al
of the populated centers o' the District have access
to Cable TelevisiLon which cnables its users to receive
the Station oh a VMF station as well.
a. Staff
The Station is run by a staff of 13 full time eoyee
Seven of these employee L ware previously unempoyed an
have been trained as technicions, program assistants,
receptionists. etc.
4. Proeram Sources
As an interim measure uni 'he Station is able to
receive programs i lfrom the national educatione
and public netw"rbs broadcasts are being receive fr
the EV staticn in Syracuse. Most of these broadcasts
are tape-d s-) t ertown station can arrange
own progr scnthe first si:-. months o
broadcastig al:oc2 al Om h Station s progras 
been from natioa -T, only a limited number of
lccally prcduc ed br oadcas p rams. The Station 
general manager epan t t has taken much mcre
time to get otcrating smco:hlIy than
been anticipated and .hat so far it has not boon
possible to esta-li:any local programs. This firs:
ycar has been out technial -robl
pro.o2in :.0o .. :at the public, nd
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aco-r~lgsu ~+r 22-- --- vy legisla-ors, school
districts, etc. As these nroblems are worked Out,
the staff pla--: a cre tine to work on loc.!.:y
oriented an" produce'-. roprn-a.
B. The Prorams
1. Present
The daytime schEd-. le, from 9:00 A.M. till 4:00 P.M.
consists of in-school programs selected by the Count-es
Boardsof coraive Edcational Services. The Stati on
has prepared Teacher Guides for these programs w:ich
are provided to a 11he mber schools. The public
school e-ucatio.JI. -roer-, will be further discussecd
below.
The eveni-ng prog -s, r-nning from 4:00 to 11:00 P.1.
have, for the most .part. . en selected from nat-icna.
edu-uan - c networs. The fo glocal
programs have also been broa6cast during the first
six months of the Station s existence:
-a live, two-hour scussion on the issue of hvirg
a charter :or: of Coun':. er cC.
-a concert givee by a local gro in Watertown.
-a -eries of t - c~ ograms for volunteer ::rcmen.-
c.. - o ':ate  h the volunteer firemen s associaz.c
of the four co-:ties-
-a cOm-Dter sc-ce course coordinated with St.
L 'rec Uni:---: - an r efrson Community Co.'-ege-Law,.rence Zr--  jef-c o c- I- -
Particiart s wo pssd a test at the end of the
sessions were to recei1:ve credit from St. Lawrence
University. ....- ,the University began to Inns;-
tate and 5 - not dcicod if it can g:.ve cryc:..
even though the course : s c.
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In addition to the locally broadcat programs, the
Station has also COnductcd special campaigns to
publicize nat:nn. programs which wou'd be of
particular interest- to area residents, such as a
series on elfare and on on Drug Abuse.
2. Immediate Plans
Several locally produced programs are planned for the
next few montns:
-Starting on Februanry 4 a series of one-hour shows
called "North Country Profiles" will be broadcast
every otner week. These shows are being produced and
directed by a gro-- of local high school students, with
the helo of the Station's staf. The students ave
picked thcir sen program topics including :.ocal
insurance men dficGssing no-fault insuranc, Local
assemblymen s reactions to Governor ocefeller s
State of the State nmssac, an interview with a c.st
official. 'ho: to buy a used car," and i
Mohawk Ind ian high school s tudents.
-Two series of o-rams planned for this sDring
the Cooperative on Agents from the four counties
are a photography course fcir 4 Club members, and a
Consumer Education Program.
-Local Chambers of Cornerce have been contacted
. .-- 
- ~ s, en pr - -am to bregard to ese---- -- -t-- se Pra----
broadcast inA-'ri - or :my. The purpose of :his series
would be to im:v: sazls mothods, public rolaticns,
etc. of local stcres. restaurmts and 3-otels in the
hopes of raisin: the atcractiveness and hooptality
of the area and icrensing sumer tourist trae-
3. .uture Plans
The Station is -- cO  a-- fcr -- 47 oalt'
-Ind adult educr.-c pr' r Seyer sua pro-;rms
-i- to-- i - t cation are no lonr
... Oa S ---.. M -:- -i y o .t e A (.lso,, ha -b cr c- .:x
v ac:o ac'' Oc tt n 'e
Yor' C)ie S S 0 n~~ :n tC L2 L
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(taking with it a maj or- finn c;il sorce Cxpectcd
for the Sation)-
The Station is lookir.g forward to making t'.se of an
adult learning prograM series wnicn is b--n d -- -
by a national network.. Also the State U ivers-it-
New York has a new pla' for an "Open Univrsit i
campus centers. cO*:_----S by ma;i television, etc.
should have a major role in this plan.
For future prograrming ideas the Station also expects
to be -receiving incrased direction from the Program
Committee of th St. J -ence Valley Educational T1 s
Board of Trustees.
C. Relat ion ith Pu'lic Sol
The public schozl" in the Economic Development Distri t havlong Su:ote c cS L -cncc Valley Educational . SC-
tnents a -- e^?- e-resented on the Board of :rus-
superintenden--s e 
sE
and o' ct ave financial support to tn
Station even oe ore - m-rs- -o
.- 1 Ychool districts in a county are
In New., Yo--: . - -
7-e1. ,- -:e- - a '"'.tveEdcationn.1 SevceS,
organized une~. -.. - a~VCSrvC(B-.. , he of the four count es :n he(ES) .The --..(BOh-O'i t-mC EducationalEDD have _oetM_ --
Telei eCv-L s o -- - - ~-.rth county, Franklin, has
-o-t, lan to organize another
noL vet pat ct-o ,
ETV station- in cnn Adirondack EDD. 
icweve
since . ca - e 6ized, it is proba e
Franlin--rest of the rBack rver-Franan oun - - 7
St . Lawrence : r -c-- -- x- -ear
TheET n-sao v ree ~ eonsibia for all th-Th  -. L Ccor -. Lac -0b-li s- - s- . nd St. Lawrence Cou--ep~ublic schoo-cs.. ---
and for actin- - s a n t S So far hShas -il - ,- these schools, Dro -o -has m&nviv-e------
the program: an-cunical azcts of hai: 
the schois e.ecause th'e pcast si- months na
bn ie- -o trc3cwcaL problems as well as
~rcmctiLons, S'a - s tr:ct tcy have not
been a'toe to ec the schc&.s ~
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S~c:~. sChz. S~ c aC.. Z c t chr hc~:e ,32
c~~~~~~ e re s:'o -crcs.- 1- ~~ s cc
thes :he :,.en -:rcv' :'C' c: :: -"-- -
Sh sco~ :-- -t
hC CCf z~: h : a Szude i 3ec:c r-z: c:.-zt c ;-
c n~ n: c; sz .S F -,a: e . tc c
th u.As ac:. a . S r~ r ~ ~ e a c
~~~~~ds on 0 : , SuS -S .
S ac co~~h:~ i.: f. 0'a.i:-----
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D. The EDA Th'net Poruli -
EDA approve this prcaezt bjsod on the -oss-b-'ties of
a public telvisio sta:ion scrying the unemployed and
-r17 o c Di---c ty provic no v1cast.on-.t .
nd edc ,tin ----- - -. 1 s reduicin the culeural
deprivatio - of t ara. Vhile all of the tion s
activities to date cmigt be said to at least indirectly
fulfill these purposcs, the ptCential for more directlv
S-A's Itargc - aion has not yet been ful -filec
It seems that the cruc-af :actor in ete--n the
.2~~~~~~~~ C .=4oo-en o n - -
realizaiofn of this o will be the -Pr--ra --
of the St. Lawrence ley Educational TV' s ooard of
Trustees. As descr in the project proposal this
commie ce wi n -rercsentat.ves from the District s
CAF orcani zations, s. - -SndustrcS, State emplo nent
s -rvcs aeat a otc. As of this month, theservices, nect -cn--:.
Program Committ s is st satinr up and beginning to
recruit members. -- .t 
he ki-o
who are rec01itod, e-ezs o' tne cormictee, and
the nature of the pro r m direction given the Station 
s
staf, as well as -h stbility to carry it out, wi-
determine the succes c tre Station as an A proect.
The o niv Ac irn - in Concil (CAPC) of JeffersonThe Comnmu i ,. A c -- -- - .
County was one c: n.-- n aons mentioned in botn the
-Ciea- - t-- Act-on Prc3 -. nicnproject -- -~~O - ..
would act- -:- direction o the Stazion
progr ams. Sine - - - - - --- e written, the Ieaders
of CAPC has cn - d. - - has not vet beendbut would very Muh
like to be nv . . stf feels -- cre s a erat
need for a parti cularly one s
ao a - aoblin a a or the elcerly. 
Oth-.er
corn-- 0eaer- -t need for the Stat on
to have local r ccific area problems,
especially emp tes.
E. Role in The con mii
The Director an. -- -- the Black River-St. Lawrence
Econo-- 'en C is.o cons-ifer ne C, .ation-nc on l-..- a----- -- -to
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0
4. A year from n ,i can :e better determin-ed how the
project is f-.liAlig;th activities described in
nu:7er 3.
Daryl Bl.aden '
Program Assistant
4
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Bill Douglas, GCG, to Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce. Summary
Memorandum re Historical Developments of GCG/EDA Project. 27
January 1976.
*Arranged chronologically.
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Charles Stein, Task Force Chairman and OMBE Representative, to Elliot
Richardson. Memorandum re GCG Problems with EDA. 27 January 1976.
David Kinley, FCC Cable TV Bureau Chief, to Wilmer D. Mizell. 29 January
1976.
Charles Stein to Walter L. Sorg, OMBE Assistant Director for National
Program. Memorandum re Federal Funding/Guarantee of Cable Systems.
30 January 1976.
. To Walter L. Sorg. Memorandum re Major Problems Created for GCG
by EDA. 30 January 1976.
Cable Communications Resource Center. Quarterly Report to OMBE. 30
February 1976.
Rep. Parren J. Mitchell (D-Md.) to Wilmer D. Mizell. EDA Mishandling of
GCG Project. 24 March 1976.
J. Clay Smith, FCC Cable TV Bureau Chief, to Robert S. Milligan, Director,
Office of Policy Development and Coordination, Department of Com-
merce. Objections to EDA Policy Statement Against Cable TV. 15
April 1976.
James R. Hobson, FCC Cable TV Bureau Chief, to John T. Wettach, SBA
Associate Administrator for Finance and Investment. Objections to
EDA and SBA Policy Statements. 12 July 1976.
John W. Eden, Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Development, to
Gary Communications Group. EDA Reexamination of Project. 19 July
1976.
Gil Mendelson, CRC Deputy Director, to Reginald Dunn, CRC Director of
Market Development. Memorandum re CRC staff discussion with EDA
Counsel. 29 July 1976.
To Reginald Dunn. Memorandum re Minutes of Interagency Task Force
Meeting. 29 July 1976.
. To Reginald Dunn. Memorandum re July 29, 1976 Task Force Meeting.
30 July 1976.
Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Commerce, to Elliot
Richardson. Memorandum re Problems Relating to Federal Financial
Assistance for Cable-TV Systems and Proposal to Form a Cable TV Task
Force. 10 August 1976.
Memorandum for Heads of Executive Department and Agencies: Administration
of Federal Aid System. 9 September 1977. Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, 12 September 1977.
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Interviews
Austin, Grant. Staff Officer, U.S. Small Business Administration, Wash-
ington, D.C. 12 April 1976.
Boyd, Warren. Loan Officer, U.S. Small Business Administration, Wash-
ington, D.C. May 1976.
Burns, George. Legal Adviser, Cablecommunications Resource Center, Wash-
ington, D.C. September 1975/18 February 1976/November 1979.
Dunn, Reginald. Director of Market Development, Cablecommunications
Resource Center, Washington, D.C. 15 October 1975/December
1975/March 1976.
Edwards, Jim. Administrative Assistant, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Economic Development Administration, Washington, D.C. November
1975/March 1976/October 1976.
Hoy, Tom. Public Information Officer, National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association, Washington, D.C. 23 April 1975.
Irons, Brenda. Staff Lawyer, Federal Communications Commission-Cable TV
Bureau, Washington, D.C. February 1976.
Long, Art. Loan Supervisor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Devel-
opment Administration, Washington, D.C. October 1979.
Mendelson, Gil. Deputy Director of Market Development, Cablecommuni-
cations Resource Center, Washington, D.C. March 1976.
Papermaster, David. Loan Officer, U.S. Department of Commerce Economic
Development Administration, Washington, D.C. October 1979/November
1979.
Sanders, Ed. Field Officer-Chicago, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic
Development Administration, Washington, D.C. November 1975.
Stein, Charles. National Coordinator for Business Development, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Office of Minority Business Enterprise,
Washington, D.C. 30 January 1976.
Smith, J. Clay. Chief of FCC Cable TV Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission-Cable TV Bureau, Washington, D.C. April 1976.
Stone, Larry. Special Assistant to Chief of Cable TV Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission-Cable TV Bureau, Washington, D.C.
February 1976.
Tyson, Ramon. Field Officer-Epes; Alabama, Federation of Southern Cooper-
atives, Washington, D.C. 4 February 1976.
